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INTRODUCTION 
IMS is a "financial services company1" in the loosest sense of the term. It invests in 
litigation claims by paying for surgeries it arranges for plaintiffs who have claims in litigation 
and charges them a substantial premium. Before investing in the claims of its clients, IMS 
investigates the merits of the claim including evaluating liability, determining the existence 
of liability insurance and obtaining a medical opinion from a doctor it has under contract to 
support medical causation and necessity for surgery. IMS not only finances the surgeries, 
it contracts with a doctor to perform the surgery at a location determined by IMS so that it 
can control the costs. The premium IMS charges to finance these surgeries is described by 
it as an amount which reflects "the nature and value of the financial services provided to 
Client, including risk of capital loss and similar exposure undertaken by [IMS] on behalf of 
Client."2 IMS primarily uses one orthopedic surgeon for this purpose and pays the surgeon 
handsomely and repeatedly for these evaluations and surgeries. IMS' s finance charge for 
arranging for the surgery and paying for it is secured by a lien on any 'judgment, settlement 
or verdict" the client recovers in their "claim for bodily injury damages"3• 
1
"Financial services company'' is the term IMS uses to describe itself in the 
disclosure it provides to its clients. (See Addendum to Response of Nesbitt to 
Intermountain Surgical's Petition for Writ of Extraordinary Relief, at NESBITT 0036) 
2IMS Disclosure of Financial Services. Addendum to Response of Nesbitt to 
Intermountain Surgical's Petition for Writ of Extraordinary Relief, at NESBITT 0036. 
3IMS Service Provider Lien and Authorization at NESBITT 0036, in Addendum to 
Response of Nesbitt to Intermountain Surgical's Petition for Writ of Extraordinary Relief. 
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The reason IMS should be subject to discovery is because its finance charge is 
cleverly disguised as a medical bill by its use of CPT codes and medical terminology. Its 
clients, the plaintiffs in litigation, use IMS' s charges, or estimates in this case, as evidence 
of their economic loss for past or future medical expenses. Because the finance charge is 
two or more times the reasonable and customary charge for the medical services IMS 
finances, the use of the IMS client invoice/estimate by plaintiffs as proof of the reasonable 
and necessary medical expenses incurred raises questions about the legitimacy of the IMS 
client invoice/estimate as evidence of the reasonable and customary medical expense for the 
surgery. In addition, the way plaintiffs and the IMS contract surgeon are introduced together 
with the mutually beneficial relationship between the surgeon and IMS, raises questions 
about the objectivity of the surgeon's surgery recommendations. 
This is a Tier 3 case arising from a low speed and minimal property damage three 
vehicle accident which occurred on June 27, 2011. After three and half years, Ignacio had 
incurred approximately $11,000 in medical expenses to treat what he claimed were injuries 
suffered in the June 27, 2011 accident. His wife, Esther, had incurred approximately $12,000 
in medical expenses over the same period of time to treat what she claimed were injuries 
suffered in the June 27, 2011 accident4. In December 2014, their lawyer referred both 
Ignacio and Esther to IMS which arranged for a medical evaluation by its contract doctor, 
4See Plaintiffs Rule 26 Initial Disclosures dated May 16, 2016 at NESBITT 0012 -
13 in Addendum to Response of Nesbitt to Intermountain Surgical's Petition for Writ of 
Extraordinary Relief. 
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Dr. Kade T. Huntsman, who saw both Ignacio and Esther once on December 15, 2014. After 
this one examination, Dr. Huntsman recommended multiple level cervical fusion surgeries 
for both Ignacio and Esther and opined in his report that the "need for surgery is due to the 
motor vehicle accident." Three days later on December 18, 2014, IMS provided a statement, 
on its Intermountain Surgical letterhead, to Ignacio advising him that it estimated the cost of 
the surgery Dr. Huntsman recommended for him to be $75,000. On the same date IMS 
provided a statement, on its Intennountain Surgical letterhead, to Esther advising her that it 
estimated the cost of the surgery Dr. Huntsman recommend for her to be $65,000. Although 
Dr. Huntsman told both Ignacio and Esther that they needed the surgery "as soon as possible" 
due to the nature of their conditions, neither went under the knife immediately and neither 
has had the surgery as of this date, nearly six and a half years after the June 27, 2011 
accident. However, both Ignacio and Esther have used the surgical estimates as part of the 
computation of damages contained in their Rule 26 Initial Disclosures5 and have hired Dr. 
Huntsman as their "retained expert" to provide a causation opinion to support their claim that 
the surgeries are necessary because of the auto accident at issue and to support their claim 
5 See Plaintiff's Rule 26 Initial Disclosures dated May 16, 2016 at NESBITT 0012 -
13 in Addendum to Response of Nesbitt to Intermountain Surgical's Petition for Writ of 
Extraordinary Relief. 
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that the surgical cost estimates from IMS are the reasonable and customary charges for the 
surgeries they ardently believe they need because Dr. Huntsman recommended it6• 
If the jury believes that the Buenrostros require expensive, risky and complicated 
spinal surgeries as a result of the relatively minor auto accident in which they were involved 
on June 27, 2011, the potential financial exposure from a verdict for damages increased 
significantly because of the involvement of IMS in this case. It is not only relevant, but 
logical, to question ( 1) the business model/plan of IMS to determine if it has acted as a 
medical facilities provider or as a finance company in this case; (2) the factual foundation 
for the estimated costs of surgery provided to the Plaintiffs by IMS to determine if the 
estimate represents reasonable and customary medical expenses or collateral source evidence 
about how the Buenrostros intend to pay for their medical expenses; and (3) the contractual 
and financial relationship between IMS and Dr. Huntsman who provided causation opinions 
and surgical recommendations at the request of IMS and who has been designated as a 
"retained expert" by the Buenrostros to testify concerning causation, surgical necessity and 
reasonable and customary charges for the medical treatment he recommended. 7 
6See Plaintiffs Expert Disclosures dated April 18, 2017 at NESBITT 0016 - 0019 
and Dr. Huntsman's expert witness reports dated January 12, 2017 at NESBITT 0032 -
0033 (Esther) and dated April 20, 2017 at NESBITT 0030 - 0031 (Ignacio) in Addendum 
to Response of Nesbitt to Intermountain Surgical's Petition for Writ of Extraordinary 
Relief. 
72017-06-01, Order on Non-Party's Motion for Protective Order. 
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The discovery ordered by Judge Hansen is relevant to the claims and defenses at issue 
in this case and is proportional to the significant involvement ofIMS in the development and 
presentation of Buenrostros' damage claims. The Petition for Extraordinary Relief by IMS 
should be denied and Judge Hansen's Order should be enforced. Even though this Court has 
requested full briefing of the issues raised by IMS, the question to be determined before 
considering the merits of the discovery order of May 31, 2017 is whether a petition for 
extraordinary relief is appropriate based on what IMS has developed at the hearing on its 
Protection Order and in its Brief. 
The determination of relevance and proportionality is a matter entrusted to the sound 
discretion of the trial court. Judge Hansen's reasoning has not been shown to be wrong, let 
alone an egregious abuse of discretion. There is no significant legal issue identified by IMS 
in its Brief. Judge Hansen's Order requires IMS to submit to a well defined and discrete 
inquiry into its business practices to determine whether the "surgical estimate" it provided 
to the Buenrostros is a collateral source and whether Dr. Huntsman is so inextricably 
connected to IMS as to be subject to impeachment for bias. Any testimony and documents 
IMS provides in response to Judge Hansen's Order are insulated from disclosure outside of 
this litigation by what amounts to an "attorney eyes only'' protective order which prohibits 
the disclosure of the information to anyone other than the attorneys representing the parties 
to this litigation and limits the use of the information to this case only. IMS cannot show 
irreparable harm under these circumstances. Therefore, IMS is not entitled to an 
extraordinary writ in this case. 
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
IMS identifies a single issue for review, namely "Whether the District Court correctly 
interpreted and determined the relevancy and proportionality standard of Utah R. Civ. P. 
26(b) with respect to discovery requests to a non-party to the litigation?" 
IMS misstates the standard of review for the issue it identifies. Nesbitt submits that 
the correct standard of appellate review of Judge Hansen's discovery order is abuse of 
discretion. This Court recently had the opportunity to address this very issue in RJW Media 
Inc. v. Heath, 2017 UT App 34, ,r 18,392 P.3d 956,960 where it explained: 
While interpretations of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are questions oflaw 
reviewedforcorrectness,Petev. Youngblood,2006UT App 303, if 7,141 P.3d 
629, "we grant district courts a great deal of deference in matters of discovery 
and review discovery orders for abuse of discretion," Dahl v. Dahl, 2015 UT 
79, ,r 63. "Accordingly, we 'will not find abuse of discretion absent an 
erroneous conclusion of law or where there is no evidentiary basis for the trial 
court's ruling.' "Id. (quoting Green v. Louder, 2001 UT 62, ,r 37, 29 P.3d 
638). 
See also Williams v. Anderson, 2017 UT App 91, ,r 13 (While we afford trial courts broad 
discretion in discovery matters, we review the interpretation of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure for correctness). The issue presented by IMS does not involve "interpretation" of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure but only a discovery issue, the review of which should be 
determined using an abuse of discretion standard. 
IMS ignores the real issue which must first be determined, namely whether 
extraordinary relief is appropriate under the facts and circumstances of this case. The 
standard for review of a Petition for Extraordinary Relief is identified in Snow, Christensen 
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& Martineau v. Lindberg, 2013 UT 15, 122, 299 P .3d I 058, 1065 where the Supreme Court 
of Utah held: 
The question of whether to grant a petition for extraordinary relief lies within 
the sound discretion of this court. Id. When considering whether to grant a 
petition, we may consider a variety of factors such as "the egregiousness of the 
alleged error, the significance of the legal issue presented by the petition, the 
severity of the consequences occasioned by the alleged error, and additional 
factors." Id. 1 But these factors are neither controlling nor do they wholly 
measure the extent of our discretion. Id. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
IMS is not licensed to provide medical services or medical facilities. IMS states 
specifically in its Disclosure of Financial Services that it "is a financial services company, 
and not a healthcare provider or medical services provider."8 Therefore, when IMS refers 
to itself as a "facilities provider"9 and attempts to suggest that its charges are "similar to the 
facility fees charged by other facilityproviders" 10 in its Brief, one must question the accuracy 
of such claims. "Medical facility provider" is not a term of art used in the Health Care 
Facility Licensing and Inspection Act, Title 26, Chapter 21, Utah Code. Therefore, IMS's 
selfidentification as a "facilities provider" is nothing more than a play on words to create the 
impression that it is something more or different than what it is. 
IMS also attempts to give itself credibility by claiming that because it uses "CPT 
8 See IMS Disclosure of Financial Services contained in the Addendum to Response of 
Nesbitt to Intermountain Surgical's Petition for Writ of Extraordinary Relief, at NESBITT 0036. 
9Brief of Petitioner/ Appellant, p. 8. 
10Brief of Petitioner/ Appellant, p. 8. 
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codes" in its invoices it is similar to "other facility providers." 11 IMS did not immediately 
identify who these "other facility providers" are in its Brief, but instead delayed until page 
16 of the Brief of Petitioner/ Appellant to suggest that it is like "IHC, St. Marks/Mountain 
Star, IASIS, University of Utah Hospital, as well as other outpatient surgical centers."12 
According to the American Medical Association, the AMA holds the copyright in CPT 
(Current Procedural Terminology) and the use or reprinting of CPT in any product or 
publication requires a license. Hospitals, ambulatory clinics, physician groups and other 
organizations involved in care delivery use CPT codes to report medical, surgical, and 
diagnostic procedures and services to entities such as health insurance companies. Until IMS 
submits to a 30(b)(6) deposition one cannot say with certainty whether IMS has a license to 
use CPT codes in its invoices, but it is doubtful because IMS is not involved in care delivery 
and is not a licensed health care facility 13 in the state of Utah. 
IMS is a financial services company only in the sense that it invests in litigation by 
financing surgeries in exchange for liens on the settlements, verdicts and judgments of its 
clients who are plaintiffs in litigation. It markets itself to plaintiff firms. It carefully 
investigates the cases it finances. Alan McDonald, the chief executive officer of IMS, 
llBrief of Petitioner/Appellant, p. 8 
12B rief of Petitioner/ Appellant, p. 16 
13
"Health care facility'' means general acute hospitals, specialty hospitals, home health 
agencies, hospices, nursing care facilities, residential-assisted living facilities, birthing centers, 
ambulatory surgical facilities, small health care facilities, abortion clinics, facilities owned or 
operated by health maintenance organizations, end stage renal disease facilities, and any other 
health care facility which the committee designates by rule. Utah Code§ 26-21-2. 
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testified in a 30(b )( 6) deposition in the Vigueras case identified in the Addendum to the Brief 
of Petitioner/Appellant about the investigation it conducts: 
11 Q. Does Intermountain Surgical vet these 
12 referrals, or does it take everyone that's referred? 
13 A. Yeah. We vet the referrals. 
14 Q. In what way? 
15 A. We ask the attorney about the underlying --
16 it's basically an intake process. In other words, we'll 
17 ask the attorney about the underlying case, what 
18 happened, what are the facts, and basically is there 
19 insurance, ultimately, on the other end of this thing, 
20 whether it's uninsured, underinsured, or bodily injury 
21 coverage by a tortfeasor, and if the answer to those 
22 questions is satisfactory, then we will go ahead and 
23 green light a consult with one of the physicians that we 
24 work with, that we contract with. 
Alan T. McDonald Deposition, pp. 9 - 10 
IMS chooses the doctors who perform the surgeries on its clients and the facilities 
where the surgeries are performed. It rewards the medical professionals by paying their full 
non-discounted or barely discounted fee. In this case, Dr. Kade T. Huntsman testified about 
his billing protocol with IMS: 
24 Q. When you do these surgeries for IMS, do you 
25 discount your fee at all? 
1 A. Slightly. 
* * * 
19 Q. Do you know whether the discount to IMS is a 
20 greater discount or a smaller discount than what you give 
21 to Blue Cross, Aetna, or Cigna? 
22 MR. KELSON: Same objections. 
23 THE WITNESS: I would make the assumption that 
24 it's less, but I would have to actually look at the 
25 amounts. 
Dr. Kade T. Huntsman Deposition, pp. 36 - 37 
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IMS makes a substantial profit for its investment, approximately 2 - 3 times its 
monetary outlay for a surgery, in exchange for assuming the "risk of capital loss and similar 
exposure" 14 on its investment. It is a very profitable business model, but it is the business 
model of an financier, not a medical services or medical facilities provider. 
On February 22, 2017, Nesbitt served IMS with a Notice of Rule 30(b)(4) and 
30(b)(6) Deposition Duces Tecum requesting that IMS designate a witness or witnesses to 
testify on March 8, 2017 about well-defined and circumscribed topics and produce the IMS 
business records which document or would be used to form the basis for the answers to the 
questions on those topics 15• 
IMS claims that it is unfair and disproportionate for it to have to respond to this kind 
of discovery because it did not finance the surgeries Dr. Huntsman recommended, obtained 
no lien rights and has no contractual agreement with the Buenrostros. However, IMS admits 
that it referred the Buenrostros to Dr. Huntsman and provided them with an estimate of what 
it would charge to finance the surgeries he recommended which they, in turn, have used it 
to develop their damage case against Nesbitt 16• This extra-contractual help for the 
Buenrostros is part of the IMS business plan for cultivating and maintaining relationships 
14See IMS Disclosure of Financial Services contained in the Addendum to 
Response of Nesbitt to Intermountain Surgical's Petition for Writ of Extraordinary Relief, 
at NESBITT 0036. 
15 2017-06-01, Order on Non-Party's Motion For Protective Order attached as 
Addendum I to the Brief of Petitioner/ Appellant. 
16B rief of Petitioner/ Appellant, pp. 8 - 9. 
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with personal injury lawyers and law firms. Chief Executive Officer Alan T. McDonald 
explained in his 30(b )( 6) deposition in the Vigueras case that IMS has only three employees 
and marketing and cultivating relationships with lawyers and law firms is their primary 
ffilSSIOn: 
14 Q. (BY MR. COOPER) What does Tyson DowDell do 
15 for IMS? 
16 A. Tyson's description is a -- is a market 
17 manager, and Tyson markets to personal injury lawyers and 
18 law firms, cultivates and maintains those relationships, 
19 works as a liaison with our physicians and their 
20 scheduling people, their staff, the staff at Canyon Crest 
21 Surgical Center, and their scheduling people, et cetera, 
22 to just make the Intermountain Surgical process go. 
Alan T. McDonald Deposition, p. 12 
The arguments by IMS that it had only minimal involvement in this case ignores that 
by providing an estimate of the cost to finance future surgeries which had not yet been 
performed, IMS increased the Buenrostros' claim for economic/medical expense damages 
from approximately $11,000 for Ignacio to over $85,000 and from approximately $12,000 
for Esther to over $75,000. The input by IMS dramatically changed the nature of the case 
against Nesbitt. The CEO of IMS, Alan T. McDonald, is experienced in and fully 
understands the litigation arena in which IMS invests. On the IMS website McDonald 
represents that he received his law from the J. Reuben Clark School of Law at BYU in 1992; 
that he is licensed as a lawyer in Arizona, Idaho and Utah; that he has over twenty years of 
experience in the practice of law; that his focus has been primarily in the areas of personal 
injury and law firm management; and that he previously served as the Chief Operating 
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Officer at one of Utah's largest personal injury firms. The conduct which subjects IMS to 
discovery is its referral of selected plaintiffs to a surgeon in cases involving an accident 
caused by a defendant with sufficient insurance coverage to justify its investment plus its 
active participation in their lawsuit by disguising its charges to finance the surgeries as 
medical bills. If left unchallenged, the IMS claim that it is a "facilities provider"17 makes it 
more likely that its surgical estimate will be admitted into evidence to establish the 
reasonable and customary cost of medical treatment. If the surgical estimate is admissible, 
the defense should have the right to show that it is actually a financing arrangement which 
explains why it is so significantly higher than other evidence that may be available to 
establish the reasonable and customary charges for these surgeries in this locality18• 
It is clear in this case that IMS' s role is far greater than the limited role IMS describes 
in its Brief at pages 8 - 9. On April 18, 2017, Buenrostros served Expert Witness Disclosures 
disclosing Dr. Huntsman, the IMS contract doctor, as their retained expert to testify on 
17Brief of Petitioner/ Appellant, p. 8. 
18See NESBITT 0049 and 0060 in that Addendum to Response of Nesbitt to 
Intermountain Surgical' s Petition for Writ of Extraordinary Relief 
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causation, medical necessity and reasonable and customary charges for medical treatment19• 
Dr. Huntsman's disclosure contains an opinion that the cost of future surgery for the 
Buenrostros is in the same approximate amounts as those contained in the IMS surgical cost 
estimates. Although one might argue that he developed that opinion independently, in his 
deposition in this case Dr. Huntsman admitted that his cost opinions were based on what he 
vaguely described as his "experience seeing patient bills and so forth," and that he would not 
be able to produce the "patient bills" on which he claimed to have relied for his opinions: 
4 Q. In other words, if I wanted to see the bills 
5 that you are relying upon to make that cost range, would 
6 I be able to find them? 
7 A. No. 
8 Q. I mean, could you produce them? 
9 A. No. We'd have to pull varying bills and see 
IO what the average is, but I don't know exactly what that 
11 amount is. That's my estimation. 
12 Q. All right. So to come up with this amount, you 
13 didn't go pull particular bills; this is just something 
14 that you had off the top of your head; am I following 
15 correctly? 
16 A. Yes. With some experience. 
17 Q. Well, I understand that. But, I mean, ifwe 
18 wanted to see the source of this, I can't go have you 
19 pull the same bills that you used; these are just numbers 
20 that you kind of came up with over time; is that right? 
21 A. Yes. 
Dr. Kade T. Huntsman Deposition, p. 40 
19See Plaintiffs Expert Disclosures dated April 18, 2017 at NESBITT 0016 - 0019 
and Dr. Huntsman's expert witness reports dated January 12, 2017 at NESBITT 0032 -
0033 (Esther) and dated April 20, 2017 at NESBITT 0030 - 0031 (Ignacio) in Addendum 
to Response of Nesbitt to Intermountain Surgical's Petition for Writ of Extraordinary 
Relief. 
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Although IMS claims that it "has not been designated as an expert in this case, is not 
qualified as an expert, and has no intention of testifying as an expert"20 IMS has supplied 
David Gillies as an expert in another case to opine that its finance charges "are within what 
is reasonable and customary for similar surgeries"21 and its contract doctor, Dr. Huntsman, 
is identified in this case as a "retained expert" for the Buenrostros to support their claim that 
the surgical costs estimated by IMS are the reasonable and customary charges for the 
surgeries Dr. Huntsman recommended22 • In its Disclosure of Financial Services, IMS 
represents that "Services charged to client shall be usual, customary and reasonable for the 
community, and shall be set at the sole discretion of the Company."23 Finally, in its Brief 
IMS claims that "invoices to patients include facility fees and CPT codes that are similar to 
the facility fees charged by other facility providers."24 
20Brief of Petitioner/ Appellant, p. 26 
21Exhibit "A" to Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Petition for 
Writ of Extraordinary Relief From Order of the Honorable Royal I. Hansen, Third District 
Court Judge, Utah Case No. 16090213 7. 
22See Plaintiffs Expert Disclosures dated April 18, 2017 at NESBITT 0016 - 0019 
and Dr. Huntsman's expert witness reports dated January 12, 2017 at NESBITT 0032 -
0033 (Esther) and dated April 20, 2017 at NESBITT 0030 - 0031 (Ignacio) in Addendum 
to Response of Nesbitt to Intermountain Surgical's Petition for Writ of Extraordinary 
Relief. 
23See IMS Disclosure of Financial Services contained in the Addendum to 
Response of Nesbitt to Intermountain Surgical's Petition for Writ of Extraordinary Relief, 
at NESBITT 0036. 
24Brief of Petitioner/ Appellant, p. 8. 
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To determine if the IMS surgical estimate is entitled to be treated as evidence of the 
reasonable and customary charge for the surgeries recommended by Dr. Huntsman, topics 
eight through fifteen on which Judge Hansen ordered IMS to produce documents and a 
30(b )( 6) witness require IMS to disclose the foundation and other information relied upon 
by IMS to formulate the surgical cost estimates it provided to the Buenrostros. Requiring 
IMS to produce and explain the factual foundation for the estimated costs of surgery 
provided to the Buenrostros to determine if the estimates represent collateral source evidence 
about the cost of financing the Buenrostro' s medical expenses is relevant and proportional 
based on the degree IMS has involved itself in the development of the Buenrostro' s medical 
economic loss damages. 
This is not a fishing expedition to harass and annoy IMS. This discovery was not 
sought until after the defense had developed substantial reliable evidence that the finance 
charges which IMS will charge to finance the surgery are not the same as the reasonable and 
customary cost of surgery. Dr. Brent Clyde, a Board Certified neurosurgeon practicing in 
Ogden, has provided expert opinion that the reasonable and customary charges for the two 
level ACDF surgery Dr. Huntsman recommended for Esther is much less than the IMS 
surgical cost estimate: 
The estimated facility costs for a two-level cervical discectomy and fusion(and 
exclusive of surgeon/assistant fees) of$65,000 is not usual and customary. At 
Davis Hospital(an inpatient facility) the average full-fee non-negotiated 
charges for this procedure are $31,600. 
(Nesbitt 0049 in the Addendum to Response of Nesbitt to Intermountain Surgical's Petition 
for Writ of Extraordinary Relief) 
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Dr. Clyde has also provided expert opinion about that the reasonable and customary 
charges for the three level ACDF surgery Huntsman recommended for Ignacio is much less 
than the IMS surgical cost estimate:. 
The estimated facility cost (exclusive of surgeon/assistant) of a three-level cervical 
discectomy and fusion of $75,000 is not usual and customary. At Davis Hospital, 
the average full-fee non-negotiated charges were $31,600 fora two-level and$27,400 
for a single-level fusion. The expected full-fee charges for this procedure (a three 
level fusion) would therefore be about $36,000. 
(Nesbitt 0060 in the Addendum to Response of Nesbitt to Intermountain Surgical's Petition 
for Writ of Extraordinary Relief) 
Based on Dr. Clyde's testimony, the IMS estimates are approximately double the 
reasonable and customary charges for the surgeries Huntsman has recommended. Before this 
case goes to trial, Judge Hansen will have to determine whether the IMS surgical estimate 
is admissible evidence of reasonable and customary medical expenses or inadmissible 
collateral source evidence about how the Buenrostros chose to finance their medical care. 
When entering the Protective Order in this case, Judge Hansen understood that to get this 
evidentiary ruling correct it would be critical to understand the unique IMS business model25 • 
25 Judge Bates similarly understood that the IMS business model is sufficiently different 
from the traditional model that discovery into the IMS business model was appropriate: "Were 
this a traditional case involving, you know, payments by Select Health or Blue Cross or 
something like that, I think the answer would be a little different here, because we've got - we've 
got some well established practices, we've got lots of case law that generally you don't get too far 
in the night. Simply take the bills as they are, and then you compare them to what is allowed in 
the- what is reasonable in the community. This case is a little different because we all know, 
sitting here, that there is a financial arrangement and that IMS is - appears to me, at least there is 
some evidence that IMS is augmenting these costs to account for the fact that they're covering the 
plaintiffs bills and providing essentially a collateral source for him. So it seems to me in this 
unique case, that it is appropriate to allow the defense to get behind that initial bill and look a 
little bit deeper." (Judge Bates oral remarks at 11/8/16 hearing on IMS Motion for Protective 
Order in Vigueras-Amezcua v. Shoeman, No. 160903969, 3rd Dist. Utah) 
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The first three topics on which Judge Hansen ordered IMS to produce documents and 
a 30(b )( 6) witness in the Protective Order require IMS to disclose the licenses and 
accreditations IMS holds to operate a medical facility. A lack of licenses and accreditations 
is relevant evidence that IMS is not a "facilities provider." Under the unique circumstances 
of his case, it is not disproportional for IMS to be required to disclose its licensing, 
accreditation and the data, documentation or other information relied upon by IMS to prepare 
the surgical cost estimate. 
However, cost is not the only disputed fact issue in this litigation. The causation 
opinion of Dr. Huntsman, IMS's contract doctor, is also at issue. After seeing Esther once 
on December 15, 2014, Dr. Huntsman diagnosed herniated discs with severe spinal stenosis 
at C5/6 and C6/7 with radiculopathy and myelopathy. Dr. Huntsman recommended a two 
level ACDF and related the necessity of such to the auto accident in 2011. Dr. Clyde, who 
regularly performs multi-level cervical fusion surgeries, conducted a comprehensive review 
of Esther's medical records and performed a Rule 35 medical examination. He concluded: 
In summary, there is no clear evidence for a disc related or other substantial structural 
neck injury from the accident on 6/27 /11 based on the medical record and my 
examination today. There is not a good indication for surgery in this patient and I 
would strongly advise against it. The likelihood of any benefit is remote and the 
consequences associated with a multi-level cervical fusion outweigh the benefit. 
(Nesbitt 0060 in the Addendum to Response of Nesbitt to Intennountain Surgical's Petition 
for Writ of Extraordinary Relief) 
After seeing Ignacio once on December 15, 2014, Dr. Huntsman diagnosed cervical 
myelopathy and severe canal stenosis with contusion of the cord in the cervical spine and 
recommended a three level ACDF at C3/4, C4/5 and C5/6 which he causally related to the 
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"motor vehicle accident." Dr. Clyde conducted a comprehensive review oflgnacio's medical 
records and performed a Rule 35 medical examination. He concluded: 
The medical record is clear that the prior accident in 2010 resulted in ongoing cervical 
symptoms and on 8/2/10 Dr. Erasmus found that Ignacio had a displaced cervical disc 
"confirmed by MRI" and ongoing cervical complaints, but was at MMI. Dr. Bova 
clearly documented that the neck was only aggravated and had returned to baseline, 
per his history with the patient. He reports this as a first person account from 
Ignacio. The MRI findings in 2010 did not change on subsequent studies. Based on 
these facts alone one would have to conclude that nothing changed structurally 
from the accident on 6/27/11 and symptoms were only temporarily aggravated. . .. 
Based on the totality of the medical record, and my own examination today, the 
6/27 /11 accident resulted in a temporary aggravation of cervical, and possibly leftarm, 
symptoms, which were back to baseline by 7 /13/11. 
(Nesbitt 0048-0049 in the Addendum to Response of Nesbitt to Intermountain Surgical's 
Petition for Writ of Extraordinary Relief) 
The significant history of symptoms and structural damage to Ignacio's cervical spine 
which pre-dated the subject auto accident on June 27, 2011, is well documented in Ignacio's 
medical record. Even Dr. Thomas Berg, the radiologist who read a cervical MRI performed 
on November 18, 2014, just days before Dr. Huntsman examined Ignacio for the first and 
only time, compared it with a cervical MRI performed on June 15, 2010. He concluded 
Ignacio had the same problems Dr. Huntsman opined were caused by the accident on June 
27, 2011, for at a least a year before the accident on June 27, 2011. 
Dr. Huntsman is the "go to" orthopedic spinal surgeon when IMS is evaluating 
whether it should invest in a litigated case. 
12 Q. Okay. How many patients do you see for 
13 Intermountain Surgical a year? 
14 A. I've -- I don't keep track of that. I'd have 
15 to go back and sort through it. But I would guess 60, 
16 70, 80 patients a year. 
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17 Q. And then do you perform surgeries on at least 
18 some of those patients that you see? 
19 A. Yes. 
20 Q. Do you have an estimate of how many surgeries 
21 you've performed on patients that Intermountain Surgical 
22 is involved in? 
23 A. Same thing. I've never counted, but I would 
24 guess that it's maybe on half or two-thirds of those, so 
25 probably, I don't know, 40, 50. 
Dr. Kade T. Huntsman Deposition, p. 6 
The consults and surgeries he performs for IMS are a significant source of income for 
Dr. Huntsman which creates a significant financial incentive for Dr. Huntsman to make a 
case for causation in those cases where IMS is considering investing. IMS and Dr. 
Huntsman have mutually beneficial financial interests. Topics four and five in the Protective 
Order require IMS to produce documents and a witness to explain the number of surgeries 
and how much IMS paid Dr. Huntsman in 2016. It is not disproportionate to require IMS to 
respond to discovery on these issues because of the relationship which exists between IMS 
and Dr. Huntsman. Dr. Huntsman did not consider the information proprietary and has 
already estimated the number of surgeries he performs for IMS. The requirement of the 
Protective Order simply adds certainty to the numbers Dr. Huntsman estimated. 
IMS is significantly involved in this case by arranging for and providing evidence for 
the Buenrostros on the issues of diagnosis, necessity for medical treatment, causation and 
cost of treatment. It is not disproportionate to permit the defense to conduct discovery into 
the IMS business model to prove that its "surgical estimates" are really finance charges. IMS 
argues that Judge Hansen's Protective Order "diverged from the interpretations of Judge 
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Bates and Judge Scott."26 Actually, the orders in this case and in the Vigueras-Amezcua v. 
Shoeman case27 are more similar than dissimilar. Both decisions provide IMS with the 
significant protection of what amounts to an "attorney eyes only" protective order and both 
decisions recognize that the collateral source rule does not bar discovery into costs incurred 
and the augmentation of those costs by IMS. Because of the restrictions imposed in Judge 
Hansen's Protective Order, IMS cannot seriously claim that production of the requested 
information will cause it irreparable harm by granting "unprecedented and expansive access 
to lntermountain's confidential proprietary business information, processes and trade 
secrets."28 All of the evidence developed during the 30(b)(4) and (6) deposition ofIMS can 
only be used in this case and any similar evidence will have to be developed independently 
in any other case to be used by the defense in those other cases. That hardly places an undue 
burden on IMS, especially given its significant involvement in this case. 
26Brief of Petitioner/ Appellant, p. 11. 
27The undersigned was not involved in the Salisbury v. The Living Planet case is 
not familiar with the arguments which were presented for and against the Motions by IMS 
and Canyon Crest. It does not appear that the issue of "collateral source" was a 
significant issue in Salisbury like it was in Vigueras-Amezcua and like it is in this case. 
That difference makes the Salisbury decision of limited importance in evaluating Judge 
Hansen's order in this case. 
28Brief of Petitioner/ Appellant, p. 11. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This case is not appropriate for extraordinary relief for an abuse of discretion by Judge 
Hansen because extraordinary circumstances do not exist. The issues involve a discovery 
dispute over the appropriate scope of discovery into the business practices of IMS and its 
relationship with its contract doctor, Kade T. Huntsman, M.D., to determine if IMS is a 
collateral source and whether its relationship with Dr. Huntsman limits his objectivity as an 
expert witness for the Buenrostros. Judge Hansen entered an order allowing discreet and 
limited discovery on these issues and provided that any information obtained from the 
discovery would be restricted from disclosure by a strict attorney eyes only protective order 
and could be used only in this case. Because of the issues raised by the Buenrostros in this 
litigation this discovery is both relevant and proportional. Judge Hansen did not abuse his 
discretion in ordering the discovery protected, as it is, by a restrictive protective order. 
ARGUMENT 
1. IMS HAS NOT SHOWN ENTITLEMENT TO EXTRAORDINARY RELIEF 
In Snow, Christensen & Martineau v. Lindberg, 2013 UT 15, if 22,299 P.3d 1058, 
1065 the Supreme Court of Utah held: 
The question of whether to grant a petition for extraordinary relief lies within 
the sound discretion of this court. Id. When considering whether to grant a 
petition, we may consider a variety of factors such as "the egregiousness of the 
alleged error, the significance of the legal issue presented by the petition, the 
severity of the consequences occasioned by the alleged error, and additional 
factors." Id. ,r But these factors are neither controlling nor do they wholly 
measure the extent of our discretion. Id. 
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The determination of relevance and proportionality is a matter entrusted to the sound 
discretion of the trial court. IMS argues that Judge Hansen abused his discretion because he 
failed to properly determine whether the information sought by discovery is relevant to any 
claim or defense and suggests that how IMS determined the cost estimate for the surgeries 
is irrelevant to determining the value of medical services29 • The common method of proving 
medical damages is by offering a bill for the medical procedure into evidence with minimal 
foundation. The Buenrostros have made clear their intention to use the IMS estimate to 
prove their medical expenses by including it as part of their Rule 26 Initial Disclosures. The 
defense seeks through this discovery to prove that the IMS estimate is an inadmissible 
collateral source which only identifies the cost of financing the surgery. Judge Hansen 
reasoned that the discovery seeks material which is relevant to the determination whether the 
IMS cost estimate is a collateral source or is evidence of reasonable and customary charges 
for medical services. IMS argues that the reasonableness of medical expenses is detennined 
by the "customary charges for services in a similar geographic area in which the services are 
provided"30 but ignores that this is exactly how its surgical cost estimate is being used in this 
case. Judge Hansen also reasoned that understanding the contractual and financial 
relationship between Dr. Huntsman and IMS is relevant because Dr. Huntsman is acting in 
the dual capacity of an adviser to IMS on whether surgery is necessary and causally related 
29Brief of Petitioner/Appellant, p. 14. 
30B rief of Petitioner/ Appellant, p. 16. 
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to the subject accident and also in the capacity of a retained expert for Buenrostros on 
medical necessity, causation and reasonable and customary charges for medical services. 
In a case involving a claim that the trial court erred in preventing the plaintiff from 
presenting damages-related evidence at trial because of the failure to disclose "a computation 
of any damages claimed" for purposes of Rule 26 of the Utah Rules ofCivi~ Procedure, this 
Court held in Williams v. Anderson, 2017 UT App 91,113,400 P.3d 1071, 1074 that "We 
will not find an abuse of discretion 'absent an erroneous conclusion of law or where there 
is no evidentiary basis for the trial court's ruling."' In this case Judge Hansen's reasoning 
that discovery about the factual foundation for the estimated surgery costs was relevant to 
a determine whether the estimated surgery cost documents were evidence of a collateral 
source has not been shown to be erroneous, let alone an egregious abuse of discretion. 
Similarly, Judge Hansen's reasoning that discovery into the contractual and financial 
relationship between IMS and Dr. Huntsman is relevant to whether Dr. Huntsman is 
conflicted and biased as an expert has not been shown to be erroneous, let alone an egregious 
abuse of discretion. State v. Hackford, 737 P.2d 200,203 (Utah 1987) (evidence of bias or 
motive is always relevant to discrediting the witness and affecting the weight of his 
testimony). 
The suggestion that IMS has been on the receiving end of different discovery orders31 
31 IMS has attached as an Addendum to its Brief the Orders from three trial courts 
addressing the extent and scope of discovery into its business of financing surgeries for 
litigants. 
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from different trial courts is not a reason for granting IMS' s petition for extraordinary relief 
in this case. Achieving uniformity and predictability of discovery under Rule 26 will 
necessarily be difficult, if not impossible, because of the myriad facts and circumstances 
presented by different cases32 • Utah R. Civ. P. 26, Advisory Committee Notes (Any system 
of rules which permits the facts and circumstances of each case to inform procedure cannot 
eliminate uncertainty.). This is why trial judges are cloaked with broad discretion to 
determine what is and what is not proportional. This Court recently explained in Ford v. 
Ford, 2016 UT App 127, 379 P.3d 14, 15: 
discovery requests are proportional, however, if they meet a 
number of criteria, including ( 1) reasonability considering the needs of the 
case, the amount in controversy, and the importance of the discovery in 
resolving the issues; (2) the benefit of the discovery when compared with the 
burden or expense it imposes; and (3) its furtherance of a ''just, speedy and 
inexpensive determination of the case," among other things. Id. R. 26(b)(2). 
A district court "has broad discretion in deciding whether a discovery request 
is proportional." 
IMS has been ordered to submit to a well defined and discrete inquiry into its business 
practices to determine whether the "surgical estimate" it provided to the Plaintiffs is a 
collateral source and whether its contract doctor is an unbiased expert witness on the issues 
of medical necessity, causation and reasonable and customary medical costs. IMS' s response 
is protected by what amounts to an "attorney eyes only" restriction which prohibits the 
32The fact that Judge Bates, Judge Scott and Judge Hansen arrived at different 
protective orders is not an indication that trial judges are struggling to apply 
proportionality standards which requires intervention by the Utah Court of Appeals to 
bring uniformity and predictability to proportionality decisions, but rather it is a testament 
to the fact that these cases involved different facts and circumstances. 
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disclosure of the information to anyone other than the attorneys representing the parties and 
limits the use of the information to this case only. IMS cannot show severe adverse 
consequences to its business under these circumstances. Therefore, IMS is not entitled to 
extraordinary relief insulating it from discovery in this case. 
2. THE DISCOVERY REQUIRED BY JUDGE HANSEN'S ORDER IS 
RELEVANT AND PROPORTIONAL 
Discovery which seeks to determine whether evidence is inadmissible evidence of 
collateral source or admissible evidence of future anticipated medical expenses is clearly 
relevant in a negligence case of the kind involved here. 
Only by characterizing itself as a "health care facility" can IMS make the argument 
that its profit margins, contracts, costs, etc. are irrelevant to a determination of the reasonable 
amount of the Buenrostros' future anticipated medical expenses. Medical bills from health 
care providers and facilities are generally accorded a great deal of deference as evidence of 
reasonable and customary medical charges. However, IMS is not a medical provider or a 
health care facility and its finance charges should not be accorded the same deference. Yet, 
because of the way it presents its estimates and charges for financing surgeries, they are 
easily mistaken for a medical bill. Because IMS refuses to acknowledge that its estimate is 
nothing more than its estimate of what it would charge to finance the Buenrostros' surgeries 
and because the Buenrostros persist in presenting the IMS estimates as medical bills, it is 
necessary to expose the estimate for what it really is, namely what IMS would charge to 
finance the surgeries for the Buenrostros in exchange for a lien on their lawsuit. 
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The amount IMS proposes to charge is well in excess of its monetary outlay and well 
in excess of the reasonable and customary charges for such surgeries. Once its actual costs 
are identified and disclosed, it will be apparent that the estimate is an estimate of financing 
charges, not an estimate of medical expenses. That makes the discovery permitted under 
Judge Hansen's May 31, 2017 Order relevant and proportional. 
IMS' s argument that the defense in this case did not demonstrate how IMS' s business 
information was relevant to determining the Buenrostros' damages misses the point. Judge 
Hansen determined that IMS' s business information is relevant to determine whether IMS 
is a medical service provider, as it claims, or a financier of the costs of surgery. This is a 
relevant inquiry to determine if the IMS cost estimate is a collateral source. Ordering such 
discovery is not an egregious abuse of discretion. 
IMS' s argument that the reasonableness of medical expenses is determined in the 
marketplace and that the defense has access to witnesses to establish and/or rebut the 
reasonable and customary charge for surgeries also misses the point. Medical bills carry 
more weight than an academic evaluation of market place economics and that is why it is 
relevant and proportional to subject IMS to discovery for the purpose of proving that its 
surgical cost estimate is not a medical bill. This endeavor is even more necessary when the 
IMS contract doctor acts as an expert witness to prove that the IMS cost estimate is the 
reasonable and customary charge for the proposed surgeries. It is well-understood by trial 
lawyers that a treating surgeon's opinion on necessity, causation and cost is likely to be better 
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received by a jury than that of an "independent" evaluator whose only connection is being 
hired to testify as an expert. That is, unless the jury is fully informed about how and why the 
"treating surgeon" became the treating surgeon and why Dr. Huntsman's opinions on 
necessity, causation and cost may not be objective because he is hired repeatedly by IMS 
whose primary motivation is to eliminate the risks associated with investing in the very 
litigation in which Dr. Huntsman is testifying. 
IMS argues that Judge Hansen was persuaded to "go off into the weeds" when he 
concluded that discovery related to collateral source, reasonable and customary charges for 
medical services and the relationship between IMS and Dr. Huntsman were relevant. IMS 's 
arguments that because it did not finance the Buenrostros' surgeries its status as a collateral 
source or medical provider is not an issue ignores that it provided a surgical cost estimate that 
the Buenrostros claim represents the reasonable and customary charge for the future medical 
treatment its contract doctor, Dr. Huntsman, recommended they have as soon as possible. 
IMS is front and center involved in the Buenrostros' damage claim and it is relevant and 
proportional that it be subject to discovery on the discreet and limited issues identified in 
Judge Hansen's May 31, 2017 Order. 
Judge Hansen addressed each of the proportionality factors identified in Utah R. Civ. 
P. 26(b)(2) and identified the reasons why the information is needed in this case. IMS does 
not claim that Judge Hansen's decision is without an evidentiary basis, it just claims he got 
it wrong. That does not rise to the level of abuse of discretion. For example, IMS argues that 
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its business information is not necessary to determine if its surgical cost estimate represents 
the reasonable and customary charge for the surgeries because evidence of the reasonable and 
customary charge for the surgeries can be obtained from experts and other medical providers. 
The argument ignores that the issue is collateral source and its business information is 
relevant to show that IMS is acting as a collateral source. Judge Bates reached a similar 
conclusion in Vigueras case, where he concluded that because it looks like IMS is a collateral 
source for the plaintiff, "it is appropriate to allow the defense to get behind that initial bill." 
(Judge Bates oral remarks at 11/8/16 hearing on IMS Motion for Protective Order in 
Vigueras-Amezcua v. Shoeman, No. I 60903969, 3rd Dist. Utah). 
IMS overstates the burden it claims is imposed on it by the discovery order. It has 
previously produced its Chief Executive Officer as a 30(b)(6) witness to answer similar 
questions in the Vigueras case. IMS is not an involuntary participant in this case. It 
voluntarily injected itself into this case by deciding to evaluate the possibility of investing 
in the Buenrostros case, providing a referral to Dr. Huntsman for a surgical consult, 
providing an estimate of what it would charge to finance Buenrostros' surgery and remaining 
supportive of Buenrostros' efforts to use the cost estimate to prove their future medical 
economic loss damages. Discovery is both relevant and proportional under the circumstances 
of this case. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Nesbitt submits that IMS 's petition for extraordinary relief 
should be denied and this matter remanded to the District Court for further discovery in 
accordance with the May 31, 2017 Protective Order. 
DATED this l0Jt-L day of November, 2017. 
COOPER & LARSEN 
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THE COURT: Good afternoon, Counsel. This is Judge 
11 Hansen. And this is the time and place for the telephone 
12 conference with regard to the issues that are before the Court 
13 in the Nesbitt matter. 
14 Appearances of the parties and counsel. 
15 
16 
17 
18 Loveland. 
19 
MR. EVANS: Scott Evans on behalf of the non-party. 
THE COURT: Great. Thank you. 
MR. COOPER: Gary Cooper on behalf of Nesbitt and 
THE COURT: And let's see, do I have Mr. Boulton 
20 here as well? It doesn't sound like it. I don't know that he 
21 had been active in briefing this matter. 
22 Is that fair from Mr. Cooper, Mr. Evans? 
23 MR. EVANS: I can't remember if he--I can't remember 
24 if he did, in fact, file--
25 
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1 record that he filed anything. 
2 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. 
3 And let's see, the issues that we're addressing here 
4 are largely between the non-parties and the Nesbitts. 
5 Tell me current status, Mr. Cooper. 
6 And then, Mr. Evans, I'd like to get a current 
7 status report from you. 
8 MR. COOPER: Your Honor, the current status is that 
9 the--is that the 30(b) (6) depositions that were scheduled of 
10 IMS have been delayed pending the outcome of this. 
11 Dr. Huntsman's deposition, as the treating physician 
12 was taken about ten days ago. 
13 And that's the current status. 
14 THE COURT: Okay. Good. 
15 And Mr. Evans, any update that you have from the 
16 non-parties? 
17 
18 
MR. EVANS: No, your Honor. Mr. Cooper was accurate 
and the--the only issue here now is that which we're--that was 
19 briefed and--
20 THE COURT: Good. And I--the Court's reviewed the 
21 pleadings that have been filed by the respective parties in 
22 the case and--
23 
24 
25 
DepomaxMerit Litigation 
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THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. EVANS: In our briefing, we made reference to 
3 another case, the Garretts, and in that case, the plaintiff 
4 and the defendant settled their claims and so that case went 
5 the way of the world. 
6 THE COURT: Okay. And are you saying it's another 
7 one where we had a trial court ruling like we did from Judge 
8 Bates and Judge Scott? 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
MR. EVANS: I--it was Judge Bates. 
THE COURT: Oh. It was Judge Bates's case. Okay. 
MR. EVANS: That--that case has been--
THE COURT: So--
MR. EVANS: --settled. 
THE COURT: Okay. Great. 
MR. EVANS: By the parties. 
THE COURT: And tell me if that has any bearing on 
17 what you're doing here today, Mr. Evans. 
18 MR. EVANS: I don't--I don't think so, it was just 
19 referenced in the briefing and whether the Court had a 
20 question regarding that or not. 
21 
22 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. EVANS: I don't think it has anything to do with 
23 this hearing today. 
24 THE COURT: Good. And let's see, let me hear from 
25 the parties with regard to the motion. What I anticipate, 
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1 gentlemen, is inviting you at the close of your argument to 
2 submit a proposed order as if there--this were a current 
3 discovery dispute and dealing with the issues that we 
4 currently address in doing so. 
5 And--and then the Court would--would look at the 
6 proposed orders and in all likelihood sign one or--as opposed 
7 to the other, but I can't guarantee that, but that's my, at 
8 least, initial reaction to it here today. 
9 
10 
MR. EVANS: Okay. 
THE COURT: Okay. And let's hear from the moving 
11 party with regard to this and then proceed on that basis. 
12 
13 
14 
MR. EVANS: Okay, your Honor, this is Scott Evans. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. EVANS: I represent IMS, Intermountain Surgical. 
15 And Intermountain Surgical's involvement in this case is 
16 minimal at best. They arranged for a surgical consult with 
17 Dr. Huntsman. Dr. Huntsman's deposition was taken a couple 
18 weeks ago. IMS did not do anything other than that. IMS 
19 didn't receive any payment of any kind, it didn't do anything 
20 except arrange for this. 
21 We don't know if the plaintiff had surgery or any 
22 other treatment subsequent to, I believe it was 2014. 
23 
24 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. EVANS: And the--the discovery, as outlined in 
25 the 30(b) (6) deposition notice is--is significant. Under 
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1 normal circumstances, even if Intermountain Surgical was 
2 involved as a treating party to provide services for the 
3 plaintiff, the--the discovery that was requested or noticed 
4 goes far beyond the pale of what would normally be discovery 
5 in a personal injury case such as this. 
6 THE COURT: Tell me, Mr. Evans, how, if--if I were 
7 filing a personal injury case and I wanted to get IMS involved 
8 to assist me in, what, putting together a package with regard 
9 to special damages and future medicals and potentially a--a 
10 treating physician, would I check in with you at IMS? Tell me 
11 what--how that works. 
12 
13 but the--
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
MR. EVANS: Okay. You wouldn't check in with me, 
THE COURT: Well,--
MR. EVANS: --the plaintiffs here--
THE COURT: --your--your clients, yeah. 
MR. EVANS: Right. Right. Right. 
If you were--if you were the plaintiff's attorney--
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. EVANS: --what would occur is, first of all, 
21 they would contact Intermountain Surgical, let them know what 
22 the case is about and then provide them with the information 
23 that--you know, who the patient is and what--what treatment 
24 will be requested and the type of accident and--and so on. 
25 And IMS would review it and make a determination of whether or 
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1 not it would want to take on the case. 
2 If--if a sur--if a doctor is necessary, if the 
3 plaintiff, in fact, doesn't already have one, then they can 
4 refer the patient to a doctor. And in this instance, that's 
5 what happened and nothing else happened thereafter. 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
THE COURT: 
MR. EVANS: 
THE COURT: 
MR. EVANS: 
THE COURT: 
And did--and did--
If, in fact--
--does Dr.--
Go ahead. 
--does Dr. Huntsman, is he a physician 
11 with IMS or does he have his own--
12 
13 
14 else? 
15 
MR. EVANS: No. 
THE COURT: --sole practice or practice some place 
MR. EVANS: Dr. Huntsman is a surgeon at the Salt 
16 Lake Orthopedic Center, which is out of St. Mark's Hospital. 
17 He is among, oh, a dozen or--or more surgeons in a partnership 
18 of some sort, I don't know what their arrangement is per se, 
19 but it's like a clinic, they're a clinic. 
20 
21 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. EVANS: And they--they're not associated with 
22 Intermountain Surgical, there's no ownership, there's no--
23 there's no shares or anything. It's similar to, you know, if 
24 you had--if you have neurosurgical associates out there doing 
25 surgeries at Intermountain Medical Center, they may or may not 
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1 be employees of IMS--or Intermountain Medi--Intermountain 
2 Medical Center, but they're a separate clinic and there's--
3 well, there's no association on it. They can go perform 
4 surgeries wherever they want. 
5 
6 
THE COURT: Okay. And so IMS, as I understand it, 
when they get a--when they arrange for a physician for--for 
7 the plaintiff, it--it needn't be a physician from Salt Lake 
8 Surgical; is that right? 
9 MR. EVANS: No, it can be--there are several 
10 physicians that are--that do surgeries with Intermountain 
11 Surgical. For example, Dr. Rich, who's a neurosurgeon, I 
12 can't remember if he's out of TOSH or I can't remember. 
13 
14 
THE COURT: I think he is out of TOSH. 
MR. EVANS: Several other doctors, there's a few 
15 doctors at Salt Lake Orthopedic that do it, there's a Dr. 
16 Winterton, who is not associated, it's just whoever, you know, 
17 there's--there's several doctors that regularly do these 
18 
19 
20 
21 
surgeries--
THE COURT: Okay. So it's--
MR. EVANS: --by referral. 
THE COURT: --on a case-by-case basis, no--no 
22 arrangement with a physician or a group of physicians, they 
23 make it on an ad hoc basis, the determination? 
24 MR. EVANS: Well, I mean, they have a--a handful of, 
25 you know, maybe--I don't know how many they have on what I 
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1 would call a quote, panel, to choose from, but they're not--
2 you don't have to choose them. 
3 
4 
5 
6 
THE COURT: Okay. And then--
MR. EVANS: But they may--
THE COURT: --then if I'm--if I'm the plaintiff and 
I decide that I won't get surgery right now, I've at least got 
7 a--an estimate as to what my future medicals are going to be 
8 if, in fact, I need surgery at some time in the future. 
9 MR. EVANS: It depends on if the plaintiff's 
10 attorney asks for an estimate. And recognize this that--and--
11 and Mr. Cooper knows this, he's taken depositions, 
12 Intermountain Surgical is not an expert and doesn't provide 
13 expert testimony with respect to how much things will cost in 
14 the future, whether it's reasonable and customary. That's--
15 the plaintiff is required to go get the appropriate foundation 
16 for that. 
17 IMS submits bills and using the CPT codes of what it 
18 believes is reasonable and customary but it doesn't provide 
19 the--the testimony for it, you know. 
20 THE COURT: And tell me, what's the advantage of 
21 doing this as opposed to simply going out and--and getting 
22 your own physician and--and having them do a medical exam and 
23 see if you need further treatment? What's the benefit to a 
24 plaintiff? Is it all in one package or something like that 
25 that they get? 
DepomaxMerit Litigation 
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MR. EVANS: Well, what the benefit is, is this: the 
2 services that IMS provides, IMS provides financial backing and 
3 the ability for people who don't have health insurance to get 
4 the treatment they need after an accident. 
5 
6 
So, for example, if you have a--somebody who's in a 
car accident and they're seriously injured, they need a back 
7 fusion or, you know, a shoulder repair or whatever, but they 
8 don't have any health insurance. 
9 
10 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. EVANS: That leaves them in a bind and they 
11 either have to settle with the--with the opposing party and 
12 get the funds needed for surgery or figure out how--what 
13 doctors may or may not be able to perform the services for--on 
14 a lien basis, what facilities would do it on a lien basis. 
15 For the most part, you know, most of the hospitals around 
16 usually don't do that. 
17 
18 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. EVANS: So IMS provides--they--they lease a 
19 surgical suite from Canyon Crest, which is a surgical center, 
20 IMS pays for and purchases the equipment for the surgeries 
21 that are performed on these, it would be plaintiffs, but 
22 patients. And then contracts with doctors, doctors will go 
23 ahead and--I don't know if it's a contract, but the doctor 
24 will then perform the surgery, submit the bill, the doctor is 
25 paid and--and then the--the anesthesiologist is paid, the 
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1 professionals are paid immediately and then a lien is taken on 
2 the other stuff, including the amounts paid to the 
3 professionals. 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
COURT: 
EVANS: 
COURT: 
EVANS: 
COURT: 
So you would--
They--
--IMS would finance that and--
Correct. 
--for, say, the surgery, the costs were 
9 $10,000, they pay those up front and then either charge some 
10 kind of--
11 MR. EVANS: They hold a lien for--they--they don't 
12 charge any interest or anything. 
13 
14 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. EVANS: They--they hold the lien and--and then 
15 at the end of the case, they're repaid. And what happens is, 
16 because of their relationship with vendors and stuff like 
17 that, they can--and they provide the facilities at a 
18 contracted rate and so on, they are able to then charge, 
19 themselves, as Judge Bates indicated, you have a hybrid here 
20 where they're a provider and they also indicate that they help 
21 finance, which is not uncommon with medical--
22 
23 
24 
25 
DepomaxMerit Litigation 
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THE COURT: Okay. That's--that's simply an option 
2 that you could have. So I could go--
3 MR. EVANS: (Inaudible) I just--
4 THE COURT: --I could go in and get surgery and 
5 things were set up to do that and assuming the surgery costs 
6 $10,000 to pay the anesthesiologist and the--and the 
7 neurosurgeon or the orthopedic surgeon and the Canyon Crest 
8 and it costs $10,000 total, I have a lien for $10,000, with no 
9 interest on that and if it takes three years to finish the 
10 case and--and get a recovery, the first ten thousand goes to 
11 me--goes to IMS? 1 : 
12 MR. EVANS: Well, it's whatever they were--yes. 
13 
14 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. EVANS: There's a lien that the patient signs as 
15 well as the attorney who then--IMS foregoes any kind of 
16 collection until after the case is over, so--
17 THE COURT: And if--if in fact there was no cause or 
18 no recovery with regard to the plaintiff's case, is the 
19 plaintiff still on the hook for the cost of the surgery at the 
20 end of the litigation? 
21 
22 
MR. EVANS: Yes. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
23 MR. EVANS: There's a contract there that says even 
I-
i 
24 if you don't get anything-- i 
25 
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MR. EVANS: --you have a legal obligation to pay. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
3 Number one, that's helpful for me to sort of get 
4 that understanding as to how things work from your 
5 
6 
perspective. 
Tell me what else I should know with regard to the 
7 protective order and--and the discovery. 
8 MR. EVANS: Well, going back to what the discovery 
9 has been requested, what--what they're asking for is stuff 
10 that--that has no bearing on--on what--whether the charges are 
11 reasonable and customary. 
12 And as in the other cases that we've been involved 
13 in, the reality of it and in fact, I think we submitted an 
14 affidavit, what is the basis for reasonable and customary is--
15 is an objective basis, based upon what's been charged in the--
16 in the area. 
17 So going in and finding out what IMS charges as--
18 what IMS's overhead is or what they pay wholesale for parts or 
19 instruments or hardware, has no bearing on whether or not the-
20 -the medical charges that they give are reasonable and 
21 customary. 
22 
23 
24 
THE COURT: And if I'm an--
MR. EVANS: So--
THE COURT: --if I'm an insurance adjustor, do I 
25 care whether the plaintiff gives me a IMS estimate or a--you 
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1 know, costs of medi--future medicals or do I--do I want to 
2 have somebody that is a--sort of a third party, has no 
3 contractual relationship that--that can give me a medical exam 
4 and tell me what future meds are and maybe there's no 
5 difference in the costs or the--in the amounts. 
6 MR. EVANS: Well, I mean, there are differences as--
7 as Mr. Cooper will--Cooper will argue, that be--because of the 
8 situation where there's no health insurance and because, you 
9 know, there's risks involved here, there is no discount given, 
10 you know. If you want to get into the, like the--like the HMO 
11 and the PPO and stuff like that, it--Blue Cross, everybody, 
12 all the insurance companies have different contracts with 
13 different providers saying it doesn't matter what you charge 
14 us, we will pay you this amount. 
15 THE COURT: Yeah. 
16 MR. EVANS: And--but none of that's relevant for 
17 purposes of trial. Whether, you know, Medicare or Medicaid 
18 pays ten cents on the dollar or IHC gives 90 percent on the 
19 dollar from Select Health, the jury doesn't need to know and 
20 shouldn't know what that is, that's the collateral source 
21 rule. 
22 So what--what--what the--the defendants and Farmers 
23 are trying to do here is get behind and find out what our 
24 business, you know, confidential business records, what our 
25 overhead is, how we come to determine what is reasonable and 
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1 customary, when the reality is, all they need is their own 
2 expert, which they have, to review the bills and review the 
3 records and say this is reasonable and customary, this isn't 
4 reasonable and customary, it's too high, you know, but they 
5 don't need our confidential, you know, proprietary information 
6 
7 
8 
9 
that we've compiled to get that--
THE COURT: Okay. And tell--
MR. EVANS: (Inaudible) 
THE COURT: --tell me one other thing. Tell me 
10 about the number of cases. You've referenced two cases at 
11 least that I saw, one that Judge Scott issued a protective 
12 order in and another one that Judge Bates ruled on. And are--
13 are you in this kind of litigation regularly or are these the 
14 first two and only cases--
MR. EVANS: Not regularly. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
15 
16 
17 
18 
MR. EVANS: What--what happens is periodically an 
insurance company gets a burr under their saddle and decides, 
19 hey, Intermountain Surgical is doing it differently than say, 
20 you know, IHC or Select Health or whatever and they're suspect 
21 of the charges and--and the charges are not Medicaid--they're 
22 not Medicaid charges or paid by Medicaid and they go in and 
23 well, they're really over-charging and so we really want to 
24 find out how much it costs them and see what their profit 
25 margin is. 
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1 The reality of that is completely and utterly 
2 irrelevant and like we said, but this happens--it happened, 
3 oh, about in 2015, Liberty Mutual did that and then a couple 
4 of years before, State Farm decided to do that and--and the 
5 rulings have all been quite consistent in that, no, collateral 
6 source is collateral source. You don't get to go behind and 
7 get the overhead information. 
8 Judge Bates wiggled a little and allowed them to get 
9 some information about the--the lease between IMS and Canyon 
10 Crest but--and that's subject to debate in the order that was 
11 given, but the fact of the matter is, this doesn't occur 
12 often, it just occurs in flurries when it happens, so--
13 THE COURT: And do you--did you have a--a ruling and 
14 a written opinion from the trial court judge in the Liberty 
15 Mutual case or the--the State Farm? 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 it--it--
MR. EVANS: That was Judge Scott. 
THE COURT: That was Judge Scott. 
And what about the State Farm case? 
MR. EVANS: The State Farm one, yeah, we--we did, 
21 [Call interruption - unrelated matter] 
22 THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Cooper, you were telling me 
23 State Farm had a written opinion--
24 
25 
DepomaxMerit Litigation 
801-328-1188 
MR. EVANS: Your Honor, this is Mr. Evans. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
I 
May 9, 2017 
1 
Buenrostro v. Nesbitt 
Telephone Conference/Motion For Protective Order 
Page 18 
MR. EVANS: There is a written--there was a written 
2 opinion and I have it--I could, you know, if the Court wants 
3 to look at it. Farmers has argued that even the Liberty 
4 Mutual opinion is not applicable because they weren't a party 
5 to that action and you know, I can understand what they're 
6 
7 
saying. But I could get that to you if you wanted. 
THE COURT: Well, would it be helpful? I mean, I'm- · 
8 -this is a--
9 
10 
MR. EVANS: It's basically the same. 
THE COURT: Yeah. Well, and--and with the same 
11 questions--you're telling me what are the same questions, I'm 
12 getting different, a little different rulings from the judges, 
13 so maybe the--the State Farm ruling may be a little different 
14 than Judge Scott or Judge Bates. 
15 MR. EVANS: But in none--in no case did the judge 
16 say that they could have the information that they were 
17 requesting. For example, in our case, my recollection is that 
18 they're asking for even tax returns and--and 1099s and 
19 things--
20 [Call interruption - unrelated matter] 
21 
22 
23 
24 
MR. EVANS: Your Honor? 
THE COURT: Go ahead. 
Go ahead, Mr. Evans. 
MR. EVANS: I think we can--I can brief this down a 
25 little bit more, so that, you know, we're not going to be 
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1 going over lots of stuff that's in the briefing, but the court 
2 uniformly says: Your requests Farmers are not, (1) they're 
3 not relevant; and (2) even if they're a little bit relevant, 
4 they're not proportional; and (3) any information that the 
5 Court requires Intermountain to produce is protected by a--a 
6 confidentiality protective order so it's not disclosed outside 
7 of the case, which makes sense, because these are private 
8 matters--
9 
10 
THE COURT: Sure. 
MR. EVANS: --and--and additionally, beside it being 
11 a health care situation where the patient wants to keep their-
12 -their information as private as possible, the--IMS has its 
13 own proprietary information that--that shouldn't be disclosed 
14 first--in the first place and then if, for some reason it was 
15 disclosed or required to be disclosed, it shouldn't be 
16 disclosed to anybody else outside of this litigation. 
17 THE COURT: Okay. Good. And--and I think I 
18 understand your position with regard to that. 
19 Let me hear from Mr. Cooper and then give you a 
20 chance to respond by way of rebuttal, Mr. Evans, to any other 
21 issues that we need to deal with. 
22 Mr. Cooper? 
23 
24 
25 
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1 the road and I flipped to--from my phone to the speaker system 
2 in the car, so I--and I don't know how to get it back off of 
3 that. 
4 
5 
6 
MR. EVANS: Yeah. I can hear you. 
THE COURT: We're just fine, yeah. Go ahead. 
MR. COOPER: All right. Thank you. Let me know if 
7 there's a problem. 
8 To try to boil this down to the essence, this 
9 discovery is directed at the estimates that Intermountain 
10 Surgical, IMS, provided to both of the Buenrostros as to what 
11 they would charge, what IMS would charge to finance their 
12 surgery and (inaudible) 
13 IMS is a finance company. It's not a medical 
14 provider. When Judge Hansen--excuse me, when Judge Bates 
15 heard this matter, no discovery had taken place and so he's 
16 never seen the fruits of discovery that was undertaken under 
17 his order. That determines that there's absolutely no medical 
18 services that are provided by IMS. IMS consists of two, 
19 possibly three employees, all of which are salesmen. There 
20 are no medical providers that are on staff for IMS. 
21 IMS pays the expenses in providing the surgery and 
22 then up charges those expenses significantly, two to three 
23 times what the actual charges are. While IMS doesn't charge 
24 interest, it has a significant fee within this estimate or 
25 within the bills that it provides if it does actually finance 
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1 the surgery, that more than accounts for interest and as this 
2 calls it in its lien papers, the risk of financing these kinds 
3 of surgeries. 
4 
5 
6 
THE COURT: So you're telling me--
MR. COOPER: What we're--
THE COURT: --you're telling me, Mr. Cooper, that if 
7 in fact, I went to Dr. Huntsman and he performed a surgery, it 
8 cost a thousand dollars to--for the facility, to--for his 
9 surgery and for the anesthesiologist and any other personnel, 
10 that the lien would not be a thousand dollars, but it would be 
11 double or triple that amount; is that right? 
12 That's correct. MR. COOPER: 
13 THE COURT: Okay. And how do you know that? 
MR. COOPER: 14 That--that's exact--
THE COURT: How--how do you know that? 
MR. COOPER: I--I know that--I know that from having 
taken the depositions 17 of Dr. Huntsman, IMS and Canyon Crest 
18 Surgical Center where they rent the surgical suite for the 
19 surgeon to do these surgeries and other cases. 
20 
21 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. COOPER: I can't use those depositions in this 
22 case, that's why I have to take them in this case because of 
23 the protective order entered by Judge Bates in that case. 
24 
25 
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THE COURT: --you were allowed to engage in that 
2 discovery by all the courts that you have approached? 
3 Did Judge Scott allow you to do that as well? 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
MR. 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
EVANS: 
COOPER: 
COURT: 
COOPER: 
COURT: 
COOPER: 
He wasn't involved in--
Your Honor, I--
Oh, just--
--haven't been involved--
Okay. 
--in the other cases. I was not 
10 involved in that case, I wasn't involved in the State Farm 
11 case. 
12 
13 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. COOPER: I'm involved in three cases involving 
14 Farmers, the one, which is the Garrett case, which is Judge 
15 Bates case, this case which involves two plaintiffs and 
16 another case, the Bahina case, and I'm sorry, I don't recall 
17 the judge off the top of my head. Those are the only three 
18 
19 
20 
cases. 
THE COURT: And what--
MR. COOPER: The judge in the Bahina case has not 
21 issued a ruling yet. 
22 THE COURT: Okay. So it's under advisement there; 
23 is that right? 
24 
25 
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MR. COOPER: It's been briefed and no hearing has 
2 been scheduled so--
3 
4 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. COOPER: --yours is the second hearing that's 
5 been held in cases that I'm involved in. 
6 
7 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. COOPER: And I know of no other cases that 
8 Farmers is involved in. 
9 
10 
THE COURT: Thank you for that background. 
MR. COOPER: Yeah, absolutely. 
11 So we know from those depositions that if allowed to 
12 proceed with the 30(b) (6) depositions that were scheduled and 
13 that were vacated, I will be able to find out what is the 
14 underlying basis for this estimate that IMS provided as the 
15 cost of the surgery. Until I take those depositions, I have 
16 no way of knowing. 
17 I do, however, know that the plaintiff intends to 
18 use this estimate as the reasonable and customary charges with 
19 this kind of surgery that he believes that his clients were 
20 going to need in the future. That's the problem. 
21 Now, I'm going to make a motion that none of that 
22 should come into evidence because it's a collateral source, 
23 but unless you have the background, unless I'm entitled--
24 allowed to do the discovery and provide you with the 
25 background, you aren't going to know whether this is a valid 
DepomaxMerit Litigation 
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1 medical bill or if it is, as I suggest, simply a financing 
2 statement that contains a significant up charge above and 
3 beyond the actual cost of the medical treatment. 
4 THE COURT: Well, now, would you know already, Mr. 
5 Cooper, if--if say, this was a herniated disc and they were 
6 going to trim that disc back and I went to the University or 
7 to IHC and had that procedure, it would all be coded and I 
8 would know exactly what it is and what the charge is and I 
9 would say that's what's reasonable and necessary. Is that 
10 fair? 
11 MR. COOPER: It's a little more complicated than 
12 that because--because of anti-trust concerns. Medical 
13 providers, including hospitals, can't exactly share their 
14 charges with each other to avoid any charges of price-fixing, 
15 but yes, I can come up with evidence of what I believe the 
16 reasonable and customary charge is. The problem is, is that 
17 that is completely unfair in normal litigation because the 
18 plaintiff is simply going to come in and say, well, here's the 
19 bill or here's the estimate and they're going to use the IMS 
20 estimate. Where if I can present the evidence to say, whoa, 
21 that is not a medical bill, that's a financing charge, the 
22 judge or the jury, if it's allowed to go to a jury, is never 
23 going to understand the difference between the two. And 
24 that's why it's important to do this. 
25 Until there's some established precedence perhaps by 
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1 the Utah Supreme Court or whatever, that these IMS bills are 
2 not admissible in evidence, we're going to go through this 
3 fight and we're going to have different judges that are going 
4 to view this differently and I don't think a judge can make a 
5 decision on this unless I'm allowed to do the discovery and 
6 get the underlying facts so that the judge has a full picture 
7 of what--what the background is and what the underlying facts 
8 are for it. 
9 THE COURT: Sounds like all the judges that have 
10 addressed this have granted a protective order in some--to 
11 some extent, is that true? 
12 MR. COOPER: Well, I know that Judge Bates did. I 
13 know that I've seen the one that came from--the decision that 
14 Scott has alluded to in this case, I'm sorry, the name escapes 
15 me. I have never heard of the State Farm case so I have no 
16 idea. 
17 The problem with those protective orders is that 
18 they were done before any discovery was conducted and so 
19 nobody had the benefit of understanding what it is. There's 
20 no need for a protective order in this case because the things 
21 that are produced by IMS and presumably, it's the same type of 
22 information which will be used by IMS to support their 
23 estimate here, are simply some bills that they paid. There's 
24 nothing secret about those. 
25 And while they suggest that maybe they got a 
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1 discount from somebody, they've never produced any 
2 documentation which supports that. Now, if they produce that, 
3 then, you know, maybe that's a valid argument but I've never 
4 seen the proof of that. 
5 Furthermore, the--the protective order that was 
6 entered by Judge Bates, which is completely unworkable, is 
7 that it was essentially attorney eyes only. I was the only 
8 person on the defense side, and my co-counsel, that could even 
9 see this information. It made it very cumbersome and very 
10 difficult to use it with experts and the like, it required us 
11 to go back to court and do that. I understand his concern. 
12 At the outset, he didn't know what it was that he was going to 
13 uncover in discovery. And we had a motion pending before 
14 Judge Bates to relieve us from that protective order based on 
15 what we actually determined; unfortunately, the case--or 
16 fortunately, the case settled before he was able to hear that 
17 so he never ruled on it. But I just absolutely believe that 
18 it is wrong and inappropriate to just be restricted, or the 
19 information be restricted to essentially an attorney eyes only 
20 protective order where me, my staff and my co-counsel are the 
21 only people that can see the information. 
22 THE COURT: Okay. Anything else? I--I know you've 
23 briefed this and--extensively. Anything else I should know--
24 
25 
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MR. COOPER: --perhaps one--
THE COURT: --and appreciate. 
MR. COOPER: Yeah. Perhaps one other thing. I 
4 don't know how significant it is in making your ruling, but 
5 Dr. Huntsman is associated with IMS. There isn't any question 
6 whatsoever about it. IMS has testified and Dr. Huntsman has 
7 indicated that he goes along with that, that he is a part of 
8 their network of physicians. He knows that when a referral is 
9 made to him by IMS, that his job is number one, make a 
10 determination whether the person needs surgery; number two, 
11 make an opinion on causation, that is that it's caused by the 
12 particular auto accident that has in--insurance associated 
13 with it; and third, that he provide all of that in writing as 
14 a part of the due diligence that IMS uses in determining 
15 whether they're going to finance the surgery. 
16 He's testified that he does as many as 60 to 80 
17 surgeries for IMS a year and these are full-fee, non-
18 discounted fees. It's a significant financial incentive to 
19 determine causation and necessity of surgeries in these 
20 matters. And in every one of these cases that I'm involved 
21 in, there is significant dispute about whether the surgery is 
22 even necessary and whether it's even caused by the auto 
23 accident in question. 
24 And so there is a significant association there and 
25 I think that that's something that we're entitled to develop 
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1 and use as a part of cross-examination of Dr. Huntsman when he 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
provides 
guess, if 
these 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
you 
MR. 
defendants (?) at trial. 
COURT: And you--I assume, if you had--
COOPER: Thank you, your Honor. 
COURT: --the old IMEs, the Rule 35 exam now, 
did that, where would you be? 
COOPER: Well, I would be at two experts who 
8 were counter to each other but have--
9 THE COURT: That--that's true all the time, isn't 
I 
10 it? 
11 MR. COOPER: --the plaintiff--well, that's true, but 
12 the plaintiff's defense would be to our experts is that, hey, 
13 these guys are essentially defense whores. They only testify 
14 for the defense and they do everything they can to make out 
15 the defense case. 
16 On the other side of the coin, in this particular 
17 case, I should be able to establish that Dr. Huntsman has a 
18 significant financial relationship with IMS and that he 
19 profits significantly from finding causation and necessity in 
20 these cases. 
21 
22 
THE COURT: Good. 
MR. COOPER: Now, when you hear the evidence, you 
23 may decide, no, that's unfair; but I should be able to--this 
24 is discovery, I should be able to develop that evidence so 
25 that I can present it properly to defend my client. 
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THE COURT: Okay. Let's see, you know, my thought 
2 is that I want to do two things, one, give Mr. Evans a chance 
3 to briefly respond and two, invite the parties to submit 
4 proposed orders now that we've honed in a--to some extent as 
5 to what the issues are and how we should approach them. 
6 
7 
Mr. Evans, any rebuttal that you have? 
MR. EVANS: Yes, a couple of things, I'll jump 
8 around so I don't get terribly redundant. 
9 First, as in our briefing, IMS is not going to be an 
10 expert in this or any other case. That's something that has 
11 been--is a red herring. IMS has already testified that it's 
12 not an expert and would not be giving expert testimony with 
13 respect to reasonable and customary charges. 
14 So that if he needs to take the deposition of IMS to 
15 get into the underlying whatever with regard to this estimate, 
16 it--it's not necessary and it won't matter because they're 
17 going to have to provide--"they" being the plaintiff, they're 
18 going to have to provide the expert testimony to--for the 
19 support of the reasonable and customary. And it's not going 
20 to be IMS. And--and that's been the testimony of IMS in the 
21 other cases and it's the representations to this Court in our 
22 briefing and during this hearing. 
23 So that--to suggest that they're entitled to dive in , 
24 to IMS's confidential information and--and processes and--and 
25 so forth is somewhat internally inconsistent,--
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THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. EVANS: --for them to say that. 
THE COURT: And so--and tell me--tell me with regard 
4 to that, Dr. Huntsman, it's been proffered to me that--does 
5 approximately 60 to 80 of these cases for IMS a year. 
6 
7 
8 
9 
MR. EVANS: Correct. 
THE COURT: It sounds like there--
MR. EVANS: That's what he says. 
THE COURT: Yeah, that's what he says, right. 
10 And--and it sounds like he's at least--has some kind 
11 of basis for saying there's a financial relationship between 
12 the two, between Dr. Huntsman and IMS. And you may know more 
13 than any of us with regard to that relationship. 
14 MR. EVANS: Well, if I--if I may, there has been 
15 representations, both in affidavit and during depositions, by 
16 Dr. Huntsman, by IMS, that Dr. Huntsman does not have any 
17 ownership interest whatsoever in IMS or Canyon Crest. 
18 Now, that doesn't mean that--I mean, you could talk 
19 to any orthopedic surgeon and say, well, he does all his 
20 surgeries at St. Mark's, therefore, he has a--an association 
21 or a relationship with St. Mark's. That's--you know, he 
22 doesn't need to take our guy's deposition for that, he's got 
23 it already from Dr. Huntsman, who has testified that he does a 
24 certain number of surgeries, I believe he said 40--whatever, 
25 40 to 60, but out of how many surgeries has he done in a year, 
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1 I can't remember, but I think it was hundreds and hundreds and 
2 hundreds, maybe even a thousand, I don't remember specifically 
3 what he testified to and that--that's not private information, 
4 that's not protected by any protective order, it was taken in 
5 this particular case only a few weeks ago. 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
COURT: 
EVANS: 
COURT: 
EVANS: 
COURT: 
And so--
So he can--he already--
--so if--
Oh, sorry. 
And so if Dr. Huntsman 
11 deposition and would he have all the cases--
MR. EVANS: He already did. 
appears for a 
12 
13 THE COURT: Yeah. I know--I know that. Would--was-
14 -would he have in his disclosures, a list of all the cases 
15 that he's done in conjunction with IMS that was tendered to 
16 the other side? 
17 MR. EVANS: If--if he's a retained expert, then he 
18 would have to do that. I--it depends on if the plaintiff 
19 decides to use him as a retained expert or a non-retained 
20 expert. 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
plaintiff 
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THE COURT: 
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MR. EVANS: 
I see. And what is--
And so--
--what are they using--what's the 
Do we know? 
I have no idea. 
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THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. COOPER: They've retained him as an expert and 
3 Dr. Huntsman testified that he doesn't even know what his fee 
4 for this kind of surgery is and we'd have to take somebody 
5 else's deposition. 
6 
7 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. COOPER: Then we have to take a 30(b) (6) 
8 deposition of one or more people at IMS to get that kind of 
9 information--excuse me, at Salt Lake Orthopedics to get that 
10 kind of information. 
11 
12 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
MR. EVANS: Did he--did somebody testify that he was : 
13 a retained expert? 
14 
15 
MR. COOPER: Yeah. He's even issued a report. 
MR. EVANS: (Inaudible) said he was--well, that's 
16 the treating expert. 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
MR. COOPER: He's issued a specific report in this 
case and--and represented to be a retained expert. 
MR. EVANS: By plaintiffs? 
MR. COOPER: Yes. 
MR. EVANS: I haven't seen that. 
MR. COOPER: Well, I hadn't seen it until I took his 
23 deposition. It surprised me. 
THE COURT: But--well, and I'm--24 
25 MR. EVANS: But in any event, then he just--if he is 
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1 actually a retained expert then, you know, plaintiff has 
2 retained him and they have to obey the rules--the Rules of 
3 Civil Procedure, but that has no bearing on this--this hearing 
4 because IMS has not been retained as an expert and IMS is not 
5 going to be giving expert testimony in this case. 
6 So let me--
7 MR. COOPER: But Dr. Huntsman is relying on the 
8 estimates from IMS as the basis for his testimony that that's 
9 the reasonable and customary charge for such surgery. 
10 MR. EVANS: Well, that's--that has noth--your Honor, , 
11 that has nothing to do with IMS, that's Dr. Huntsman. 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
COURT: 
EVANS: 
COURT: 
EVANS: 
COURT: 
Okay. 
If they want to impeach--
I--I--
--Dr. Huntsman, they can--
I think I understand your respective 
17 positions with regard to that. 
18 Anything else, Mr. Evans, that I should know? 
19 MR. EVANS: Okay. Yeah, there was a couple--your 
20 Honor, there was a couple more issues--there's about three 
21 more items that I needed to--to clarify. 
22 With regard to the CPT code question that you asked 
23 counsel, of course, you can go and get the CPT codes and--and 
24 then ask IHC what they would charge under the CPT code or St. 
25 Mark's or--or any other hospital, I've done it, both as a 
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1 defense attorney and as a plaintiff, and as a patient, 
2 frankly. And it can be done readily and--and easily, so--and 
3 they already have their own experts and they can do their own 
4 due diligence anyway. 
5 
6 
7 
THE COURT: Okay. And if it--
MR. EVANS: So--
THE COURT: --if that figure's different than IMS, 
8 you just have--or Dr. Huntsman, you just have to accept 
9 whatever he says--
10 MR. EVANS: No. What you do is if--if Dr. Huntsman 
11 and I don't know this to be true, but if Dr. Huntsman or any 
12 other expert for the plaintiff is going to testify that a 
13 thousand dollars for this surgery is reasonable and customary, 
14 then Farmers has an expert who will testify, no, it's not, 
15 it's--reasonable and customary is this, or that's way far--
16 that's way higher than what's reasonable and customary. 
17 
18 
19 
THE COURT: And if Dr. Huntsman--
MR. EVANS: And then--
THE COURT: --if Dr. Huntsman doesn't know what the 
20 expenses are and says, you've got to talk to IMS to find that 
21 out, what should I do? 
22 MR. EVANS: Well that's actually quite easy because 
23 Dr.--all the plaintiff has to do is retain their own expert--
24 THE COURT: I have--we--we've talked about that, we-
25 -we understand that there may be a--
DepomaxMerit Litigation 
801-328-1188 
May 9, 2017 
1 
Buenrostro v. Nesbitt 
Telephone Conference/Motion For Protective Order 
Page 35 
MR. EVANS: If--if Dr.--if Dr. Huntsman refers to 
2 IMS, saying, well, I'm just relying on their estimate and if 
3 IMS says, well, we're not an expert here, then the plaintiff's 
4 counsel and their expert--or not plaintiff's now, but defense 
5 counsel and their expert can impeach Dr. Huntsman quite 
6 readily, saying, well, there's no basis for it. We have our 
7 own expert who actually is qualified to give the opinions--
8 THE COURT: And is your--your own expert, is that 
9 Dr. Huntsman that said they--he couldn't tell you what any of 
10 the charges are? Who's the expert? 
11 
12 Farmers--
13 
14 
15 
16 
MR. EVANS: I'm saying that defense counsel, 
THE COURT: Yeah, they've got their--their Rule 35--
MR. EVANS: --they have their own expert--
THE COURT: --exam, okay. 
MR. EVANS: Right. They have--they have their own 
17 expert who is going to comb through the CPT codes, comb 
18 through the charges and say, look, in the Salt Lake area, 
19 these--this--this surgery, the 75th percentile or whatever 
20 they want to call it, is such-and-such an amount and that's 
21 what's reasonable and customary by comparing all the hospitals 
22 and all the surgical centers--
23 
24 
25 
DepomaxMerit Litigation 
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1 numbers were behind the IMS services and Dr. Huntsman, Dr. 
2 Huntsman's been deposed and it's at least been represented to 
3 me by Mr. Cooper, that Dr. Huntsman didn't know what the 
4 charges and expenses would be associated with the procedures 
5 in this matter and that you would have to ask someone else 
6 
7 
other than him. Who would that someone else be? 
MR. EVANS: Well, first of all, I disagree with what 
8 his--his argument is, if Dr. Huntsman doesn't have the ability 
9 to testify to what's reasonable and customary, you'll have to 
10 talk to somebody else, then Dr. Huntsman's--I mean, he's not 
11 the expert. We have not been designated as a retained expert 
12 and--nor will we be designated--
13 THE COURT: And that--I understand that. I 
14 understand that. 
15 MR. EVANS: Therefore, the estimate is just an 
16 estimate. 
17 When somebody comes to our client, IMS, and says, 
18 you know, how much do you think this will cost in the future? 
19 It's an estimate, it's not--it's an estimate based upon our, 
20 you know, our experience and how we do things, but--
THE COURT: Okay. 21 
22 
23 
MR. EVANS: --we are not experts and I just don't 
understand the logic of, well, Huntsman says that you'll have 
24 to go somewhere else and he's relying on--on this other--this 
25 estimate, then that means he's not really an expert in 
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1 reasonable and customary. That's just--I--I just don't--it 
2 doesn't make a whole lot of sense to me. 
3 
4 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. EVANS: That--that they would then need to go 
5 depose--they could go depose IHC or St. Mark's, for that 
6 matter, because if--if Dr. Huntsman says, well, I think that 
7 St. Mark's charges about a thousand dollars, you might want to 
8 ask them, well, does that give them the right to go depose St. 
9 Mark's or IHC or--
10 
11 
12 
THE COURT: Yeah. 
MR. EVANS: I don't--I don't think that works. 
THE COURT: Okay. And you know, I--I'm probably--
13 I've gone a half hour more than I should have on this--
14 
15 
17 
18 
19 
would, 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
please. 
MR. 
EVANS: 
COURT: 
EVANS: There's just one more. 
COURT: Okay. Tell me what it is quickly if you 
EVANS: I--IMS is a facilities provider. 
20 There's a difference between medical professional and medical 
21 care providers and a facilities provider. And it is clear 
22 that they are a facilities provider and can make those 
23 charges. So the argument that they're not a provider is 
24 without merit. 
25 
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1 surgical center or like a hospital? 
2 MR. EVANS: Yeah. And--and there's an affidavit of 
3 a guy in our--our reply brief, who has--David Gilles, who is 
4 an expert in the field of medical billing and--and charges and 
5 that's all he does and he does it for the Utah Medical 
6 
7 
8 
Association and--and many others and in his affidavit--
[Call interruption] 
MR. EVANS: --his affidavit is--his affidavit is 
9 very telling and--and explains the difference between the 
10 facilities and the medical providers, so ... 
11 THE COURT: Okay. Good. 
12 Let me ask you, gentlemen, if you'd do this for me. 
13 If I gave you a week--do you need more time than that to 
14 prepare--
15 [Call interruption] 
16 THE COURT: --to prepare a proposed order with 
17 regard to the proportionality of the discovery issues and the 
18 protective order? 
19 MR. EVANS: I would be able to do it within a week, 
20 your Honor. 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
DepomaxMerit Litigation 
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THE COURT: Other side? 
MR. COOPER: (Inaudible) 
THE COURT: I can't--
Counsel? 
1, 
1, 
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MR. COOPER: Yes, I can, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. So if we said that you would 
3 submit those proposed orders and they would be filed on or 
4 before May 16th at 5:00 p.m. 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
DepomaxMerit Litigation 
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MR. EVANS: Okay. 
THE COURT: Great. 
MR. EVANS: Thank you. 
THE COURT: Thanks, Counsel. 
MR. EVANS: Bye-bye. 
THE COURT: Court's in recess. 
MR. COOPER: Thank you, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Court's in recess on the 1:30 matter. 
[Operator: Leaving the meeting: 
MR. COOPER: Gary Cooper. 
[Operator: Leaving the meeting: 
MR. EVANS: Scott Evans. 
(Whereupon, this hearing was concluded.) 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
(Electronically recorded on December 8, 2016) 
THE COURT: We're back on the record. Counsel and the 
parties-- I guess Counsel's present. We don't have any parties 
here, do we? All right, I have -- I read through the briefing, 
I've looked at the exhibits, I've considered some of the case 
law. I've heard argument. 
This is a really, really interesting issue. It's one 
I understand has made its way around the courthouse a little 
bit. It's one I -- I mean, I've never really hope something 
gets appealed, but I think it would be really interesting to 
see this one get in front of one of our appellate Courts, 
because I think we really have found a somewhat novel niche 
in the collateral source rule in the way we conduct discovery 
in these cases where there are some medical bills that need 
to be dealt with. 
So I am I am going to grant the statement of 
18 discovery issues in part and I'm going to deny it in part. 
19 I'm going to allow some limited discovery that is on these 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
subpoenas; and first, let me make a record of sort of how I 
view things and how I'm applying facts in the law of this case. 
Then what I'd like to do is just walk through each of these 
subpoenas and I'll identify what I'm going to allow and what 
I'm not going to allow. 
Mr. Cooper, since this is -- this is kind of your 
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1 burden, and you're the one seeking discovery, I'll ask you to 
2 put together an order when we're all done with this. So --
3 MR. COOPER: Okay, I'll try --
4 THE COURT: -- you need to pay a little more attention 
5 than they do. 
6 MR. COOPER: -- I'll try to follow closely. 
7 THE COURT: Okay, so if we start with Rule 26, Rule 26 
8 allows discovery into any matter that is relevant to a claim or 
9 defense and that is not privileged. As I understand the word 
10 
11 
12 
13 
"privileged" as it's used there, I don't believe we've had any 
claims that this is privileged in that sense; that it's a, you 
know, Rule 500 privilege or fits the privilege that's in Rule 
26. So it's just -- the question is, is it relevant to a claim 
14 of defense, and then is it proportional. 
15 Under that analysis it seems there are sort of two 
16 big things that the Court considers in determining whether or 
17 not this is relevant to a claim or defense and whether it's 
18 proportional. The first is whether any of the evidence that 
19 is sought would be excluded by the collateral collateral 
20 source rule at trial. The fact that it would be excluded is 
21 not necessarily a per se of reason not to allow in discovery, 
22 but it seems to weigh against allowing it where it puts a 
23 burden on the non-parties. 
24 The other aspect is simply a Rule 26 proportionality 
25 analysis. Looking at the fact that these are non-parties, and 
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1 looking at the factors in Rule 26(b), you know, whether it's 
2 reasonable in the case weighing the benefits and the burdens, 
3 whether it's consistent with the case management order, whether 
4 it's not duplicative, whether the defendants can get it from 
5 some other source and whether they've had any opportunity to 
6 
7 
get it from somewhere else. So those are kind of the two areas 
I've looked at. 
8 With respect to the collateral source rule, this is a 
9 rule that basically states that the tort fees or may not reduce 
10 his damages by the amount that a plaintiff will receive from 
11 some other source. In that sense I think the parties seem to 
12 agree that IMS is a collateral source; that they are providing 
13 a benefit to the plaintiff in this case. That they are provid-
14 ing a way for him to pay for these injuries and the costs --
15 and the costs he's incurred. 
16 It's different than -- different than you have other 
17 insurance and I'll get into that difference a little bit, but 
18 IMS is collateral source; and really what the collateral -- the 
19 most primary collateral source evidence here, which I think has 
20 already really been disclosed, is the evidence of a financial 
21 relationship -- of the financial relationship between IMS and 
22 the plaintiff in this case. 
23 That is really the collateral source evidence here 
24 that should not come in at trial when we get there, because I 
25 don't think the jury needs to know or should know, just as they 
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1 don't -- shouldn't need to know that insurance paid for some-
2 thing, they don't need to know about whatever the financial 
3 arrangement is between IMS and the defendant, whether that bill 
4 will ever be paid, whether it's paid in installments, whether 
5 interest is accruing or not, and the fact that IMS has a lien 
6 on the judgment -- any judgment that's obtained so that they 
7 can get their -- their money back. That seems to me to be the 
8 
9 
10 
real primary collateral source evidence. 
Of course, as I said, it seems like some of that has 
already been discovered. Other -- other evidence that might 
11 fit that category, some of these bills, in the right context, 
12 might lead to the inference that there is a financial relation-
13 ship between the plaintiff and IMS, but I think that's some-
14 thing that can be dealt with, if needed, with, you know, pre-
15 trial orders and motions in limine or whatnot. 
16 So as far as the bulk of these -- of what's requested 
17 here in these two subpoenas, I don't find that the collateral 
18 source rule by itself bars really any of this from discovery 
19 at this stage in the litigation. It certainly may bar it come 
20 trial, but as far as discovery goes, I don't find that that 
21 rule by itself bars it. 
22 However, when it comes to the question of the burden 
23 that is being put on non-parties, I think that's a different --
24 
25 
a different question, a little more difficult question. These 
subpoenas do ask for a great deal of very expansive information 
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1 including tax records for the entire year of 2015. Those, 
2 when I weigh the proportionality and the relevance of those, 
3 I don't find that discovery on those issues is proportional or 
4 necessary in this case. 
5 The real question here is I think the extent to which 
6 the defense is allowed to dig into the costs and sort of behind 
7 
8 
the scenes numbers of a medical provider. Here, IMS, while it 
is a collateral source, it also is a medical provider. I know 
9 they seem to say that they aren't in their financial disclosure 
10 but the fact is they're telling me that they -- that they have 
11 a leased surgical space, that they own the equipment in that 
12 surgical space. So I think IMS appears to have a mul -- multi-
13 ple roles in this. One of which is to provide medical services 
14 or at least coordinate medical services, and the other is to 
15 provide financial services. 
16 So the question is under Rule 26, to what extent can 
17 the defendants dig into the costs and whatnot that IMS incurs 
18 in providing these services. Were this a traditional case 
19 involving, you know, payments by Select Health or Blue Cross 
20 or something like that, I think the answer would be a little 
21 different here, because we've got we've got some well esta-
22 blished practices, we've got lots of case law that generally 
23 you don't get too far in the night. Simply take the bills as 
24 they are, and then you compare them to what is allowed in the 
25 -- what is reasonable in the community. 
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1 
2 
3 
This case is a little different because we all know, 
sitting here, that there is a financial arrangement and that 
IMS is appears to me, at least there is some evidence that 
4 IMS is augmenting these costs to account for the fact that 
5 they're covering the plaintiff's bills and providing essenti-
6 ally a collateral source for him. 
7 
8 
So it seems to me in this unique case, that it is 
appropriate to allow the defense to get behind that initial 
9 bill and look a little bit deeper. This seems to me -- the 
10 analogy with that Mr. Kendall provided with Select Health 
11 was somewhat helpful. 
12 I mean, it seems to me that if the defense came in 
13 and simply laid out the Select Health bill and said, "That's 
14 all we're -- that's all we should have to pay," that when in 
15 reality the bills behind the Select Health bill that the 
16 providers had charged were much greater than that, you know, 
17 that we wouldn't be -- nobody would be showing the Select 
18 Health bill to the jury. We'd be looking at the providers' 
19 bills. I think that the same reasoning applies here, where 
20 the collateral source bill is allegedly higher than what was 
21 charged by the providers. 
22 So with that in mind, here's what I'm going to allow. 
23 Starting with the subpoena to Canyon Crest Surgical Center, 
24 in paragraph No. 1, I am -- I am going to order Canyon Crest 
25 Surgical Center to turn over any invoice or bill they may have 
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1 given to IMS for a charge for the surgery that was performed on 
2 the plaintiff on the date in question here. 
3 What I'm essentially going to be ordering as we go 
4 through these is I'm going to order the non-parties here to 
5 basically turn over their file as it pertains to Mr. Javier 
6 Vigueras Amezcua, the plaintiff in this case. So I am going 
7 to allow that second one there. I'm not going to require that 
8 the check be turned over right -- I don't know that that's 
9 pertinent or necessary. I think it's sufficient that the bill 
10 was sent, and that should be the defendant (inaudible). 
11 With No. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7, I'm going to grant that 
12 the motion -- the objections and the protective order and the 
13 discovery statement with respect to those, I'm not going to 
14 order Canyon Crest to turn over any of its financial documents 
15 beyond what is pertinent to the plaintiff in this case. So all 
16 of the tax records that have been requested for 2015 I'm not 
17 going to require them to turn over. 
18 MR. COOPER: Did you say 2 through 7, Judge? 
19 THE COURT: Nos. 2 through 7. I am not going to order 
20 those to be turned over. I'm going to strike those from the 
21 subpoena. With respect to 8, 9, 10 and 11, those seem to me to 
22 be rather un-burdensome to turn over, if in fact they exist. 
23 They do go somewhat to the bias that the defendant is alleging. 
24 I assume that these are stock forms, again if they exist, that 
-25 Canyon Crest keeps around and shows to a patient when they come 
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1 in. They may not exist if there is no ownership or investment 
2 relationship, but to the extent that those forms may exist, 
3 I'll direct that they be turned over to the -- to the defense. 
4 Then No. 12, again, I don't see a huge burden on 
5 Canyon Crest in turning over its licenses, just copies of its 
6 licenses. I don't know how relevant that is at trial, but it 
7 
8 
doesn't seem to me to be terribly burdensome to have them do 
that. Again, I am also and if you'll please include this, 
9 Mr. Cooper -- I'm going to direct the defense in this case to 
10 pay -- to pay reasonable costs in copying this material. So 
11 you will be -- you will be paying a little bit for -- a little 
12 bit for this. 
13 Moving onto the subpoena for Dr. Huntsman, I'm going 
14 to make essentially the same order. I'm going to require that 
15 he turn over his invoice or bill that he gave to IMS for the 
16 surgery. I'm not going to require the check. I'm not going to 
require 2 through 8. 17 
18 I'll note with that that at this point where there's 
19 been a very clear statement from Dr. Huntsman that he does not 
20 have any ownership interest in IMS or Canyon Crest, I don't 
21 I think that the burden of digging into his tax records and 
22 the invasion of privacy and the burden it would put on him to 
23 retrieve and copy those outweighs the -- what I think is really 
24 kind of nominal probative value here. 
25 If the defense can later on get some evidence to show 
-9-
1 that there is some financial relationship beyond just being 
2 a doctor and an independent contractor, I will absolutely re-
3 consider that, but for now I'm not going to let anyone get into 
4 his tax records or Canyon Crest's tax records. 
5 Then the same as I did for Canyon Crest, I'm going to 
6 allow 9 and 10 --
MR. COOPER: Does that include 8? 7 
8 THE COURT: Yes, so I said 2 through 8 on the subpoena 
9 to Dr. Huntsman will not be allowed. Nos. 9 and 10 will be 
10 allowed. 
11 MR. COOPER: Well, that was my point. I think it's --
12 No. 8 is the form used to disclose ownership. So it's 2 through 
13 7 that are the financial --
14 MR. KENDALL: Not from my notes. 
15 THE COURT: My No. 8 says it's a 1099 received --
16 MR. KENDALL: Right. 
17 THE COURT: -- by the Salt Lake Orthopedic Clinic. 
18 MR. KENDALL: We're on Huntsman. 
19 
20 
MR. COOPER: I'm using the ones that he put in, and 
it's in the other case. Okay. 
21 THE COURT: So and I should be clear. 
22 MR. COOPER: I apologize, I'm looking at the wrong 
23 number. 
24 THE COURT: I'm looking at the copies that were 
2 5 provided in the binder. 
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1 
2 
3 
MR. KENDALL: Right. 
THE COURT: At the very beginning, your subpoena duces 
tecum requesting production. These are the copies I'm looking 
4 at, but I think I got it from 
5 MR. COOPER: Yeah. 
6 THE COURT: -- plaintiffs and -- or Mr. Evans, were you 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
the one that provided that? 
MR. EVANS: Yes, and 
THE COURT: Thank you. That was very helpful to have 
those. Appreciate that. 
MR. EVANS: You're welcome. 
THE COURT: Okay, so No. 8 will not be allowed. No. 9 
13 and 10 will be allowed, and then No. 11 and 12 I don't see any 
14 relevance in providing those, so I'm not going to allow those. 
15 MR. KENDALL: So if I 
16 THE COURT: Yes. 
17 MR. KENDALL: my understanding that you were saying 
18 No. 9 was not allowed for now unless they can show -- because 
19 of the affidavit from Dr. Huntsman saying he doesn't have --
20 THE COURT: Well, I'm not going to let them get into 
21 his tax records, but if there is a document that discloses a 
22 financial relationship --
23 MR. KENDALL: Oh, okay. 
24 THE COURT: --then I'm going to allow that with respect 
25 to Intermountain Surgical Center and Canyon Crest. I think the 
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1 defense is entitled to have that. Again, it's a very simple 
2 it should not take much to get that document if it exists. 
3 MR. KENDALL: Right. 
4 MR. COOPER: Then no on 11 and 12? 
5 THE COURT: I think you have it attached to clipboards 
6 in the lobby, so --
7 
8 
9 
10 
MR. KENDALL: Right. 
THE COURT: Then what was that? 
MR. COOPER: Then no on 11 and 12? 
THE COURT: No on 11 and 12. Lastly, with the subpoena 
11 to Intermountain Surgical, as I understand it, the first three 
12 bullets under No. 1 have already been provided. 
13 MR. KENDALL: Yes. 
14 THE COURT: I'm going to order that -- and now I've 
15 got to count here, one, two, three, four, five, six -- so the 
16 seventh bullet down, the Canyon Crest Surgical invoice bill 
17 for the facility charge, that that be turned over. The ninth 
18 bullet down, the Salt Lake Orthopedic Clinic, Dr. Kay T. Hunts-
19 man bill, be provided. 
20 The -- on the next page, which I think now we're at 
21 the eleventh bullet point, the anesthesiologist invoice or 
22 bill; the thirteenth bullet point which is the physician's 
23 assistant invoice or bill; and the fifteenth which is the 
24 invoice or bill for any medical services or supplies paid by 
25 Intermountain Surgical. I'm going to order that to be turned 
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1 over as well. I will not require that -- I'm not going to 
2 order that two, three, four or five be turned over. 
3 So essentially what I'm ordering is that the non-
4 parties turn over their file as it relates to the plaintiff, 
5 and I think that the defendants, at least for purposes of 
6 discovery, are entitled to at least look at the costs that 
7 IMS incurred in coordinating those services for the plaintiff. 
8 We're not getting into the tax records at this time, but I 
9 think they get to just look at the costs. 
10 I am also going to grant the motion for a protective 
11 order to the extent that it is seeking to just deem these 
12 documents private, and protect -- prevent the parties from 
13 disclosing them or using them outside of this litigation. 
14 Mr. Evans, I'll ask you to draft up a separate order on that 
15 point, a protective order. 
16 What I'd like to see is an order that, first off, 
17 deems these private, and if they were filed with the Court, 
18 they were to be done -- they are to be filed under seal, and 
19 the clerk is to be directed to mark them "Private." I think 
20 we usually do that with a motion at the time they are filed. 
21 Second, that --
22 COURT CLERK: They're automatic --
23 THE COURT: Are they automatically pre (inaudible)? 
24 COURT CLERK: They can put them in prior to putting 
2 5 them in the file. 
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1 THE COURT: Right, you put them in prior, there's a 
2 motion that's filed, I grant it --
3 COURT CLERK: Right. 
4 THE COURT: -- and then they're deemed -- and then 
5 they're marked "Private." 
6 
7 
8 
9 
COURT CLERK: You guys mark them "Private." Don't rely 
on me to do that. 
MR. COOPER: Right. 
THE COURT: Yeah, okay. Second, that the documents 
10 are not to leave the possession of the attorneys without prior 
11 order of the Court. So if you decide that you need to give 
12 them to an expert or someone like that, then you need to do so 
13 by a motion to the Court, Mr. Cooper, okay? 
14 MR. COOPER: That's going to be all of these documents 
15 that are produced here? 
16 THE COURT: Yes, all the documents that are produced 
17 here, okay? Essentially I want to make sure that we know who 
18 gets these documents, okay? I want to publi -- I want a record 
19 
20 
in the case of who is getting these documents. So I'm not going 
to put up a bit fight if you want to have one of your medical 
21 billing experts look at this document, but I want to know, and 
22 I want there to be an order in place that protects it when they 
23 get it, and that we know who has it. 
24 MR. COOPER: That will be part of the protective order? 
25 THE COURT: That will be part of the protective order. 
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1 MR. COOPER: Okay. 
2 THE COURT: Yeah, so the parties are not to disburse 
3 these documents outside of their own law firms, their own --
4 their own attorneys. They are not to be used in any way out-
5 side of this litigation without prior order of the Court, okay? 
6 Then once the litigation is concluded, the parties will be 
7 directed to either return the documents to the non-parties or 
8 to destroy them. Anything I missed? 
9 MR. KENDALL: Question on the Intermountain Surgical 
10 subpoena. 
11 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
12 MR. KENDALL: We addressed bullet points one, two, 
13 three, we've already satisfied. Then you went through seven, 
14 nine, I think eleven, thirteen and fifteen said yes, I'm going 
15 to allow it. 
16 THE COURT: Yeah. 
17 
18 
19 
20 
MR. KENDALL: I take that to mean, then, for example, 
four, five, six --
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. KENDALL: -- you're not allowing? 
21 THE COURT: So basically I'm allowing the invoices for 
22 Canyon Crest, Dr. Huntsman, the anesthesiologist, the physi-
23 cian's assistant, and then sort of the catchall here for any 
2 4 medical services. 
25 I'm not going to require that the checks be turned 
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1 over, and I'm not going to require that they provide invoices 
2 for any of the medical -- the Med Ser supplies or the DME 
3 supplies. Part of the reason for not requiring those is that 
4 seems to me to be something that is commonly used across the 
5 board with lots of providers. 
6 I'm sure there is plenty of information out there 
7 about what these generally cost. Your experts probably know 
8 what they cost. So I don't think we need to -- we need to have 
9 IMS turn over its invoices on that -- on that particular point. 
10 I think the relationship between IMS and Canyon Crest, 
11 Salt Lake Orthopedic, the anesthesiologist, I think the defense 
12 does need to at least see the bills, the invoices that went 
13 back and forth, so they can see what's going on. 
14 Okay, anything else? 
15 MR. COOPER: Two things. Because this motion to compel 
16 did not result in the provision of the medical records them-
17 selves, because I've already disbursed those to experts --
18 THE COURT: Okay, and that's fine. 
19 
20 
21 
22 Honor? 
MR. COOPER: -- so I'm assuming that that's not --
THE COURT: That's fine. 
MR. COOPER: -- considered to be a violation, your 
23 THE COURT: No, what I'm worried about here are what I 
24 see as the non-parties proprietary business records. These are 
25 records that given -- given their business model, I suspect 
-16-
1 they have some interest in keeping quiet how much they're 
2 paying their partic -- you know, Canyon Crest and the doctor. 
3 That's something they -- those are relationships they've devel-
4 oped, and I think that while you're entitled to look at them, I 
5 don't want them disbursed outside to anybody else without them 
6 knowing who it's going to and having a protection in place. 
7 MR. COOPER: The next issue really is just to prevent 
8 us from having to come back here, and that is this 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
can. 
THE COURT: Oh, we're coming back here, I'm sure, but--
MR. COOPER: Well, with this 
THE COURT: -- let's minimize the number of times we 
MR. COOPER: Exactly, and I mean, we've already heard 
14 that as between Canyon Crest and IMS, I think they're telling 
15 us that there is no bill. So even though I'm not going to get 
16 it by subpoena, am I going to be prohibited from deposing some-
17 body at Canyon Crest and IMS to try to et to the difference 
18 between the costs and the finance charges? 
19 THE COURT: Right. 
MR. COOPER: This is the biggest issue in the case. 20 
21 THE COURT: Right. You're kind of asking me to sort of 
22 pre-rule 
23 MR. KENDALL: Right, I was going to say --
24 THE COURT: -- on something? 
25 MR. KENDALL: -- we don't give advisory opinions, do 
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1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
we? 
along. 
THE COURT: Well, they don't. 
MR. KENDALL: Okay. 
THE COURT: I sometimes do just to help move the case 
MR. KENDALL: We would object, of course --
THE COURT: Sure. 
MR. KENDALL: -- for the same reasons. 
THE COURT: Sure. 
MR. KENDALL: Yeah. 
THE COURT: Sure. I imagine you probably would. My 
intent with this ruling today was to allow Mr. Cooper and his 
13 client to at least understand a little bit the costs. I don't 
14 want them getting down onto a line-by-line, but at least know, 
15 you know, this is how much it costs -- it actually costs IMS to 
16 have that surgical room. 
17 As I was looking at the subpoenas and looking at the 
18 briefing, it occurred to me that there may not be a charge or 
19 an invoice for this particular surgery, especially when you 
20 told me that this was -- they had exclusive use of a surgery 
21 room at Canyon Crest. 
22 MR. KENDALL: Right, it's a lease. 
23 THE COURT: It's probably a year-long lease, is what I 
2 4 would guess, or a lease. 
25 MR. KENDALL: Whatever it is. 
-18-
1 THE COURT: So I-- here's what -- what I would probably 
2 be inclined to rule, just so you know. Based on what I have in 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
front of me is I would -- I would likely allow Mr. Cooper to 
ask an IMS witness maybe if it was like a 30(b)-6 witness 
I would allow him to inquire into if there is a cost associated 
-- if there's an identifiable cost related to this specific 
surgery. So if this was leased for a few hours or a day or 
something like that, then I would definitely allow that. 
9 If the question -- if there's no way to separate that 
10 out -- and what we're talking about is a lease for a period of 
11 time -- we'll probably have to come back and have a chat about 
12 that. I'm not sure how to rule on that. 
13 So maybe -- hopefully the two of you can talk a little 
14 bit about this, and you know, maybe -- maybe Mr. Evans could 
15 proffer what might be said so we know whether or not we need 
16 to come back and have another statement of discovery issues. 
17 MR. KENDALL: Okay. 
18 MR. COOPER: Okay. 
19 
20 
THE COURT: So I'll leave that to the two of you; but 
that's -- that's where I'm leaning now, and that was -- that 
21 represents sort of the intent of my ruling today, is just to 
22 allow Mr. -- if it's -- if there's a very simple bill that 
23 Mr. Cooper can look at where he can see the difference between 
24 IMS's Canyon Crest's cost and bill and IMS-- not Canyon Crest's 
25 costs, but Canyon Crest's costs and IMS's, you know, total 
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1 bill, then I think he's entitled to know that. If it's going 
2 to get more complicated than that, then I think we need to come 
3 back and discuss it. 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
MR. KENDALL: Okay. 
THE COURT: Okay. All right, anything else? 
MR. COOPER: No, your Honor. Thank you. 
MR. KENDALL: Thank you. 
THE COURT: Okay, thank you, and enjoy the rest of your 
9 day. We'll be in recess. 
10 
11 
MR. KENDALL: You, too, your Honor. 
(Hearing concluded) 
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PROCEEDINGS 1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
(Exhibit-) O, Exhibit-11, Exhibit-) 4, 
Exhihit-15, Exhibit-) 6, Exhihit-17, Exhibit-18, 
Exhihit-19, and Exhibit-20 were marked for 
identification.) 
KADE T. HUNTSMAN, M.D., 
7 having been first duly sworn to tell the truth, 
8 was examined and testified as follows: 
9 EXAMINATION 
10 BY MR. COOPER: 
11 Q. The record should reflect that this is the time 
12 and place for taking the deposition of Dr. Kade Huntsman. 
13 It's being taken pursuant to notice and Utah Rules of 
14 Civil Procedure and may be used for all purposes 
15 consistent with those rules. 
16 Would you state your name and professional 
1 7 address for the record, please. 
18 A. Yes. It's Kade, middle initial T., Huntsman. 
19 And Salt Lake Orthopaedic Clinic, 1160 East 3900 South, 
20 Suite 5000, Salt Lake, Utah. 
21 Q. And you're an orthopedic surgeon practicing 
2 2 here in Salt Lake, correct? 
23 A. Yes. 
24 Q. Have you seen either Ignacio or Esther 
2 s Buenrostro in your capacity as an orthopedic surgeon? 
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1 A. Yes. I've seen them both. 
2 Q. I'm going to show you what's been marked as 
3 depositions Exhibit- l O and -11. 
4 Do you recognize those documents? 
5 A. Yes. 
6 Q. And what do you recognize these as? 
7 A. These - it's a statement of account for 
8 Intermountain Surgical indicating a bill of $500 for 
9 seeing me in consultation, one for both Esther and 
10 Ignacio. 
11 Q. So did you understand, when you saw these two 
12 people, that you were seeing them as a result of a 
13 referral by Intermountain Surgical? 
14 A. I don't know who referred the patient to see 
15 me, but I assume that we knew that there was involvement 
16 of Intermountain Surgical at the time I saw the patient, 
17 but I don't know who ref erred them to me. 
18 Q. And I asked you to bring your files today and 
19 you've brought those. You have one on Ignacio and one on 
20 Esther, correct? 
21 A. Yes, sir. 
22 Q. When you saw them, did you see them together or 
23 separately? 
24 A. I don't recall. I think I saw them on the same 
25 day, but I don't know if I saw them together in the same 
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1 room or not. 
2 Q. What is your relationship with Intermountain 
3 Surgical? 
4 A. I see some patients that they pay the bills 
5 for, and we do some surgeries that they pay the bills 
6 for. 
7 Q. So these bills that I've marked as Exhibit-I 0 
8 and -11, based on those bills, do you believe that 
9 Intermountain Surgical paid your consultation fee of $500 
10 and then billed somebody else for it? 
11 A. Yes. 
12 Q. Okay. How many patients do you see for 
13 Intermountain Surgical a year? 
14 A. I've -- I don't keep track of that. I'd have 
15 to go back and sort through it. But I would guess 60, 
16 70, 80 patients a year. 
17 Q. And then do you perform surgeries on at least 
18 some of those patients that you see? 
19 A. Yes. 
20 Q. Do you have an estimate of how many surgeries 
21 you've performed on patients that lntermountain Surgical 
22 is involved in? 
23 A. Same thing. I've never counted, but I would 
24 guess that it's maybe on half or two-thirds of those, so 
25 probably, I don't know, 40, 50. 
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Q. Do you perform all of those surgeries at Canyon 
Crest Surgical Center? 
A. No. The vast majority of them are done there. 
Q. When you say "vast majority," can you give us 
an idea? 
A. 90-plus percent. 
Q. Why? 
A. Why what? 
Q. Why do you perform them at Canyon Crest rather 
than some other facility? 
A. I would assume that Intermountain has a 
relationship with Canyon Crest, and so they have a 
complete setup for me to do spinal surgery out there; so 
we take the patients out there for those cases that we 
deem appropriate for that setting. If it's a bigger 
case, then we'll take that patient to a hospital. 
Q. And if you take it to a hospital, do you 
generally do it here at St. Mark's or does it vary? 
A. Generally here at St. Mark's. 
Q. What is the relationship when you see these 
patients on a consultation basis when you do this 
surgical consult? Do you -- are they your patients at 
that point, or are you just doing it to perform a 
consultation for Intermountain Surgical? 
A. They're my patients at that point. 
Page8 
Q. When you performed the evaluations on Ignacio 
and Esther Buenrostro, did you understand that the 
purpose was to determine whether or not surgery would be 
performed? 
A. When I'm seeing any patient, including patients 
Esther and Ignacio, I see them and make recommendations 
as to treatment options. That's the purpose of the 
visit. So if - that includes, you know, surgery, if 
needed. 
Q. Do you understand that Intermountain Surgical 
finances surgeries for people? 
A. I don't know exactly what their business 
arrangement is, but I know that they pay these bills. 
Q. And so do you know that your surgical 
consultation is a part of their vetting process or due 
diligence to determine whether or not they're going to 
finance the surgery for these people? 
A. I don't know how that works. 
Q. When you see a patient for lntermountain 
Surgical, you know that as a part of that evaluation is 
to make a causation opinion, correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And so when you saw Ignacio and Esther, you 
knew that part of the request from lntermountain Surgical 
was that you evaluate whether or not this was related to 
Q & A Reporting, Inc. (2) Pages 5 - 8 
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1 an accident that they were involved in on June 27th of 
2 2011? 
3 A. That's accurate. 
4 Q. Okay. How do you get this infonnation in 
5 advance of the surgical consultation? 
6 A. I don't get the information myself in advance 
7 until I'm about to walk into the patient's room and my 
8 office staff, who schedules appointments, will let me 
9 know that this is a patient that I need to make that 
10 determination on, a causation determination. 
11 Q. Okay. So in this case, the accident in 
12 question is one that happened on June 27th of 2011, and 
13 you were seeing them over three years later, on 
14 December 15th of2014; so did you know that that -- that 
15 it was an accident that happened on June 27th of 201 I 
16 that you needed to evaluate causation? 
17 A. Yes. 
18 Q. And that's -- again, how did you know that? 
19 Was there a form or something that came with the patient 
2 o so that you knew that this was the accident? 
21 A. I'm notified by my office, as I'm going in the 
22 room, that the patient is here and needs me to determine 
23 causation. And so as I go in to see the patient, I find 
24 that information out. And I go in, and I talk to the 
25 patient and sort through all of those issues, and then 
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1 come to a determination. 
2 Q. In the case oflgnacio and Esther, were you 
3 provided records from any other providers? 
4 A. Not at the time that I'd seen them, with the 
5 exception of Brent Felix, who works in this office as 
6 well. His chart and my chart are the same, and Esther 
7 had seen Dr. Felix in the past; so I had his records. 
8 Q. So on Esther's file that you brought with you, 
9 do you have Dr. Felix's records as well? 
10 A. Yes. 
11 Q. Okay. Are these your original files or did you 
12 make copies? 
13 A. These are original files. 
14 Q. All right. I'm going to mark those. After the 
15 deposition, we'll make arrangements to make copies, and 
16 I'll mark them as exhibits at that time. 
1 7 So to get back to my question, I'm not sure I 
18 totally understood it, did you get records from any 
19 providers other than Dr. Felix on Esther? 
2 o A. At the time of that visit, no, I did not. 
21 Q. Did you at any other time? 
22 A. I did get some records later on, and I can't 
23 remember ifit was on Ignacio or Esther, about some 
24 previous conservative treatment that they had had. 
25 Q. Do you have those records in your file? 
. \l in-U-Seri pPJ, 801.484.2929 
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1 A. I don't. 
2 Q. Do you still have those records? 
3 A. I'm sure that my office does. I don't know. 
4 Q. Who provided those records to you? 
5 A. I believe they're the attorney for Esther or 
6 Ignacio. 
7 Q. When? 
8 A. I'm not certain. Within the last month or so. 
9 Q. Okay. Did you issue a report on either one of 
10 them with those records? 
11 A. I did. 
12 Q. And is that record in the file? 
13 A. No, it's not. It's not in the office chart. 
14 MR. COOPER: Do you have that? 
15 MR. BOULTON: Do I have his report? 
16 MR. COOPER: Yes. 
17 MR. BOULTON: Yes. 
18 MR. COOPER: Can I see that? 
19 MR. BOULTON: Sure. I'm surprised you don't 
2 o have these. 
21 MR. COOPER: Yeah. Me, too. 
22 MR. BOULTON: I believe we've disclosed those. 
2 3 MR. COOPER: I don't remember seeing these, so 
24 whatever. Are these copies that I could mark as 
25 exhibits? 
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1 MR. BOULTON: Yeah. I have copies, obviously, 
2 at my office. Those are the only ones I have today, but 
3 we could use them as exhibits. 
4 MR. COOPER: Okay. Great. 
s (Exhibit-21 and Exhibit-22 were marked for 
6 identification.) 
7 Q. (BY MR. COOPER) Okay. I've marked two 
8 reports here, one as Exhibit-21, which is on Esther, and 
9 the other, which is Exhibit-22, which is on Ignacio. 
10 Are those the two reports that you authored 
11 recently on the Buenrostros? 
12 A. Yes. 
13 Q. If you don't mind, if I can just take a look at 
14 these real quick. Thank you. 
15 Did you use interpreters or an interpreter when 
16 you evaluated either or both of the Buenrostros? 
17 A. I don't recall. It's fairly common with 
18 Spanish speakers that we have an interpreter help us, but 
19 I don't recall specifically here. 
20 Q. Did the Buenrostros fill out a history form or 
21 any kind of thing like that to help you in evaluating the 
22 history? 
2 3 A. Yes. They both did. 
24 Q. Okay. Do you know whether they filled it out 
25 or somebody else helped them fill it out? 
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1 A. I don't know how that was filled out. 
2 Q. Could I see it in their files? 
3 A. Yes. This is Ignacio's. And there's a few 
4 pages behind that first page that the patient fills out. 
5 Q. The handwriting on that form, is it all 
6 Ignacio's? 
7 
8 
9 
A. I don't know. 
Q. Is it any of it yours? 
A. No. 
10 Q. It's the same sort of form that you have on 
11 Esther? 
12 A. Yes. 
13 Q. Okay. Is that the only intake history form 
14 that you have for both of them? 
15 A. Yes. There's a questionnaire and then there's 
16 another page; so there's basically two forms. 
17 Q. Okay. I've marked the report that you prepared 
18 as Exhibit-14. I think you have it there in front of 
19 you. You can -- and this is on -- we'll take Esther 
20 first. How much of this was taken from the forms as 
21 opposed to getting a verbal history from them? 
22 A. I get the verbal history from them, and then 
KADE T. HUNTSMAN 
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1 from a pinched nerve in their neck that shoots down into 
2 their arm. If it gets a little bit more severe, that can 
3 become numbness, and that can become weakness as well. 
4 
5 
So we're looking at three different things: pain, 
numbness, and weakness. 
6 
8 
Q. And in her case, did you understand that it was 
7 pain rather than numbness or weakness that was the 
primary complaint that she had? 
9 A. I documented in my note that she had some 
10 numbness as well. But my understanding was that her 
biggest complaint was the pain. 11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
Q. And where did you understand that she had 
numbness, or where did you document that she had 
numbness? 
A. On page 3 of my note it says sensation in left 
16 arm decreased in the C6 and C7 nerve root distributions. 
17 
18 
19 
Q. In that same note you say, "She is very clearly 
decreased in C7. 11 
What does that mean versus decreased? What's 
2 o the significance? 
21 A. We're trying to make sure that what we're 
22 seeing on an MRI scan or X-ray is consistent with what 
the complaints of the patient are. And she was 
complaining of a very specific distribution of the pain, 
which correlated well with the C7 nerve root. 
23 that information is combined with the information on the 23 
24 form. I don't know what percentage it is, but it's 24 
2 5 basically a -- both sets of information that are included 2 5 
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1 here. 
2 Q. Would you just explain how you prepared that, 
3 then? Is this you dictating this report, or is there 
4 somebody else that incorporates some of this information 
5 into your report? 
6 A. Some of this information gets put into the 
7 report based on that form in the back, and then as I 
8 dictate, it fills in the rest of the template. So I 
9 dictate certain boxes on an electronic medical record 
10 that then creates the report. 
11 Q. Under "Chief Complaint" in Esther's, you state 
12 that she had a sudden onset of, I guess, symptoms. When 
13 you say "sudden onset" in relationship to this accident 
14 that happened on June 27, 2011, what does that mean? 
15 A. It means that shortly after the accident she 
16 began to have pain; so it isn't something that happened 
17 slowly over a period of time. It was relatively soon 
18 after the accident. 
19 Q. Did she tell you how soon after the accident 
20 that she had the onset of pain? 
21 A. I don't recall. 
22 Q. In your report, you state that she had pain. 
23 And then down lower under "Chief Complaint" you say "no 
24 arm numbness." Can you explain that? 
25 A. It's very possible for patients to have pain 
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Q. But when you say it's clearly decreased in C7, 
does that mean some really significant decrease? 
A. It means it's significant, yes, but it also 
means that it's very clear-cut, that it's not - the 
opposite of the situation would be somebody that says, 
you know, "My arm is numb," butthey can't really tell 
you exactly where on the arm it's numb. 
Q. Okay. In the records that you were provided 
recently, did you get a copy of the ER report from 
August 1st of 2011? 
A. I believe I did, yes. 
Q. Okay. I'm going to show you what's been marked 
as Exhibit-15. Is that a document that you've seen 
previously? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You, then, read the portion of Exhibit-15 that 
relates to "History of Present Illness"? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you ascribe any significance to the fact 
that she said that after a chiropractor visit last 
Thursday, which would be the Thursday before 
August 3rd -- or August 1st of 2011, that two days later 
she had much worsening symptoms in the left arm, 
especially pain in the left neck? 
A. Yes. I see that. 
Q & A Reporting, Inc . (4) Pages 13 - 16 
BUENROSTRO v. 
NESBITT 
Page 17 
1 Q. Is that significant to you in terms of 
2 causation? 
3 A. It indicates that she had some symptoms prior 
4 to this emergency report. 
5 Q. Yes, but it also indicates that they became 
6 severe enough now that she went to the emergency room 
7 after a chiropractor visit. Is that significant in terms 
8 of causation? 
9 A. Yes, it is. 
10 Q. And why is it significant? 
11 A. It just indicates that she had had some pain, 
12 like I said, after going to the chiropractor; so it's 
13 another contributing factor to her having neck and arm 
14 pain. 
15 Q. The chiropractor adjustment is? 
16 A. Possibly, yes. 
17 Q. Okay. And so in terms of determining whether 
18 something is related to the auto accident, how did you 
19 take this into account? 
20 A. Well, she had the auto accident. I'm trying to 
21 see the date of that accident. 
22 Q. It's June 27th of 2011. 
2 3 A. So my understanding, from discussing this with 
24 her, was prior to that she didn't have any problems. 
25 After that she's having problems and she's seeking 
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1 treatment. And a chiropractic visit made those symptoms 
2 worse. 
3 Q. And so could the chiropractor have aggravated 
4 her condition? 
5 A. Yes. It's possible that the chiropractor 
6 aggravated her condition. 
7 Q. Okay. Were you able to determine this late in 
8 the game how much of her present condition was due to 
9 that aggravation versus the auto accident? 
10 A. Well, I think it's a minor contributor because, 
11 of course, she's seeking treatment from the chiropractor 
12 in the first place because of the problem. And now he's 
13 made it worse. And then any of these injuries like this 
14 wax and wane; so they get worse, they get better, they 
15 get worse, they get better. That's just routine. And so 
16 I take all that into consideration. And there's a slight 
17 possibility that the chiropractor made her situation 
18 worse, but my understanding was that that would be for a 
19 short period of time. 
2 o Q. And did you review the chiropractor's records? 
21 A. I did. 
22 Q. And do you recall that she didn't complain of 
2 3 any left arm or hand symptoms to the chiropractor? 
2 4 A. I don't recall that. 
25 Q. Would that be significant to you? 
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1 A. Ifshe ... 
2 Q. If she hadn't complained of left hand and arm 
3 symptoms until after the adjustment or adjustments? 
4 A. That could be significant information, yes. 
5 Q. Okay. And why would it be significant? 
6 A. If that's the case and she truly didn't have 
7 any, then it would make me think that possibly the 
8 chiropractor did more aggravation. 
9 Q. At page 2 of your report, you identified and 
10 described her neck rotation and forward flexion. 
11 A. Yes. 
12 Q. Are those all normal? 
13 A. Her neck rotation is a little bit less than 
14 normal but not much, and the forward flexion was normal. 
15 Q. And then am I not seeing it? Was there -- did 
16 you evaluate her extension? 
17 A. No. 
18 Q. Why? 
19 A. I did evaluate it. I should clarify. Part of 
20 the next line there it says "Spurling's test." And the 
21 Spurling's test is where you extend the neck and put 
2 2 compression on it to see if you can pinch the nerve root. 
23 And in her case, it was strongly positive. In other 
24 words, if I put her into extension, her arm would hurt. 
25 Q. And was it her left arm that did? 
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1 A. I would assume so, but all I said in that 
2 section was that it was positive; so it was causing arm 
3 pain. 
4 Q. On the next page under "Reflexes," you identify 
5 the Hoffmann's test, and you say it's strongly positive. 
6 Explain how you detennine a finding on a Hoffmann's test? 
7 A. So what we're looking for in a situation like 
8 this with severe stenosis is if there are any reflex 
9 changes, and she had definite reflex changes. A 
10 Hoffmann's test is where you flip a finger- kind of 
11 flick the finger and watch for a reflex in the thumb. 
12 And I could make her thumb jump quite easily by just 
13 flicking a different finger. That's a reflex that's 
14 pathologic. 
15 Q. For irritation where? 
16 A. Of the spinal cord. 
17 Q. At the time you saw Esther, did you have 
18 Dr. Felix's notes --
19 A. Yes. 
2 o Q. -- available? 
21 A. Yes, I did. 
22 Q. I marked what I think are Dr. Felix's records 
2 3 as Exhibit-16. Are those the same records that you had? 
2 4 So Dr. Felix saw her, what, about three years before you 
25 saw her? 
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1 A. Correct. 
2 Q. When he saw her, one of the things that he 
3 noted was that her ann pain is in the entire ann and 
4 radiates to the hand, including the ring and small 
s finger. Now, that's somewhat different than what she 
6 complained to you because it was middle and ring finger 
7 when she saw you, correct? 
8 A. Correct. 
9 Q. What's the significance of that, if any? 
10 A. It's a little bit of a different nerve 
11 distribution. It's very close to the same, but just a 
12 slightly different nerve distribution. 
13 Q. So in her case, is it significant that this is 
14 changed over a period of three years? 
15 A. No. I would expect it to change over that much 
16 time. And she has problems at multiple levels; so it's 
17 not surprising that she's got some different levels of 
18 nerve impingement at different times, depending on which 
19 nerve root happens to be irritated at that point. 
2 o Q. And then he also noted that she reports 
21 numbness in the inside of the ann and in the outside of 
22 the hand, and she does not report any weakness. Is that 
23 similar to the findings that you made? 
24 A. Yes. It is similar. 
25 Q. He also discussed her sensation findings. He 
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1 said "Sensation in the neck was intact, but decreased on 
2 the left at C8." 
3 A. Yes. 
4 Q. Now, that's different than what you found, 
5 correct? 
6 A. Slightly, yes. 
7 Q. Well, slightly. You didn't find any decrease 
8 in sensation at CS? 
9 A. Correct. When I saw her it was more in the C7 
10 distribution. 
11 Q. So, again, is that significant when you're 
12 evaluating causation? 
13 A. Not when you have injury at multiple levels in 
14 the neck. She has injury at multiple levels. And the 
15 significance here is that it's not just a nerve being 
16 pinched but the spinal cord itself. And when you're 
1 7 pinching the cord, you can get all kinds of different 
18 symptoms. So when I saw her, her biggest complaint was 
19 in the C7 distribution. When Felix saw her three years 
2 o prior, her biggest complaint was in the CS distribution. 
21 Both of those fit with the findings on her MRI scan of 
22 severe central spinal stenosis. 
2 3 Q. So when a person has severe stenosis in an 
24 injury of the kind that you think that she had, would you 
2 5 expect that that would show up on an EMG or NCV test? 
.\Un-C-Script:fy 801.484.2929 
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1 A. It depends. So a nerve conduction study it, 
2 early on, will be negative, and then later will become 
3 positive. And it's only good to measure how much motor 
4 loss there is. So there has to be gross loss of motor 
5 function before they're able to pick anything up. So you 
6 can have a lot of pain and numbness before -- excuse me 
7 - and still have a normal EMG and nerve conduction 
8 study. 
9 Q. So when you got these records recently, did you 
10 see this EMG report of January 24th of 2012? 
11 A. Yes. 
12 Q. And it does show that there is no evidence of 
13 active or chronic denervation changes that are sometimes 
14 observed in cervical radiculopathy, correct? 
15 A. Correct. 
16 Q. Okay. Did she have another EMG/NCV later? 
17 A. Not that I'm aware of. 
18 Q. And I think Dr. Felix detennined that she 
19 needed additional -- or he needed additional information 
2 o to determine if surgery was necessary to treat her 
21 condition. Last sentence of his report. 
2 2 A. Yes. He indicates that he discussed surgical 
23 and nonsurgical treatments, and that he had requested the 
24 EMG to see if she was a candidate for the surgery, and 
2 5 asked her to return if her symptoms were getting worse. 
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1 Q. And did she ever return? 
2 A. Not to Dr. Felix, no. 
3 Q. And did Dr. Felix get this EMG/NCV report that 
4 we marked as Exhibit-] 7? 
5 A. It's in the chart; so I would assume so. 
6 Q. Okay. Did he make any recommendation after 
7 seeing that? 
8 A. Not that I saw. 
9 Q. If you had been the surgeon instead of 
10 Dr. Felix, would you have recommended surgery at that 
11 point when -- based on the results of this EMG-NVC study, 
12 Exhibit-17? 
13 A. It would be difficult for me to say whether or 
14 not I would have recommended surgery. At that stage she 
15 hadn't had a whole lot of conservative treatment. I 
16 think he indicated no injections and things like that. 
17 So we probably would have treated her conservatively, and 
18 if the conservative treatment failed, then moved to 
19 surgery. 
20 Q. And have you seen the treatment that she had 
21 after she saw Dr. Felix? 
22 A. I have seen some of that treatment, yes. 
23 Q. What have you seen? 
24 A. I'd have to go back to my report. 
25 Q. Is it going to be in -- referenced in your 
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report that we marked as Exhibit what? 
A. This is Exhibit-21. And I noted in that report 
when I reviewed the records, I reviewed some from Injury 
Recovery Center; lntermountain Medical Center; Salt Lake 
MRI; Salt Lake Orthopaedic Clinic-Dr. Felix; and my own 
records; records from Dr. Joseph Watkins; Dr. Stewart 
Porter; Shannon Nelson, who's a chiropractor; Alta Sports 
and Pain Medicine; Michael Chen; and Patrick Garcia. I 
don't have specific recollections of each of those 
reports, but that's what I reviewed at the time. 
Q. And if we want to see those reports, you have 
them somewhere here; is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. When we finish this deposition, would you ask 
your office to make a copy of those reports? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Thank you. We'll mark those as a separate 
exhibit as well. 
Back to your report on Esther, you make a 
reference under "Assessment" to something called 
hyperreflexia. 
A. Yes. 
Q. What are you referring to there? In other 
words, what findings supported your indication of 
hyperreflexia? 
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A. The positive Spurling's test that we talked 
about earlier. Excuse me. That's not indicative of 
hyperreflexia. It's the Hoffmann's test that was 
4 strongly positive. That is indicative of hyperreflexia. 
5 Q. Would you expect somebody that had a positive 
6 Hoffmann's test, that they would continue to have that 
7 even up to the present? 
8 A. It can wax and wane, but it usually - once you 
9 have it, it usually persists. 
10 Q. If she doesn't have it now, would that be 
11 significant to you? 
12 A. No. Because really what it is is just 
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Did you have the actual films? 
I had the actual films of the 2014 study, and I 
don't recall ifl had the 2011 actual films or not. I 
know that I had the report. 
Q. Have you ever had the opportunity to compare 
the two? 
A. Yes. I have had the opportunity to compare the 
two. 
Q. I'm talking about the films. 
A. The - I don't specifically recall reviewing 
the films of the 2011. 
Q. And so when you compared, what did you compare, 
then? 
A. I - the two reports. So the report from 2011 
and the report from 2014, I had both of those at the time 
I saw her. I had the 2014 films, but I don't recall if I 
had the 2011 films. 
Q. The reason I'm asking this is because you made 
a diagnosis of progressive myelopathy. 
A. Yes. 
Q. And I assume that that was based upon a 
comparison of the 2011 scan with the 2014 scan; am I 
correct? 
A. Correct. But it also includes comparison of 
Dr. Felix's exam and then my exam. 
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Q. Okay. So help me understand what it was from 
2 both the films and Dr. Felix's exam that you felt 
supported the finding of progressive myelopathy. 
l 
3 
4 A. On the MRI scan of 2011, she has a description 
5 of-
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
Q. Let me just stop you for a second. 
one I marked as Exhibit-18? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. 
Is that the 
A. She - that report shows that she has stenosis 
11 secondary to a disc herniation, broad-based at C4-5, at 
12 CS-6 with just a millimeter of cord compression, and at 
C6-7. So at multiple levels in her neck she's got some 
disc herniations and some stenosis. 
13 indicative of what we see on the MRI scan, which is that 13 
14 she has severe stenosis impinging on her cord. And if 14 
15 the cord is irritated at that moment in time that you're 15 Then when you compare that with the MRI scan of 
2014, she now has severe central spinal stenosis. And 
the canal measurement there should be at least 10 or 
greater, and hers is 7.3 at C5-6 and 7 millimeters at 
C6-7. So that indicates it's very tight on the spinal 
cord itself, and it's the pressure on the spinal cord 
16 examining her, you should see reflex changes. So it's 
17 significant, but not as significant as what you see on 
18 the MRI scan. 
19 Q. The MRI scan that you were looking at, is that 
20 the one of September 30,2011? 
21 A. I have both the scan from 2011 as well as the 
22 scan from November of 2014. 
23 Q. Well, I guess my question is: Did you have 
24 both of those scans when you saw her in December of 2014? 
25 A. Yes. 
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21 that causes myelopathy. And my examination confirmed 
2 2 what I saw on the MRI, which is she had a positive 
Hoffmann's test, which is one of the indications of 
myelopathy. 
Q. And she didn't have that when she saw 
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1 Dr. Felix? 
2 A. He didn't note that, no. 
3 Q. Well, ifhe didn't note it, do you believe he 
4 tested it and it was negative? 
5 A. Yes. 
6 Q. Based on these two scans, what was it that 
7 caused the difference in compression between 2011 and 
8 2014? Was it-- let me just ask a little bit further. 
9 Was it advancement of the disc herniation, or was it bony 
10 growth, or a combination? 
11 A. A combination of both. She developed - on the 
12 first MRI scan, she had soft disc herniations. On the 
13 later examination, she has disc herniations with bone 
14 spurs, which are typical to see in progression after you 
15 have a disc herniation. 
16 Q. Did you feel in her case that any more testing 
17 was necessary --
18 A. No. 
19 Q. - for making the determination to recommend 
20 surgery? 
21 A. No. With that MRI scan and some hyperreflexia, 
22 by definition she has myelopathy, and she's a surgical 
23 candidate at that stage. 
24 Q. Let's go to Ignacio, if you would, please. And 
25 I marked his report as Exhibit-19, if you want to just 
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1 compare the two and make sure they're the same. 
2 A. Yes. That's the same. 
3 Q. So you saw him on the same day? 
4 A. Yes. 
5 Q. In his case, you recommended a -- well, 
6 let's -- I'm sorry. Let's go back to Esther for a 
7 second. 
8 You recommended what on her? 
9 A. I recommended surgical intervention on her. 
10 Q. And the -- it was a two-level surgical fusion; 
11 is that right? 
12 A. Yes. She's got problems at more than hvo 
13 levels, but those two levels are very severe, and I felt 
14 like they were the major contributors to her problem. 
15 Q. And, I'm sorry, the two levels that you felt 
16 needed fused were what? 
17 A. 5-6 and 6-7. 
18 Q. All right. On Ignacio, you recommended a 
19 three-level cervical fusion, correct? 
20 A. Yes. 
21 Q. C3-4, C4-5, and C5-6? 
22 A. Correct. 
23 Q. And you indicated in your report that his need 
24 for that surgery and the symptoms that he was exhibiting 
25 when you saw him were all due to this motor vehicle 
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accident. But you didn't indicate what motor vehicle 
accident. I assume you meant the June 27, 2011, 
accident; is that correct? 
A. Yeah. My note indicates he was involved in a 
motor vehicle accident in 2011. 
Q. Were you aware that he was involved in an 
accident on April 19th of 20 IO? 
A. I don't have a recollection of that. 
Q. You got records later. Did you get records 
that indicated that he had been involved in this auto 
accident on April 19th of 20 IO? 
A. I don't recall seeing that accident, but I'm 
not certain. 
Q. Okay. So you weren't aware that he had a neck 
injury in the April 19, 20 I 0, accident? 
A. At this time, I don't recall that. No. I 
don't believe I did. 
Q. If you had the additional history that he had 
an auto accident on April 19th of 20 I 0, and that he 
treated for a neck injury, and that at least part of his 
symptoms were left-handed numbness, would that be 
significant in determining causation in this case? 
A. Yes. 
Q. How would that be significant? 
A. It may indicate possibly that there were other 
Page 32 
factors that contributed to his current level of 
stenosis. 
Q. I'm going to hand you what I have marked as 
Exhibit-20. This is a report from a Dr. Bova. 
Have you ever heard of Dr. Bova? 
A. Yes, I have. 
Q. Okay. What do you know about Dr. Bova? 
A. He does conservative spinal treatment. I think 
I've actually seen this report. 
Q. Okay. If you would tum to page 2. 
A. Yes. 
Q. At the top of that, he is evaluating this 
accident, which happened on June 27th of 20 I I. And he 
makes this note, at the end of that second paragraph, 
"Mr. Buenrostro reported that following this 
treatment" -- that is, the treatment from June 28th to 
July 7th of 201 I -- "his symptoms from this accident 
improved to his pre-June 27,201 I, condition." 
Were you aware of that history when you made 
your causation opinion? 
A. When I made my second report, yes, I was aware 
of that. Prior to that, I was not. 
Q. And, again, I just got that report today; so I 
haven't had a chance to review it. 
How did you evaluate this information from 
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1 Dr. Bova in detennining causation in Mr. Ignacio 
2 Buenrostro's case? 
3 A. It is one small bit of information. And like I 
4 said earlier, the natural history of these is for the 
5 symptoms to wax and wane. And so if he gets treatment, 
6 you would expect him to get somewhat better, but that 
7 doesn't mean that the anatomical injury has gone away. 
8 It just means that it's settled down at that point in 
9 time; so you would expect the pain to return. 
10 Q. And as you read Dr. Buenrostro -- or Dr. Bova's 
11 report, it's clear that Ignacio had the same or similar 
12 symptoms from the April 20 IO accident. 
13 A. It's - my understanding of this report is that 
14 he has -- or he had similar symptoms, but, obviously not 
15 as severe as they were after the June 2011 accident. 
16 Q. In what way were they not as severe? 
17 A. Well, he indicates that the patient had an 
18 aggravation, was worse after the accident, and had to 
19 come in for treatment. That indicates that symptoms were 
20 worse. 
21 Q. Could also indicate that he was still suffering 
22 symptoms from the April 2010 accident, couldn't it? 
23 A. Yes. That's possible. 
24 Q. Were you aware that Mr. Buenrostro had an MRI 
25 in June of 20 IO? I'll show you what's been previously 
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1 marked as Exhibit-2 in this case. 
2 A. At my first evaluation, I wasn't aware of this. 
3 Q. Okay. And you were later? 
4 A. Yes. 
5 Q. Okay. And the MRI that you reviewed was one 
6 that was taken on November 8th of 2014; is that correct? 
7 A. Yes. 
8 Q. And that's the one -- the report at least is 
9 the one I've marked as Exhibit-?; is that right? 
10 A. That's correct. 
11 Q. Were you aware that we took the deposition of 
12 the radiologist who read the November 8, 2018 -- excuse 
13 me -- November 8, 2014, MRI? 
14 A. Was I aware that you had a -- took his 
15 deposition? 
16 Q. Yes. 
17 A. No. 
18 Q. We took his deposition, and he compared the 
19 actual films from November 8, 2014, with the films from 
20 the MRI on June 15th of 20 I 0. And he testified that the 
21 images on November 8th of2014 are not significantly 
22 different from the images on June 15th of 20 I 0. 
23 Would that be significant to you in fonnulating 
24 your causation opinion? 
25 A. No, because I had a chance to review these and, 
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Q. Did you review the actual films or just the 
reports? 
A. Just the reports. And the report does sound 
like it's progressed, that it's worse on the 2014 film, 
but he did have a lot of abnormalities on the 2010 MRI as 
well. 
Q. Okay. So with this additional information that 
you received -- and, again, I'll ask you to make copies 
of that -- is it still your opinion that Mr. Ignacio 
Buenrostro's symptoms and the need for surgery are 
causally related to the accident on June 27th of 2011? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you apportion any of the need for that 
surgery to the earlier accident in April of2010? 
A. Apportionment is very difficult because clearly 
he had anatomic changes on his MRI scan prior to that. 
And so for him, he's either had a permanent aggravation 
of his preexisting condition or he's had, you know, a 
causal injury that's made that worse. And so by either 
of those definitions, you know, I think it's had a 
problem. It's significantly worse after the accident; so 
I was apportioning everything to that accident because 
prior to that he kind of had a neck like most people have 
that has to get treated once in a while. 
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Q. As far as you know, neither Ignacio nor Esther 
have had surgery, correct? 
A. As far as I know, they have not. 
Q. Have you seen them again? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. So when you were provided records, you didn't 
evaluate them again? 
A. No. 
Q. So now we're, what, a little over two years 
since you saw them? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. Given the conditions that you've 
diagnosed in both of them, what would you expect their 
present condition to be? 
A. I would expect them to slowly progress and 
deteriorate over time, meaning worse pain, worse 
numbness, and worsening weakness. That waxes and wanes, 
but overall is a progressive negative trend. 
Q. In the case of Ignacio, you recommended the 
three-level ACDF at C3-6. What is your full 
nondiscounted fee for that surgery? 
A. I don't know. I would have to go ask the 
office what that amount is. 
Q. When you do these surgeries for IMS, do you 
discount your fee at all? 
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2 Q. How much do you discount your fee? 
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3 MR. KELSON: I would object to the extent this 
4 is collateral source and irrelevant for the current 
5 litigation. It's confidential and proprietary. 
6 Q. (BY MR. COOPER) How much do you discount --
7 A. I don't know exactly how much. 
8 Q. Is the discount that you provide to IMS the 
9 same or similar that you do to insurance companies like 
10 Blue Cross? 
11 MR. KELSON: Same objections. 
12 THE WITNESS: I have different contracts with 
13 different insurance carriers, and so the amount of a 
14 discount that varying insurance companies get is 
15 different. So Blue Cross, Cigna, Aetna, they all have 
16 different rates and different discounts that I negotiate 
1 7 with them. So none of them are the same; so I would say 
18 that it's a different amount than Intermountain. 
19 Q. Do you know whether the discount to IMS is a 
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1 MR. KELSON: Objection. It's irrelevant and 
2 confidential and proprietary. 
3 THE WITNESS: Same. I don't know exactly what 
4 the amount is. 
5 Q. (BY MR. COOPER) And, again, with patients that 
6 are referred through IMS, you discount that full 
7 nondiscounted fee somewhat, but you don't know the amount 
8 of the discount, correct? 
9 A. Correct. 
10 Q. And you don't know whether it's more or less 
11 than the discount that you give to Blue Cross, Aetna, 
12 Cigna, those? 
13 
14 
MR. KELSON: Same objections. 
THE WITNESS: Correct. 
15 Q. (BY MR. COOPER) Ifl could just see those two 
16 reports. I think we marked them as Exhibits --
17 MR. BOULTON: 21 and 22. 
18 THE WITNESS: You've got the one. 
19 
20 greater discount or a smaller discount than what you give 20 
21 to Blue Cross, Aetna, or Cigna? 21 
Q. (BY MR. COOPER) I have 21. Let's talk about 
21 for a second. At page 4, you estimated what the 
surgery would cost in Esther Buenrostro's case. Where 
22 did you get that information from? 22 MR. KELSON: Same objections. 
23 THE WITNESS: I would make the assumption that 23 A. Just my experience seeing patient bills and so 
24 forth. 24 it's less, but I would have to actually look at the 
25 amounts. 
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1 Q. (BY MR. COOPER) Who in your office would be 
2 most knowledgeable about the discounts in the full 
3 nondiscounted fee that you have for various surgeries? 
4 MR. KELSON: Same objections. 
5 THE WITNESS: I would have to ask the coding 
6 and billing and collecting office. I don't know that 
7 there's any one person. There's a team of people that do 
8 that, and I would have to ask one of them if they could 
9 research that and get that information. 
10 Q. (BY MR. COOPER) But it would be somebody in 
11 your billing office; is that right? 
12 A. Yes. 
13 Q. Who's the main person in your billing office? 
14 A. I don't know. 
15 Q. When I say "your billing office," I assume 
16 we're talking about Salt Lake Orthopaedic Clinic, 
17 correct? 
18 A. Correct. 
19 Q. Okay. All of this evaluation, and if you had 
2 o done the surgery that we're talking about, would have 
21 been done through Salt Lake Orthopaedic Clinic? 
22 A. Yes. 
25 Q. Where did -- how many bills did you look at to 
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1 come up with that estimate? 
2 A. I don't know how many bills I've looked at 
3 through the years, but --
4 Q. In other words, if I wanted to see the bills 
5 that you are relying upon to make that cost range, would 
6 I be able to find them? 
7 
8 
9 
A. No. 
Q. I mean, could you produce them? 
A. No. We'd have to pull varying bills and see 
10 what the average is, but I don't know exactly what that 
11 amount is. That's my estimation. 
12 Q. All right. So to come up with this amount, you 
13 didn't go pull particular bills; this is just something 
14 that you had off the top of your head; am I following 
15 correctly? 
16 A. Yes. With some experience. 
17 Q. Well, I understand that. But, I mean, ifwe 
18 wanted to see the source of this, I can't go have you 
19 pull the same bills that you used; these are just numbers 
2 o that you kind of came up with over time; is that right? 
21 
22 
A. Yes. 
23 Q. In the case of Esther, you recommended the 23 
24 two-level ACDF at C5-7. What is your full nondiscounted 24 
2 5 fee for that surgery? 2 5 
Q. Okay. Did you look at any of the bills from 
any of the other providers? 
A. To make this estimate? 
Q. No. No. I'm sorry. I'm off on something 
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l different. 
2 You say that the treatment described in the 
3 enclosed medical records was reasonable, necessary, and 
4 related to the June 28, 2011, auto collision. Did you 
5 look at their bills as well? 
6 A. No. 
7 Q. So you didn't offer any opinion as to whether 
8 their bills were reasonable and customary? 
9 A. Correct. 
10 Q. On Exhibit-22, which is Ignacio, you made an 
11 estimate of the cost of surgery for the three-level ACDF. 
12 Same basis as you described in Esther; this is just 
13 information that you have kind of formulated over time, 
14 but you couldn't go find specific bills that support 
15 this; is that right? 
16 A. Correct. 
17 Q. And, again, in her case, you didn't look at any 
18 of the bills from any of the other providers that saw 
19 her? 
2 o A. No, I did not. 
21 Q. Okay. Thank you. I have no further questions 
2 2 at this time. 
23 MR. BOULTON: I have no questions. 
24 MR. KELSON: It's my understanding you 
25 generally don't read; is that correct? 
1 THE WITNESS: That's correct. 
2 (The deposition concluded at 7:55 a.m.) 
3 (Exhibit-12, Exhibit-13, Exhibit-23, and 
4 Exhjbit-24 were marked for identification.) 
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2 State of Utah ) 
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3 County of Salt Lake ) 
4 I, Dawn Brunner-Hahn, a Registered Professional 
Reporter and Notary Public in and for the State of Utah, 
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That the deposition of Kade T. Huntsman, M.D., 
6 the witness in the foregoing deposition named, was taken 
on April 27, 2017; that said witness was by me, before 
7 examination, duly sworn to testify the truth, the whole 
truth, and nothing but the truth in said cause; 
8 That the testimony of said witness was reported 
9 
by me in stenotype and thereafter transcribed into 
typewriting and that a full, true, and correct 
transcription of said testimony so taken and transcribed 
10 is set forth in the preceding pages; 
That the witness waived his/her right to review 
11 the transcript, the Original transcript has been sealed 
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otherwise associated with any of the parties of said 
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thereof. 
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1 PROCEEDINGS 
2 ALAN TAYLOR MCDONALD, 
3 having been first duly sworn to tell the truth, 
4 was examined and testified as follows: 
5 MR. COOPER: The record should reflect that 
6 this is the time and place for taking the 30(b)(6) and 
7 30(b )( 4) deposition of lntermountain Surgical, LLC, being 
8 taken pursuant to notice and may be used for all purposes 
9 under the Utah civil rules. 
10 EXAMINATION 
11 BY MR. COOPER: 
12 Q. Would you state your name, address, and 
13 position with lntermountain Surgical. 
14 A. Alan Taylor McDonald. 11762 South State 
15 Street, No. 315, Draper, Utah 84020. Chief executive 
16 officer of Intermountain Surgical, LLC. 
17 Q. And the address that you gave, that's the 
18 address -- the office address of Intermountain Surgical, 
19 correct? 
20 A. Correct. 
21 Q. I may,just because I've got into the habit of 
22 it, refer to Intermountain Surgical as IMS. You'll 
23 understand what I'm talking about if I do that? 
24 A. Yes. 
25 Q. Okay. Thank you. 
Page4 
1 If you would, tum to Exhibit-47. I think 
2 these are all in order right now. Exhibit-47 is the 
3 amended notice of deposition in this matter. Have you 
4 seen that before today? 
5 A. Yes. 
6 Q. And you've had an opportunity to look at the 
7 various subparts of it and consider those, correct? 
8 A. Yes. 
9 Q. Have you had sufficient opportunity to review 
10 that matter and -- so that you can come here and testify 
11 about each of those issues? 
12 A. Yes. 
13 Q. Thank you. Did you --
14 MR. EV ANS: You received my objections? 
15 MR. COOPER: I did. 
16 MR. EV ANS: So just subject to those 
17 objections, yes. 
18 MR. COOPER: You bet. And I understand, as we 
19 get into this, that there may be objections to the scope 
20 of those questions, and we'll deal with that when we come 
21 to it. 
22 Q. (BY MR. COOPER) Although this may be obvious, 
23 would you just explain what there is about your position 
24 at IMS that gives you the ability to respond to all of 
25 these subissues? 
Q & A Reporting, Inc. (1) Pages 1 - 4 
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1 A. I've been the chief executive officer of IMS 1 MR. COOPER: Well, remember, my question was 
2 since July 2012, and am probably the person most 2 about Mr. Vigueras1s file. Are those documents part of 
3 knowledgeable in the business to answer the topics that 3 Mr. Vigueras's file? 
4 are contained here in this notice of deposition. 4 MR. EV ANS: No. No. 
5 Q. Okay. What did you do to prepare for this 5 MR. COOPER: Then --
6 deposition, besides review this notice? 6 MR. EV ANS: Mr. Vigueras's file has been 
7 A. Reviewed - well, besides reviewing the notice, 7 produced. 
8 I had discussions and conferences with my legal counsel. 8 MR. COOPER: That was my question, if I 
9 Q. Okay. Did you consult with anybody else in the 9 remember correctly. 
10 organization in order to familiarize yourself with 10 MR. EV ANS: Yeah. Well, yes, kind of. 
11 background or facts so that you could answer questions 11 MR. COOPER: Well, I don't want to go back and 
12 concerning IMS? 12 have it reread. Let me ask it again. 
13 A. No. 13 MR. EV ANS: Okay. 
14 Q. Did you review any documents in preparation for 14 Q. (BY MR. COOPER) IMS maintains a file on 
15 the deposition? 15 Mr. Vigueras? 
16 A. Yes. 16 A. Yes. 
17 Q. What documents did you review? 17 Q. And all of the documents in Mr. Vigueras's file 
18 A. Oh, I reviewed the invoice for the services 18 have been produced, as far as you know? 
19 that were rendered to Mr. Vigueras-Amezcua. I reviewed 19 A. Yes. 
20 whatever documents had been produced in this matter, and 20 Q. Do you know when Intem10untain Surgical, LLC, 
21 just basically the underlying documents to 21 was formed? 
22 Mr. Vigueras-Amezcua's surgical procedure. 22 A. I think it was - I think it was initially 
23 Q. The documents that you reviewed, do you 23 formed in 2009. 
24 understand that all of those have been supplied in 24 Q. Who are the current owners of Intermountain 
25 discovery to me and other counsel involved in this 25 Surgical, LLC? 
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1 matter? 1 MR. EV ANS: I'm going to object, like I did 
2 A. Yes. Subject to the - to whatever my legal 2 yesterday, but in this instance, the ownership of 
3 counsel supplied. 3 Intermountain hasn't been identified as a subject matter, 
4 Q. I'm not sure I understand that answer. 4 and, really, the ownership oflntermountain is not really 
5 A. Well, ask me your question again. 5 relevant to any issue in this case. 
6 Q. Okay. Do you believe that all of the documents 6 MR. COOPER: I understand. 
7 that you reviewed have been produced to me and other 7 Q. (BY MR. COOPER) Go ahead. 
8 counsel in this matter? 8 MR. EV ANS: So I'm going to instruct him not to 
9 A. Yes. I believe so. 9 answer. 
10 Q. Does IMS maintain a file on Mr. Vigueras? 10 Q. (BY MR. COOPER) Okay. Do you know who the 
11 A. Yes. 11 owners oflntermountain Surgical, LLC, are? 
12 Q. Have all of the documents in that file been 12 A. Yes. 
13 produced? 13 Q. How many owners are there? 
14 MR. EV ANS: Objection. Subject to the court's 14 A. One. 
15 order. 15 Q. Is -- or does Canyon Crest Surgical II, LLC, 
16 MR. COOPER: Well, here's where I'm going, 16 have an ownership interest in IMS? 
17 Scott. I'm not asking you to produce or talk about 17 A. No. 
18 something that was not produced as a result of the court 18 Q. Does Dr. Huntsman have an ownership interest in 
19 order, but I just want to understand if there are 19 IMS? 
20 documents that haven't been produced, just by way of 20 A. No. 
21 identity-- 21 Q. Going back to January of 2016, so a year ago, 
22 MR. EV ANS: I can say there are a couple of 22 in January of 2016, did IMS have a license from the Utah 
23 documents that are internal accounting documents that 23 Department of Health to operate an ambulatory surgical 
24 don't deal specifically with him, the patient, and the 24 facility? 
25 court addressed that. 25 A. No. 
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l Q. Has it ever had such a license, to your l process? 
2 knowledge? 2 A. Kristi Jones, my compliance manager. 
3 A. No. 3 Q. What is a compliance manager in this context? 
4 Q. Can you just describe for me what the business 4 A. An individual who essentially vets a case like 
5 of Intermountain Surgical, LLC, is? 5 I just described. 
6 A. Yeah. IMS facilitates a healthcare 6 Q. Does Kristi Jones have a staff, or does she do 
7 opportunity, particularly orthopedic surgical consults 7 all of this herself? 
8 and procedures for personal injury victims, or victims 8 A. Yeah. She has staff. She does a lot of it 
9 who don't typically otherwise have access to high-end 9 herself. She delegates some of it. 
10 healthcare because they have no health insurance. 10 Q. How many employees does Intermountain Surgical 
11 Q. How does IMS identify potential clients, if you 11 have? 
12 will? 12 A. Intermountain Surgical has three employees. 
13 A. Typically attorneys who represent those 13 Q. And those are whom? 
14 personal injury victims will contact Intermountain 14 A. Tyson DowDell, James Henrichsen, and Luica 
15 Surgical seeking to access our network of physicians in 15 Becerra. 
16 seeking -- in helping their clients seek quality medical 16 Q. You didn't include yourself or Kristi Jones. 
17 care. 17 Are they additional employees or are they employed by--
18 Q. The network of physicians, can you explain what 18 well, that's my question. You didn't include them why? 
19 you mean by that? 19 A. Because they are not employees of Intermountain 
20 A. Yes. We have multiple orthopedic surgeons who 20 Surgical. 
21 work with Intermountain Surgical and who perform the 21 Q. But you are, correct? 
22 surgical consults and, if necessary, the procedures for 22 A. No. 
23 personal injury victims that they see that are introduced 23 Q. Who are you employed with? 
24 to them by Intermountain Surgical. 24 A. Well, I am the CEO of Intermountain Surgical. 
25 Q. So let me follow up on that to make sure I 25 My wages are paid by a different company. 
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1 understand. 1 Q. What company pays your wages? 
2 In some cases -- and I recognize that there may 2 MR. EV ANS: Again, not on the list. Not 
3 be variances to this -- but in some cases, an attorney 3 relevant. Instruct him not to answer. 
4 contacts IMS to determine if it might be interested in 4 Q. (BY MR. COOPER) Does the same company that 
5 financing the surgery for a client of theirs; am I 5 pays your wages pay Kristi Jones' wages? 
6 correct? 6 A. Yes. 
7 A. It's more they will contact us, understanding 7 Q. Why the disconnect there? I mean, why does 
8 that we have a network of qualified and quality 8 somebody -- another company pay your wages and those of 
9 orthopedic surgeons who will see their clients with no 9 Kristi Jones? 
10 out-of-pocket costs up front to their clients. 10 MR. EV ANS: Again, I'm not sure that -- it's 
11 Q. Does Intermountain Surgical vet these 11 not on the list. It's not really relevant to anything in 
12 referrals, or does it take everyone that's referred? 12 the case. I don't think he -- I'm going to instruct him 
13 A. Yeah. We vet the referrals. 13 not to answer. 
14 Q. In what way? 14 Q. (BY MR. COOPER) What does Tyson DowDell do 
15 A. We ask the attorney about the underlying - 15 for IMS? 
16 it's basically an intake process. In other words, we'll 16 A. Tyson's description is a -- is a market 
17 ask the attorney about the underlying case, what 17 manager, and Tyson markets to personal injury lawyers and 
18 happened, what are the facts, and basically is there 18 law firms, cultivates and maintains those relationships, 
19 insurance, ultimately, on the other end of this thing, 19 works as a liaison with our physicians and their 
20 whether it's uninsured, underinsured, or bodily injury 20 scheduling people, their staff, the staff at Canyon Crest 
21 coverage by a tortfeasor, and if the answer to those 21 Surgical Center, and their scheduling people, et cetera, 
22 questions is satisfactory, then we will go ahead and 22 to just make the Intermountain Surgical process go. 
23 green light a consult with one of the physicians that we 23 Q. James Hendricks, what's his position? 
24 work with, that we contract with. 24 A. Same description. 
25 Q. Who at IMS is responsible for that vetting 25 Q. And Luica Becerra? 
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1 A. She is an administrative assistant to both 1 A. Yes. I have a file. 
2 James and Tyson. 2 Q. And if there were such communications, you 
3 Q. Based on your review of Mr. Vigueras's file, do 3 would expect it to be in that file? 
4 you know how Mr. Vigueras was referred to IMS? 4 A. Yes. 
5 A. No, not specifically. 5 Q. Okay. So would you provide the full context of 
6 Q. I'm going to hand you what's been marked as 6 that file to counsel so that he can review it, and if it 
7 Exhibit-12 in Mr. Vigueras's deposition. This is the 7 is something that can be produced, then presumably, he 
8 earliest contact between Mr. Vigueras and lntermountain 8 will produce it; otherwise, you'll advise that there are 
9 Surgical that I've been able to find. Do you know if 9 documents in there that are going to be objected to? 
10 there's any earlier contact? 10 MR. EV ANS: Right. And we have produced what 
11 A. There would likely have been an earlier contact 11 we believe is in the file. 
12 which would precede this, which would be a request from 12 MR. COOPER: Okay. And that is exhibit what? 
13 the law firm to Luica or James or Tyson that they 13 MR. EV ANS: Well, there's Intermountain 
14 represent Mr. Vigueras. He has ongoing neck pain, 14 Surgical's first response back in October. 
15 cervical pain. He hasn't responded to conservative care. 15 MR. COOPER: And I'm sorry, Scott, that's 
16 He has what appears to be a positive finding on his MRI, 16 attached to which exhibit? 
17 and would Intermountain Surgical have a physician who 17 MR. EV ANS: It's not attached to any of your 
18 could see him, more or less. I'm kind of generalizing 18 exhibits. I brought it. 
19 the process. So there would likely have been some kind 19 MR. COOPER: So let me just see what you're 
20 of a contact between Intermountain Surgical and a 20 talking about. 
21 representative of Mr. Vigueras's law firm to initiate the 21 MR. EV ANS: It may be attached to an exhibit. 
22 process. 22 I don't know. I just brought it. 
23 Q. Okay. And the reason I asked that question is 23 MR. COOPER: Well, let's just check. So I 
24 in other cases, I've actually seen a communication 24 think that's Exhibit-46, Scott. 
25 between the law office and lntermountain Surgical, and I 25 MR. EVANS: Okay. Yeah. Exhibit-46. And then 
-
Page 14 Page 16 
1 think specifically with Ms. Becerra, in which there is a 1 there was November --
2 list of criteria, if you will, that's contained in that 2 MR. COOPER: But which document are you talking 
3 correspondence. Is there something similar in 3 about? 
4 Mr. Vigueras1s case? 4 MR. EV ANS: This contained the treatment files 
5 A. Possibly. I mean, sometimes that's verbal, and 5 or, you know -- this contained -- I mean, if you look at 
6 sometimes there's a fax or an e-mail. 6 it, it talks -- it has --
7 Q. Okay. The other reason I'm asking it is I want 7 MR. COOPER: I understand, but Exhibit-12 isn't 
8 to make certain in this case that I have all of the 8 in there, is it? 
9 records that pertain to Mr. Vigueras. And at least my 9 MR. EV ANS: Exhibit-12? 
10 recollection -- and sometimes I get confused because I 10 MR. COOPER: The document we were just looking 
11 get these records from various locations -- but I don't 11 at. 
12 recall that this communication between Dr. Huntsman's 12 MR. EV ANS: Okay. And then there was the 
13 office and Intermountain Surgical came from Intermountain 13 supplement on November 1st. It's not in there. All I'm 
14 Surgical. And so I still kind of question whether I got 14 saying is that we have produced what we believe was the 
15 the full file from Mr. Vigueras. Do you remember, from 15 file, so if we can go back and -- what is that? Yeah. 
16 looking at the file, whether there are communications, 16 If that's in our file, then we'll -- if that is in the 
17 like Exhibit- I 2, or communications from the law office 17 file, we'll produce it. That's the -- you can look at 
18 that communicated the criteria that was vetted before the 18 all of them. 
19 green light was given for Mr. Vigueras to have a consult? 19 MR. COOPER: Well, the November 1st response is 
20 A. I don't recall. I suppose I could check, but I 20 Exhibit-44. 
21 don't recall. 21 MR. EV ANS: Uh-huh. 
22 Q. Would you mind doing that? Provide that -- I 22 MR. COOPER: I don't see it in there. 
23 mean, you have those things available, correct? Excuse 23 MR. EV ANS: What I'm saying is in addition to 
24 me. I don't mean that you have that available because 24 what we produced, which we thought was the file, we'll go 
25 you don't know, but you have the file available? 25 back and look. As you well know, sometimes files are not 
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HEAL TH CARE FACILITY ~ 
LICENSING AND INSPECTION 
ACT, TITLE 26, CHAPTER 21, 
UTAH CODE 
T. 26, Ch. 21, Refs & Annos, UT ST T. 26, Ch. 21, Refs & Annos 
West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 26. Utah Health Code 
Chapter 21. Health Care Facility Licensing and Inspection Act 
U.C.A. 1953 T. 26, Ch. 21, Refs &Annos 
Currentness 
U.C.A. 1953 T. 26, Ch. 21, Refs & Annos, UT ST T. 26, Ch. 21, Refs & Annos 
Current through the 2017 First Special Session. 
End of Document ~~' 2017 Thomson Reutl!rs. :\io claim to original U.S. Government Works. 
WESTLAW © 2017 Thomson Reuters. No clz;rn to original U.S. Government \!\forks. 
§ 26-21-1. Title, UT ST§ 26-21-1 
West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 26. Utah Health Code 
Chapter 21. Health Care Facility Licensing and Inspection Act (Refs & Annos) 
Part 1. General Provisions 
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-1 
§ 26-21-1. Title 
Currentness 
This chapter is known as the "Health Care Facility Licensing and Inspection Act." 
Credits 
Laws 1981, c. 126, § 20; Laws 1990, c. 114, § 3; Laws 1997, c. 209, § 2, eff. May 5, 1997. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-1, UT ST§ 26-21-1 
Current through the 2017 First Special Session. 
End of Document 'v 2017 Thomson Reuters. No daim to original U.S. Gov~rnment Works. 
WESTLA\N © 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 
§ 26-21-2. Definitions, UT ST§ 26-21-2 
West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 26. Utah Health Code 
Chapter 21. Health Care Facility Licensing and Inspection Act (Refs & Annos) 
Part 1. General Provisions 
As used in this chapter: 
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-2 
§ 26-21-2. Definitions 
Currentness 
( 1) "Abortion clinic" means a type I abortion clinic or a type II abortion clinic. 
(2) "Activities of daily living" means essential activities including: 
(a) dressing; 
(b) eating; 
( c) grooming; 
(d) bathing; 
( e) toileting; 
(f) ambulation; 
(g) transferring; and 
(h) self-administration of medication. 
(3) "Ambulatory surgical facility" means a freestanding facility, which provides surgical services to patients not requiring 
hospitalization. 
(4) "Assistance with activities of daily living" means providing of or arranging for the provision of assistance with 
activities of daily living. 
WESTLAW © 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Vvorks. 
§ 26-21-2. Definitions, UT ST§ 26-21-2 
(5)(a) "Assisted living facility" means: 
(i) a type I assisted living facility, which is a residential facility that provides assistance with activities of daily living 
and social care to two or more residents who: 
(A) require protected living arrangements: and 
(B) are capable of achieving mobility sufficient to exit the facility without the assistance of another person; and 
(ii) a type II assisted living facility, which is a residential facility with a home-like setting that provides an array 
of coordinated supportive personal and health care services available 24 hours per day to residents who have been 
assessed under department rule to need any of these services. 
(b) Each resident in a type I or type II assisted living facility shall have a service plan based on the assessment, which 
may include: 
(i) specified services of intennittent nursing care; 
(ii) administration of medication; and 
(iii) support services promoting residents' independence and self sufficiency. 
(6) "Birthing center" means a freestanding facility, receiving maternal clients and providing care during pregnancy, 
delivery, and immediately after delivery. 
(7) "Committee" means the Health Facility Committee created in Section 26-1-7. 
(8) "Consumer" means any person not primarily engaged in the provision of health care to individuals or in the 
administration of facilities or institutions in which such care is provided and who does not hold a fiduciary position, or 
have a fiduciary interest in any entity involved in the provision of health care, and does not receive, either directly or 
through his spouse, more than 1/10 of his gross income from any entity or activity relating to health care. 
(9) "End stage renal disease facility" means a facility which furnishes staff-assisted kidney dialysis services, self-dialysis 
services, or home-dialysis services on an outpatient basis. 
(10) ••Freestanding" means existing independently or physically separated from another health care facility by fire walls 
and doors and administrated by separate staff with separate records. 
'NESTLAW © 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 2 
§ 26-21-2. Definitions, UT ST§ 26-21-2 
(11) ··General acute hospital" means a facility which provides diagnostic, therapeutic, and rehabilitative services to both 
inpatients and outpatients by or under the supervision of physicians. 
(12) "Governmental unit" means the state, or any county, municipality, or other political subdivision or any department, 
division, board, or agency of the state, a county, municipality, or other political subdivision. 
(13)(a) "Health care facility" means general acute hospitals, specialty hospitals, home health agencies, hospices, nursing 
care facilities, residential-assisted living facilities, birthing centers, ambulatory surgical facilities, small health care 
facilities, abortion clinics, facilities owned or operated by health maintenance organizations, end stage renal disease 
facilities, and any other health care facility which the committee designates by rule. 
(b) "Health care facility" does not include the offices of private physicians or dentists, whether for individual or group 
practice, except that it does include an abortion clinic. 
(14) "Health maintenance organization" means an organization. organized under the laws of any state which: 
(a) is a qualified health maintenance organization under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 300e-9; or 
(b)(i) provides or otherwise makes available to enrolled participants at least the following basic health care services: 
usual physician services, hospitalization, laboratory, x-ray, emergency, and preventive services and out-of-area 
coverage; 
(ii) is compensated, except for copayments, for the provision of the basic health services listed in Subsection (14) 
(b)(i) to enrolled participants by a payment which is paid on a periodic basis without regard to the date the health 
services are provided and which is fixed without regard to the frequency, extent, or kind of health services actually 
provided; and 
(iii) provides physicians' services primarily directly through physicians who are either employees or partners of such 
organizations, or through arrangements with individual physicians or one or more groups of physicians organized 
on a group practice or individual practice basis. 
(l S)(a) "Home health agency" means an agency, organization, or facility or a subdivision of an agency, organization, or 
facility which employs two or more direct care staff persons who provide licensed nursing services. therapeutic services 
of physical therapy, speech therapy, occupational therapy, medical social services, or home health aide services on a 
visiting basis. 
(b) "Home health agency" does not mean an individual who provides services under the authority of a private license. 
(16) "Hospice" means a program of care for the terminally ill and their families which occurs in a home or in a health 
care facility and which provides medical, palliative, psychological, spiritual, and supportive care and treatment. 
WESTLAW © 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 3 
§ 26-21-2. Definitions, UT ST§ 26-21-2 
(17) "Nursing care facility" means a health care facility, other than a general acute or specialty hospital, constructed, 
licensed, and operated to provide patient living accommodations, 24-hour staff availability, and at least two of the 
following patient services: 
(a) a selection of patient care services, under the direction and supervision of a registered nurse, ranging from 
continuous medical, skilled nursing, psychological, or other professional therapies to intermittent health-related or 
paraprofessional personal care services; 
(b) a structured, supportive social living environment based on a professionally designed and supervised treatment 
plan, oriented to the individual's habilitation or rehabilitation needs; or 
(c) a supervised living environment that provides support, training, or assistance with individual activities of daily 
living. 
(18) "Person" means any individual, firm, partnership, corporation, company, association, or joint stock association, 
and the legal successor thereof. 
(19) .. Resident" means a person 21 years of age or older who: 
(a) as a result of physical or mental limitations or age requires or requests services provicled in an assisted living facility; 
and 
(b) does not require intensive medical or nursing services as provided in a hospital or nursing care facility. 
(20) "Small health care facility" means a four to 16 bed facility that provides licensed health care programs and services 
to residents. 
(21) .. Specialty hospital" means a facility which provides specialized diagnostic, therapeutic, or rehabilitative services in 
the recognized specialty or specialties for which the hospital is licensed. 
(22) "Substantial compliance" means in a department survey of a licensee, the department determines there is an absence 
of deficiencies which would harm the physical health, mental health, safety, or welfare of patients or residents of a 
licensee. 
(23) "Type I abortion clinic" means a facility, including a physician's office, but not including a general acute or specialty 
hospital, that: 
(a) performs abortions, as defined in Section 76-7-301, during the first trimester of pregnancy; and 
WESTLAW @ 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 4 
§ 26-21-2. Definitions, UT ST§ 26-21-2 
(b) does not perform abortions, as defined in Section 76-7-301, after the first trimester of pregnancy. 
(24) "Type II abortion clinic" means a facility, including a physician's office, but not including a general acute or specialty 
hospital, that: 
(a) performs abortions, as defined in Section 76-7-301, after the first trimester of pregnancy; or 
(b) performs abortions, as defined in Section 76-7-301, during the first trimester of pregnancy and after the first 
trimester of pregnancy. 
Credits 
Laws 1981, c. 126, § 20; Laws 1985, c. 21, § 11; Laws 1990, c. 114, § 4; Laws 1994, c. 47, § 1; Laws 1996, c. 79, § 45, eff. 
April 29, 1996; Laws 1997, c. 209, § 3, eff. May 5, 1997; Laws 1998, c. 13, § 25, eff. May 4, 1998; Laws 1998, c. 192, § 
2, eff. July 1, 1998; Laws 2000, c. 1, § 46, eff. May 1, 2000; Laws 2005, c. 31, § 1, eff. July 1, 2005; Laws 2011, c. 161, 
§ 1, eff. July I, 2011. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-2, UT ST§ 26-21-2 
Current through the 2017 First Special Session. 
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§ 26-21-2.1. Services, UT ST§ 26-21-2.1 
West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 26. Utah Health Code 
Chapter 21. Health Care Facility Licensing and Inspection Act (Refs & Annos) 
Part 1. General Provisions 
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-2.1 
§ 26-21-2.1. Services 
Currentness 
(1) General acute hospitals and specialty hospitals shall remain open and be continuously ready to receive patients 24 
hours of every day in a year and have an attending medical staff consisting of one or more physicians licensed to practice 
medicine and surgery under Title 58, Chapter 67, Utah Medical Practice Act, or Title 58, Chapter 68, Utah Osteopathic 
Medical Practice Act. 
(2) A specialty hospital shall provide on-site all basic services required of a general acute hospital that are needed for the 
diagnosis, therapy, or rehabilitation offered to or required by patients admitted to or cared for in the facility. 
(3)(a) A home health agency shall provide at least licensed nursing services or therapeutic services directly through the 
agency employees. 
(b) A home health agency may provide additional services itself or under arrangements with another agency, 
organization, facility, or individual. 
Credits 
Laws 1990, c. 114, § 5; Laws 1997, c. 209, § 4, eff. May 5, 1997. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-2.1, UT ST§ 26-21-2.1 
Current through the 2017 First Special Session. 
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West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 26. Utah Health Code 
Chapter 21. Health Care Facility Licensing and Inspection Act (Refs & A1mos) 
Part 1. General Provisions 
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-3 
§ 26-21-3. Health Facility Committee--Members--Terms--Organization--Meetings 
Currentness 
(I) The Health Facility Committee created by Section 26-1-7 consists of 15 members appointed by the governor with 
the consent of the Senate. The appointed members shall be knowledgeable about health care facilities and issues. The 
membership of the committee is: 
(a) one physician, licensed to practice medicine and surgery under Title 58, Chapter 67, Utah Medical Practice Act, or 
Title 58, Chapter 68, Utah Osteopathic Medical Practice Act, who is a graduate of a regularly chartered medical school; 
(b) one hospital administrator; 
(c) one hospital trustee; 
(d) one representative of a freestanding ambulatory surgical facility; 
(e) one representative of an ambulatory surgical facility that is affiliated with a hospital; 
(f) two representatives of the nursing care facility industry; 
(g) one registered nurse, licensed to practice under Title 58, Chapter 31 b, Nurse Practice Act; 
(h) one professional in the field of intellectual disabilities not affiliated with a nursing care facility; 
(i) one licensed architect or engineer with expertise in health care facilities; 
(j) two representatives of assisted living facilities licensed under this chapter; 
(k) two consumers, one of whom has an interest in or expertise in geriatric care; and 
(I) one representative from either a home health care provider or a hospice provider. 
WESTLAW © 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 
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(2)(a) Except as required by Subsection (2)(b), members shall be appointed for a term of four years. 
(b) Notwithstanding the requirements of Subsection (2)(a), the governor shall, at the time of appointment or 
reappointment, adjust the length of terms to ensure that the terms of committee members are staggered so that 
approximately half of the committee is appointed every two years. 
(c) When a vacancy occurs in the membership for any reason, the replacement shall be appointed for the unexpired 
term by the governor, giving consideration to recommendations made by the committee, with the consent of the Senate. 
(d) A member may not serve more than two consecutive full terms or 10 consecutive years, whichever is less. However, 
a member may continue to serve as a member until he is replaced. 
(e) The committee shall annually elect from its membership a chair and vice chair. 
(f) The committee shall meet at least quarterly, or more frequently as determined by the chair or five members of the 
committee. 
(g) Eight members constitute a quorum. A vote of the majority of the members present constitutes action of the 
committee. 
Credits 
Laws 1981, c. 126, § 20; Laws 1990, c. 114, § 6; Laws 1996, c. 243, § 67, eff. April 29, 1996; Laws 1997, c. 209, § 5, eff. 
May 5, 1997; Laws 1999, c. 21, § 31, eff. May 3, 1999; Laws 2007, c. 158, § 1, eff. April 30, 2007; Laws 2008, c. 74, § 1, 
eff. May 5, 2008; Laws 2011, c. 366, § 29, eff. May 10, 2011. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-3, UT ST§ 26-21-3 
Current through the 2017 First Special Session. 
End of Document (g 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 
WESTLAW © 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 2 
§ 26-21-4. Per diem and travel expenses of committee members, UT ST§ 26-21-4 
West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 26. Utah Health Code 
Chapter 21. Health Care Facility Licensing and Inspection Act (Refs & Annos) 
Part 1. General Provisions 
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-4 
§ 26-21-4. Per diem and travel expenses of committee members 
Currentness 
A member may not receive compensation or benefits for the member's service, but may receive per diem and travel 
expenses in accordance with: 
(1) Section 63A-3-106; 
(2) Section 63A-3-107; and 
(3) rules made by the Division of Finance pursuant to Sections 63A-3-106 and 63A-3-l 07. 
Credits 
Laws 1996, c. 243, § 68, eff. April 29, 1996; Laws 2010, c. 286, § 60, eff. May 11, 2010. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-4, UT ST§ 26-21-4 
Current through the 2017 First Special Session. 
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§ 26-21-5. Duties of committee, UT ST§ 26-21-5 
West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 26. Utah Health Code 
Chapter 21. Health Care Facility Licensing and Inspection Act (Refs & Annos) 
Part 1. General Provisions 
The committee shall: 
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-5 
§ 26-21-5. Duties of committee 
Currentness 
(I) with the concurrence of the department, make rules in accordance with Title 63G, Chapter 3, Utah Administrative 
Rulemaking Act: 
(a) for the licensing of health-care facilities; and 
(b) requiring the submission of architectural plans and specifications for any proposed new health-care facility or 
renovation to the department for review; 
(2) approve the information for applications for licensure pursuant to Section 26-21-9; 
(3) advise the department as requested concerning the interpretation and enforcement of the rules established under this 
chapter; and 
(4) advise, consult, cooperate with, and provide technical assistance to other agencies of the state and federal government, 
and other states and affected groups or persons in carrying out the purposes of this chapter. 
Credits 
Laws 1981, c. 126, § 20; Laws 1990, c. 114, § 7; Laws 1991, c. 202, § 2; Laws 1991, c. 275, § 2; Laws 1992, c. 30, § 56; Laws 
1993, c. 4, § 68; Laws 1993, c. 234, § 17; Laws 1995, c. 28, § 12, eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 1997, c. 209, § 6, eff. May 5, 1997; 
Laws 2008, c. 382, § 309, eff. May 5, 2008; Laws 2016, c. 74, § 6, eff. May 10, 2016. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-5, UT ST§ 26-21-5 
Current through the 2017 First Special Session. 
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§ 26-21-6. Duties of department, UT ST§ 26-21-6 
West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 26. Utah Health Code 
Chapter 21. Health Care Facility Licensing and Inspection Act (Refs & Annos) 
Part 1. General Provisions 
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-6 
§ 26-21-6. Duties of department 
Currentness 
(I) The department shall: 
(a) enforce rules established pursuant to this chapter; 
(b) authorize an agent of the department to conduct inspections of health care facilities pursuant to this chapter; 
(c) collect information authorized by the committee that may be necessary to ensure that adequate health care facilities 
are available to the public; 
(d) collect and credit fees for licenses is free revenue; 
(e) collect and credit fees for conducting plan reviews as dedicated credits; 
(f)(i) collect and credit fees for conducting clearance under Chapter 21, Part 2, Clearance for Direct Patient Access; and 
(ii) beginning July 1, 2012: 
(A) up to $105,000 of the fees collected under Subsection ( I )(t)(i) are dedicated credits; and 
(B) the fees collected for background checks under Subsection 26-21-204(6) and Section 26-21-205 shall be 
transferred to the Department of Public Safety to reimburse the Department of Public Safety for its costs in 
conducting the federal background checks; 
(g) designate an executive secretary from within the department to assist the committee in carrying out its powers and 
responsibilities; 
(h) establish reasonable standards for criminal background checks by public and private entities; 
WESTLAW © 2017 Thomson Reuters. ~Jo claim to original U.S. Government Works. 
§ 26-21-6. Duties of department, UT ST§ 26-21-6 
(i) recognize those public and private entities that meet the standards established pursuant to Subsection ( 1 )(h); and 
(j) provide necessary administrative and staff support to the committee. 
(2) The department may: 
(a) exercise all incidental powers necessary to carry out the purposes of this chapter; 
(b) review architectural plans and specifications of proposed health care facilities or renovations of health care facilities 
to ensure that the plans and specifications conform to rules established by the committee; and 
(c) in accordance with Title 63G, Chapter 3, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act, make rules as necessary to 
implement the provisions of this chapter. 
Credits 
Laws 1981, c. 126, § 20; Laws 1990, c. 114, § 8; Laws 1991, c. 202, § 3; Laws 1993, c. 4, § 69; Laws 1993, c. 234, § 18; 
Laws 1997, c. 209, § 7, eff. May 5, 1997; Laws 1998, c. 169, § I, eff. July 1, 1998; Laws 2012, c. 328, § 1, eff. May 8, 2012; 
Laws 2016, c. 74, § 7, eff. May 10, 2016. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-6, UT ST§ 26-21-6 
Current through the 2017 First Special Session. 
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§ 26-21-6.5. Licensing of an abortion clinic-Rulemaking authority--Fee, UT ST§ 26-21-6.5 
West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 26. Utah Health Code 
Chapter 21. Health Care Facility Licensing and Inspection Act (Refs & Annos) 
Part 1. General Provisions 
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-6.5 
§ 26-21-6.5. Licensing of an abortion clinic--Rulemaking authority--Fee 
Currentness 
(1) Beginning on April I, 2012, a type I abortion clinic may not operate in the state without a license issued by the 
department to operate a type I abortion clinic. 
(2) A type II abortion clinic may not operate in the state without a license issued by the department to operate a type 
II abortion clinic. 
(3)(a) The department shall make rules establishing minimum health, safety, sanitary, and recordkeeping requirements 
for: 
(i) a type I abortion clinic; and 
(ii) a type II abortion clinic. 
(b) The rules established under Subsection (3)(a) shall take effect on April 1, 2012. 
(4) Beginning on April 1, 2012, in order to receive and maintain a license described in this section, an abortion clinic shall: 
(a) apply for a license on a form prescribed by the department; 
(b) satisfy and maintain the minimum health, safety, sanitary, and recordkeeping requirements established under . 
Subsection (3)(a) that relate to the type of abortion clinic licensed; 
(c) comply with the recordkeeping and reporting requirements of Subsection 76-7-305.6 (4) and Section 76-7-313; 
(d) comply with the requirements of Title 76, Chapter 7, Part 3, Abortion; 
(e) pay the annual licensing fee; and 
WESTLAW @ 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim lo original U.S. Government Worl<s. 
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(f) cooperate with inspections conducted by the department. 
(5) Beginning on April I, 2012, the department shall, at least twice per year, inspect each abortion clinic in the state to 
ensure that the abortion clinic is complying with all statutory and licensing requirements relating to the abortion clinic. 
At least one of the inspections shall be made without providing notice to the abortion clinic. 
(6) Beginning on April I, 2012, the department shall charge an annual license fee, set by the department in accordance 
with the procedures described in Section 631-1-504, to an abortion clinic in an amount that will pay for the cost of the 
licensing requirements described in this section and the cost of inspecting abortion clinics. 
(7) The department shall deposit the licensing fees described in this section in the General Fund as a dedicated credit 
to be used solely to pay for the cost of the licensing requirements described in this section and the cost of inspecting 
abortion clinics. 
Credits 
Laws 2011, c. 161, § 2, eff. July 1, 2011. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-6.5, UT ST§ 26-21-6.5 
Current through the 2017 First Special Session. 
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§ 26-21-7. Exempt facilities, UT ST§ 26-21-7 
West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 26. Utah Health Code 
Chapter 21. Health Care Facility Licensing and Inspection Act (Refs & Annos) 
Part 1. General Provisions 
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-7 
§ 26-21-7. Exempt facilities 
Currentness 
This chapter does not apply to: 
(1) a dispensary or first aid facility maintained by any commercial or industrial plant, educational institution, or convent; 
(2) a health care facility owned or operated by an agency of the United States; 
(3) the office of a physician or dentist whether it is an individual or group practice, except that it does apply to an 
abortion clinic; 
(4) a health care facility established or operated by any recognized church or denomination for the practice of religious 
tenets administered by mental or spiritual means without the use of drugs, whether gratuitously or for compensation, if 
it complies with statutes and rules on environmental protection and life safety; 
(5) any health care facility owned or operated by the Department of Corrections, created in Section 64-13-2; and 
(6) a residential facility providing 24-hour care: 
(a) that does not employ direct care staff; 
(b) in which the residents of the facility contract with a licensed hospice agency to receive end-of-life medical care; and 
(c) that meets other requirements for an exemption as designated by administrative rule. 
Credits 
Laws 1981, c. 126, § 20; Laws 1990, c. I 14, § 9; Laws 1995, c. 353, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1996; Laws 2004, c. 141, § 1, eff. May 
3, 2004; Laws 2011, c. 161, § 3, eff. July 1, 2011. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-7, UT ST§ 26-21-7 
Current through the 2017 First Special Session. 
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§ 26-21-8. License required-Not assignable or ... , UT ST § 26-21-8 
West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 26. Utah Health Code 
Chapter 21. Health Care Facility Licensing and Inspection Act (Refs & Annos) 
Part 1. General Provisions 
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-8 
§ 26-21-8. License required--Not assignable or transferable--Posting--
Expiration and renewal--Time for compliance by operating facilities 
Currentness 
(l)(a) A person or governmental unit acting severally or jointly with any other person or governmental unit, may not 
establish, conduct, or maintain a health care facility in this state without receiving a license from the department as 
provided by this chapter and the rules adopted pursuant to this chapter. 
(b) This Subsection (1) does not apply to facilities that are exempt under Section 26-21-7. 
(2) A license issued under this chapter is not assignable or transferable. 
(3) The current license shall at all times be posted in each health care facility in a place readily visible and accessible 
to the public. 
(4)(a) The department may issue a license for a period of time not to exceed 12 months from the date of issuance for 
an abortion clinic and not to exceed 24 months from the date of issuance for other health care facilities that meet the 
provisions of this chapter and department rules adopted pursuant to this chapter. 
(b) Each license expires at midnight on the day designated on the license as the expiration date, unless previously 
revoked by the department. 
(c) The license shall be renewed upon completion of the application requirements, unless the department finds the 
health care facility has not complied with the provisions of this chapter or the rules adopted pursuant to this chapter. 
(5) A license may be issued under this section only for the operation of a specific facility at a specific site by a specific 
person. 
(6) Any health care facility in operation at the time of adoption of any applicable rules as provided under this chapter 
shall be given a reasonable time for compliance as determined by the committee. 
WESTLAW © 2017 Thomson Reuters. No cla:m lo original U.S. Government Works. 
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Credits 
Laws 1981, c. 126, § 20; Laws 1990, c. 114, § 10; Laws 1993, c. 201, § I; Laws 1997, c. 209, § 8, eff. May 5, 1997; Laws 
2003, c. 155, § 1, eff. May 5, 2003; Laws 2011, c. 161, § 4, eff. July l, 2011; Laws 2016, c. 74, § 8, eff. May 10, 2016. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-8, UT ST§ 26-21-8 
Current through the 2017 First Special Session. 
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§ 26-21-9. Application for license-Information required--Public records, UT ST§ 26-21-9 
West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 26. Utah Health Code 
Chapter 21. Health Care Facility Licensing and Inspection Act (Refs & Annos) 
Part 1. General Provisions 
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-9 
§ 26-21-9. Application for license--Information required--Public records 
Currentness 
(1) An application for license shall be made to the department in a form prescribed by the department. The application 
and other documentation requested by the department as part of the application process shall require such information 
as the committee determines necessary to ensure compliance with established rules. 
(2) Information received by the department in reports and inspections shall be public records, except the information 
may not be disclosed if it directly or indirectly identifies any individual other than the owner or operator of a health 
facility (unless disclosure is required by law) or if its disclosure would otherwise constitute an unwarranted invasion of 
personal privacy. 
(3) Information received by the department from a health care facility, pertaining to that facility's accreditation by a 
voluntary accrediting organization, shall be private data except for a summary prepared by the department related to 
licensure standards. 
Credits 
Laws 1981, c. 126, § 20; Laws 1983, c. 132, § 1; Laws 1990, c. 114, § 11; Laws 2000, c. 86, § 27, eff. May 1, 2000; Laws 
2011, c. 297, § 181, eff. May 10, 2011. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-9, UT ST§ 26-21-9 
Current through the 2017 First Special Session. 
End of Document f,; 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Guv~rnmcnl Works. 
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West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 26. Utah Health Code 
Chapter 21. Health Care Facility Licensing and Inspection Act (Refs & Annos) 
Part 1. General Provisions 
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-9.5 
§ 26-21-9.5. Repealed by Laws 2012, c. 328, § 18, eff. May 8, 2012 
Currentness 
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-9.5, UT ST §26-21-9.5 
Current through the 2017 First Special Session. 
End of Document {~ ~017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Gl°>Vernment Works. 
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West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 26. Utah Health Code 
Chapter 21. Health Care Facility Licensing and Inspection Act (Refs & Annos) 
Part 1. General Provisions 
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-10 
§ 26-21-10. Repealed by Laws 1997, c. 209, § 18, eff. May 5, 1997 
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-10, UT ST§ 26-21-10 
Current through the 2017 First Special Session. 
End of D01.:umcnt 
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West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 26. Utah Health Code 
Chapter 21. Health Care Facility Licensing and Inspection Act (Refs & Annos) 
Part 1. General Provisions 
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-11 
§ 26-21-11. Violations--Denial or revocation oflicense--Restricting or prohibiting new admissions--Monitor 
Currentness 
If the department finds a violation of this chapter or any rules adopted pursuant to this chapter the department may 
take one or more of the following actions: 
(1) serve a written statement of violation requiring corrective action, which shall include time frames for correction of 
all violations; 
(2) deny or revoke a license if it finds: 
(a) there has been a failure to comply with the rules established pursuant to this chapter; 
(b) evidence of aiding, abetting, or permitting the commission of any illegal act; or 
(c) conduct adverse to the public health, morals, welfare, and safety of the people of the state; 
(3) restrict or prohibit new admissions to a health care facility or revoke the license of a health care facility for: 
(a) violation of any rule adopted under this chapter; or 
(b) permitting, aiding, or abetting the commission of any illegal act in the health care facility; 
(4) place a department representative as a monitor in the facility until corrective action is completed; 
(5) assess to the facility the cost incurred by the department in placing a monitor; 
(6) assess an administrative penalty as allowed by Subsection 26-23-6(1)(a); or 
(7) issue a cease and desist order to the facility. 
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Credits 
Laws 1981, c. 126, § 20; Laws 1990, c. 114, § 13; Laws 1997, c. 209, § 9, eff. May 5, 1997. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-11, UT ST§ 26-21-11 
Current through the 2017 First Special Session. 
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West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 26. Utah Health Code 
Chapter 21. Health Care Facility Licensing and Inspection Act (Refs & Annos) 
Part 1. General Provisions 
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-11.1 
§ 26-21-11.1. Failure to follow certain health care claims practices--Penalties 
Currentness 
(1) The department may assess a fine of up to $500 per violation against a health care facility that violates Subsection 
31A-26-301.5(4). 
(2) The department shall waive the fine described in Subsection (1) if: 
(a) the health care facility demonstrates to the department that the health care facility mitigated and reversed any 
damage to the insured caused by the health care facility's violation; or 
(b) the insured does not pay the full amount due on the bill that is the subject of the violation, including any interest, 
fees, costs, and expenses, within 120 days after the day on which the health care facility makes a report to a credit 
bureau or uses the services of a collection agency in violation of Subsection 31A-26-301.5(4). 
Credits 
Laws 2017, c. 321, § 1, eff. May 9, 2017. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-11.1, UT ST§ 26-21-11.1 
Current through the 2017 First Special Session. 
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West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 26. Utah Health Code 
Chapter 21. Health Care Facility Licensing and Inspection Act (Refs & Annos) 
Part 1. General Provisions 
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-12 
§ 26-21-12. Issuance of new license after revocation--Restoration 
Currentness 
( 1) If a license is revoked, the department may issue a new license only after it determines by inspection that the facility 
has corrected the conditions that were the basis of revocation and that the facility complies with all provisions of this 
chapter and applicable rules. 
(2) If the department does not renew a license because of noncompliance with the provisions of this chapter or the rules 
adopted under this chapter, the department may issue a new license only after the facility complies with all renewal 
requirements and the department determines that the interests of the public will not be jeopardized. 
Credits 
Laws 1981, c. 126, § 20; Laws 1990, c. 114, § 14; Laws 1997, c. 209, § 10, eff. May 5, 1997. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-12, UT ST§ 26-21-12 
Current through the 2017 First Special Session. 
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West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 26. Utah Health Code 
Chapter 21. Health Care Facility Licensing and Inspection Act (Refs & Annos) 
Part 1. General Provisions 
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-13 
§ 26-21-13. License issued to facility in compliance or substantial compliance with chapter and rules 
Currentness 
{ 1) The department shall issue a standard license for a health care facility which is found to be in compliance with the 
provisions of this chapter and with all applicable rules adopted by the committee. 
(2) The department may issue a provisional or conditional license for a health care facility which is in substantial 
compliance if the interests of the public will not be jeopardized. 
Credits 
Laws 1981, c. 126, § 20; Laws 1990, c. 114, § 15. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-13, UT ST§ 26-21-13 
Current through the 2017 First Special Session. 
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West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 26. Utah Health Code 
Chapter 21. Health Care Facility Licensing and Inspection Act (Refs & Annos) 
Part 1. General Provisions 
U.CA. 1953 § 26-21-13.5 
§ 26-21-13.5. Intermediate care facilities for people with an intellectual disability--Licensing 
Currentness 
(l)(a) It is the Legislature's intent that a person with a developmental disability be provided with an environment and 
surrounding that, as closely as possible, resembles small community-based, homelike settings, to allow those persons to 
have the opportunity, to the maximum extent feasible, to exercise their full rights and responsibilities as citizens. 
(b) It is the Legislature's purpose, in enacting this section, to provide assistance and opportunities to enable a 
person with a developmental disability to achieve the person's maximum potential through increased independence, 
productivity, and integration into the community. 
(2) After July 1, 1990, the department may only license intermediate care beds for people with an intellectual disability 
in small health care facilities. 
(3) The department may define by rule "small health care facility" for purposes oflicensure under this section and adopt 
rules necessary to carry out the requirements and purposes of this section. 
(4) This section does not apply to the renewal of a license or the licensure to a new owner of any facility that was licensed 
on or before July 1, 1990, and that licensure has been maintained without interruption. 
Credits 
Laws 1989, c. 48, § l; Laws 1993, c. 201, § 2; Laws 2011, c. 366, § 31, eff. May 10, 2011. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-13.5, UT ST§ 26-21-13.5 
Current through the 2017 First Special Session. 
End of Document ~' 2017 Thomson Reuters. Nu claim to original U.S. Govcmm~nt Works. 
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§ 26-21-13.6. Rural hospital-Optional service designation, UT ST§ 26-21-13.6 
West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 26. Utah Health Code 
Chapter 21. Health Care Facility Licensing and Inspection Act (Refs & Annos) 
Part 1. General Provisions 
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-13.6 
§ 26-21-13.6. Rural hospital--Optional service designation 
Currentness 
(I) The Legislature finds that: 
(a) the rural citizens of this state need access to hospitals and primary care clinics; 
(b) financial stability of remote-rural hospitals and their integration into remote-rural delivery networks is critical to 
ensure the continued viability of remote-rural health care; and 
(c) administrative simplicity is essential for providing large benefits to small-scale remote-rural providers who have 
limited time and resources. 
(2) After July I, 1995, the department may grant variances to remote-rural acute care hospitals for specific services 
currently required for licensure under general hospital standards established by department rule. 
(3) For purposes of this section, "remote-rural hospitals" are hospitals that are in a county with less than 20 people per 
square mile. 
Credits 
Laws 1995, c. 321, § 5, eff. May I, 1995. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-13.6, UT ST§ 26-21-13.6 
Current through the 2017 First Special Session. 
End of Document {', 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 
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§ 26-21-14. Closing facility-Appeal, UT ST§ 26-21-14 
West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 26. Utah Health Code 
Chapter 21. Health Care Facility Licensing and Inspection Act (Refs & Annos) 
Part 1. General Provisions 
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-14 
§ 26-21-14. Closing facility--Appeal 
Currentness 
(1) If the department finds a condition in any licensed health care facility that is a clear hazard to the public health, the 
department may immediately order that facility closed and may prevent the entrance of any resident or patient onto the 
premises of that facility until the condition is eliminated. 
(2) Parties aggrieved by the actions of the department under this section may obtain an adjudicative proceeding and 
judicial review. 
Credits 
Laws 1981, c. 126, § 20; Laws 1987, c. 161, § 65; Laws 1990, c. 114, § 16. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-14, ur ST§ 26-21-14 
Current through the 2017 First Special Session. 
End of Document • 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim 10 original U.S. Government Works. 
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§ 26-21-15. Action by department for injunction, UT ST§ 26-21-15 
West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 26. Utah Health Code 
Chapter 21. Health Care Facility Licensing and Inspection Act (Refs & Annos) 
Part 1. General Provisions 
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-15 
§ 26-21-15. Action by department for injunction 
Currentness 
Notwithstanding the existence of any other remedy, the department may, in the manner provided by law, upon the advice 
of the attorney general, who shall represent the department in the proceedings, maintain an action in the name of the 
state for injunction or other process against any person or governmental unit to restrain or prevent the establishment, 
conduct, management, or operation of a health care facility which is in violation of this chapter or rules adopted by 
the committee. 
Credits 
Laws 1981, c. 126, § 20; Laws 1990, c. 114, § 17. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-15, UT ST§ 26-21-15 
Current through the 2017 First Special Session. 
End of Dornment 't, 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to ()riginal U.S. Government \A/orks. 
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§ 26-21-16. Operating facility in violation of chapter a misdemeanor, UT ST§ 26-21-16 
West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 26. Utah Health Code 
Chapter 21. Health Care Facility Licensing and Inspection Act (Refs & Annos) 
Part 1. General Provisions 
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-16 
§ 26-21-16. Operating facility in violation of chapter a misdemeanor 
Currentness 
In addition to the penalties in Section 26-23-6, any person owning, establishing, conducting, maintaining, managing, or 
operating a health care facility in violation of this chapter is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
Credits 
Laws 1981, c. 126, § 20; Laws 1990, c. 114, § 18; Laws 1991, c. 241, § 18; Laws 1997, c. 209, § 11, eff. May 5, 1997; Laws 
2009, c. 347, § 4, eff. May 12, 2009. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-16, UT ST§ 26-21-16 
Current through the 2017 First Special Session. 
End of Document {', 201 i Thomson Reuters. :,,.io claim to original U.S. Government Works. 
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§ 26-21-17. Department agency of state to contract for ... , UT ST§ 26-21-17 
West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 26. Utah Health Code 
Chapter 21. Health Care Facility Licensing and Inspection Act (Refs & Annos) 
Part 1. General Provisions 
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-17 
§ 26-21-17. Department agency of state to contract for certification of facilities under Social Security Act 
Currentness 
The department is the sole agency of the state authorized to enter into a contract with the United States government for 
the certification of health care facilities under Title XVIII and Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 1 and any amendments 
thereto. 
Credits 
Laws 1981, c. 126, § 20; Laws 1990, c. 114, § 19. 
Footnotes 
1 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395 et seq. and 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396 et seq. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-17, UT ST§ 26-21-17 
Current through the 2017 First Special Session. 
End of Document (i";: 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 
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§ 26-21-18. Repealed by Laws 1990, c. 114, § 25, eff. April 23, 1990, UT ST§ 26-21-18 
West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 26. Utah Health Code 
Chapter 21. Health Care Facility Licensing and Inspection Act (Refs & Annos) 
Part 1. General Provisions 
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-18 
§ 26-21-18. Repealed by Laws 1990, c. 114, § 25, eff. April 23, 1990 
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-18, UT ST§ 26-21-18 
Current through the 2017 First Special Session. 
End of Dornmcnt 
Currentness 
{) 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 
V✓ESTI.AW @2017 Thomson Reuters. l✓ o c!Bim to original U.S. Governrnenl Works. 
§ 26-21-19. Life and Health Insurance Guaranty Association Act. .• , UT ST§ 26-21-19 
West's Utah Code Annotated· 
Title 26. Utah Health Code 
Chapter 21. Health Care Facility Licensing and Inspection Act (Refs & Annas) 
Part 1. General Provisions 
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-19 
§ 26-21-19. Life and Health Insurance Guaranty Association Act not amended 
Currentness 
The provisions of this chapter do not amend, affect, or alter the provisions of Title 31A, Chapter 28, Guaranty 
Associations. 
Credits 
Laws 1981, c. 126, § 20; Laws 1985, c. 242, § 3. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-19, UT ST§ 26-21-19 
Current through the 2017 First Special Session. 
End of Document <O 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim ro original U.S. Government Works. 
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§ 26-21-20. Requirement for hospitals to provide statements of .•. , UT ST§ 26-21-20 
West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 26. Utah Health Code 
Chapter 21. Health Care Facility Licensing and Inspection Act (Refs & Annos) 
Part 1. General Provisions 
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-20 
§ 26-21-20. Requirement for hospitals to provide statements of itemized charges to patients 
Currentness 
(1) For purposes of this section, "hospital" includes: 
(a) an ambulatory surgical facility; 
(b) a general acute hospital; and 
(c) a specialty hospital. 
(2) A hospital shall provide a statement of itemized charges to any patient receiving medical care or other services from 
that hospital. 
(3)(a) The statement shall be provided to the patient or the patient's personal representative or agent at the hospital's 
expense, personally, by mail, or by verifiable electronic delivery after the hospital receives an explanation of benefits 
from a third party payer which indicates the patient's remaining responsibility for the hospital charges. 
(b) If the statement is not provided to a third party, it shall be provided to the patient as soon as possible and 
practicable. 
(4) The statement required by this section: 
(a) shall itemize each of the charges actually provided by the hospital to the patient; 
(b)(i) shall include the words in bold "THIS IS THE BALANCE DUE AFTER PAYMENT FROM YOUR 
HEALTH INSURER"; or 
(ii) shall include other appropriate language if the statement is sent to the patient under Subsection (3)(b ); and 
(c) may not include charges of physicians who bill separately. 
WESTLAW «) 2017 Thomson Reuters. No clalrn to original U.S. Government Works. 
§ 26-21-20. Requirement for hospitals to provide statements of ... , UT ST§ 26-21-20 
(5) The requirements of this section do not apply to patients who receive services from a hospital under Title XIX of 
the Social Security Act. 1 
(6) Nothing in this section prohibits a hospital from sending an itemized billing statement to a patient before the hospital 
has received an explanation of benefits from an insurer. If a hospital provides a statement of itemized charges to a 
patient prior to receiving the explanation of benefits from an insurer, the itemized statement shall be marked in bold: 
"DUPLICATE: DO NOT PAY" or other appropriate language. 
Credits 
Laws 1989. c. 196. § 2; Laws 1990. c. 114, § 20; Laws 1997, c. 209, § 12. eff. May 5, 1997; Laws 2000, c. 86, § 28, eff. May 
I, 2000; Laws 2009, c. 11, § I, eff. May 12, 2009. 
Footnotes 
1 42 U.S.C.A. § 1936 et seq. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-20, UT ST§ 26-21-20 
Current through the 2017 First Special Session. 
End of Document ·{? 2017 Thomson Reuters. ~o claim to c•riginal U.S. Guvcrnment Works. 
V✓ESTLA'.\i @ 2017 Thomson Reuters. 1·~0 cla:m to original U.S. Governmenl Works. 2 
§ 26-21-21. Authentication of medical records, UT ST§ 26-21-21 
West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 26. Utah Health Code 
Chapter 21. Health Care Facility Licensing and Inspection Act (Refs & Annos) 
Part 1. General Provisions 
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-21 
§ 26-21-21. Authentication of medical records 
Currentness 
Any entry in a medical record compiled or maintained by a health care facility may be authenticated by identifying the 
author of the entry by: 
(1) a signature including first initial, last name, and discipline; or 
(2) the use of a computer identification process unique to the author that definitively identifies the author. 
Credits 
Laws 1992, c. 31, § 1. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-21, UT ST§ 26-21-21 
Current through the 2017 First Special Session. 
End of Document :() 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 
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§ 26-21-22. Reporting of disciplinary information--lmmunity from liability, UT ST§ 26-21-22 
West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 26. Utah Health Code 
Chapter 21. Health Care Facility Licensing and Inspection Act (Refs & Annas) 
Part 1. General Provisions 
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-22 
§ 26-21-22. Reporting of disciplinacy information--Immunity from liability 
Currentness 
A health care facility licensed under this chapter which reports disciplinary infomrntion on a licensed nurse to the Division 
of Occupational and Professional Licensing within the Department of Commerce as required by Section 58-31 b-702 is 
entitJed to the immunity from liability provided by that section. 
Credits 
Laws 1998, c. 288, § 1, eff. July 1, 1998. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-22, UT ST§ 26-21-22 
Current through the 2017 First Special Session. 
End of Document ~: 201 i Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 
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§ 26-21-23. Licensing of a new nursing care facility--Approval for ... , UT ST§ 26-21-23 
West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 26. Utah Health Code 
Chapter 21. Health Care Facility Licensing and Inspection Act (Refs & Annos) 
Part 1. General Provisions 
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-23 
§ 26-21-23. Licensing of a new nursing care facility--Approval for a licensed bed 
in an existing nursing care facility--Fine for excess Medicare inpatient revenue 
Currentness 
(I) Notwithstanding Section 26-21-2, as used in this section: 
(a) "Medicaid" means the Medicaid program, as that term is defined in Section 26-18-2. 
(b) "Medicaid certification" means the same as that term is defined in Section 26-18-501. 
(c) ••Nursing care facility" and .. small health care facility": 
(i) mean the fo!lowing facilities licensed by the department under this chapter: 
(A) a skilled nursing facility; 
(B) an intermediate care facility; or 
(C) a small health care facility with four to 16 beds functioning as a skilled nursing facility; and 
(ii) do not mean: 
(A) an intermediate care facility for the intellectually disabled; 
(B) a critical access hospital that meets the criteria of 42 U.S.C. 1395i-4(c)(2)(1998); 
(C) a small health care facility that is hospital based; or 
(D) a small health care facility other than a skilled nursing care facility with no more than 16 beds. 
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§ 26-21-23. Licensing of a new nursing care facility--Approval for ... , UT ST§ 26-21-23 
(d) .. Rural county" means the same as that term is defined in Section 26-18-501. 
(2) Except as provided in Subsection (6) and Section 26-21-28, a new nursing care facility shall be approved for a health 
facility license only if: 
(a) under the provisions of Section 26-18-503 the facility's nursing care facility program has received Medicaid 
certification or will receive Medicaid certification for each bed in the facility; 
(b) the facility's nursing care facility program has received or will receive approval for Medicaid certification under 
Subsection 26-18-503(5), if the facility is located in a rural county; or 
(c)(i) the applicant submits to the department the information described in Subsection (3); and 
(ii) based on that information, and in accordance with Subsection (4), the department determines that approval of 
the license best meets the needs of the current and future patients of nursing care facilities within the area impacted 
by the new facility. 
(3) A new nursing care facility seeking licensure under Subsection (2) shall submit to the department the following 
information: 
(a) proof of the following as reasonable evidence that bed capacity provided by nursing care facilities within the county 
or group of counties that would be impacted by the facility is insufficient: 
(i) nursing care facility occupancy within the county or group of counties: 
(A) has been at least 75% during each of the past two years for all existing facilities combined; and 
(B) is projected to be at least 75% for all nursing care facilities combined that have been approved for licensure 
but are not yet operational; 
(ii) there is no other nursing care facility within a 35-mile radius of the new nursing care facility seeking licensure 
under Subsection (2); and 
(b) a feasibility study that: 
(i) shows the facility's annual Medicare inpatient revenue, including Medicare Advantage revenue, will not exceed 
49% of the facility's annual total revenue during each of the first three years of operation; 
'NESTLA.W © 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 2 
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(ii) shows the facility will be financially viable if the annual occupancy rate is at least 88%; 
(iii) shows the facility will be able to achieve financial viability; 
(iv) shows the facility will not: 
(A) have an adverse impact on existing or proposed nursing care facilities within the county or group of counties 
that would be impacted by the facility; or 
(B) be within a three-mile radius of an existing nursing care facility or a new nursing care facility that has been 
approved for licensure but is not yet operational; 
(v) is based on reasonable and verifiable demographic and economic assumptions; 
(vi) is based on data consistent with department or other publicly available data; and 
(vii) is based on existing sources of revenue. 
(4) When determining under Subsection (2)(c) whether approval of a license for a new nursing care facility best meets 
the needs of the current and future patients of nursing care facilities within the area impacted by the new facility, the 
department shall consider: 
(a) whether the county or group of counties that would be impacted by the facility is underserved by specialized or 
unique services that would be provided by the facility; and 
(b) how additional bed capacity should be added to the long-term care delivery system to best meet the needs of current 
and future nursing care facility patients within the impacted area. 
(5) The department may approve the addition of a licensed bed in an existing nursing care facility only if: 
(a) each time the facility seeks approval for the addition of a licensed bed, the facility satisfies each requirement for 
licensure of a new nursing care facility in Subsections (2)(c), (3), and (4); or 
(b) the bed has been approved for Medicaid certification under Section 26-18-503 or 26-18-505. 
(6) Subsection (2) does not apply to a nursing care facility that: 
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(a) has, by the effective date of this act, submitted to the department schematic drawings, and paid applicable fees, for 
a particular site or a site within a three-mile radius of that site; 
(b) before July 1, 2016: 
(i) filed an application with the department for licensure under this section and paid all related fees due to the 
department; and 
(ii) submitted to the department architectural plans and specifications, as defined by the department by 
administrative rule, for the facility; 
(c) applies for a license within three years of closing for renovation; 
(d) replaces a nursing care facility that: 
(i) closed within the past three years; or 
(ii) is located within five miles of the facility; 
(e) is undergoing a change of ownership, even if a government entity designates the facility as a new nursing care 
facility; or 
(f) is a state-owned veterans home, regardless of who operates the home. 
(7)(a) For each year the annual Medicare inpatient revenue, including Medicare Advantage revenue, of a nursing care 
facility approved for a health facility license under Subsection (2)(c) exceeds 49% of the facility's total revenue for the 
year, the facility shall be subject to a fine of $50,000, payable to the department. 
(b) A nursing care facility approved for a health facility license under Subsection (2)(c) shall submit to the department 
the information necessary for the department to annually determine whether the facility is subject to the fine in 
Subsection (7)(a). 
(c) The department: 
(i) shall make rules, in accordance with Title 63G, Chapter 3, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act, specifying the 
information a nursing care facility shall submit to the department under Subsection (7)(b); 
(ii) shall annually determine whether a facility is subject to the fine in Subsection (7)(a); 
WESTLAW © 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 4 
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(iii) may take one or more of the actions in Section 26-21-11 or 26-23-6 against a facility for nonpayment of a fine 
due under Subsection (7)(a); and 
(iv) shall deposit fines paid to the department under Subsection (7)(a) into the Nursing Care Facilities Provider 
Assessment Fund, created by Section 26-35a-106. 
Credits 
Laws 2007, c. 24, § 2, eff. Feb. 28, 2007; Laws 2008, c. 382, § 311, eff. May 5, 2008; Laws 2013, c. 60, § 3, eff. May 14, 
2013; Laws 2016, c. 276, § 5, eff. March 25, 2016; Laws 2016, c. 357, § 1, eff. May 10, 2016; Laws 2017, c. 443, § 4, eff. 
July 1, 2017. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-23, UT ST§ 26-21-23 
Current through the 2017 First Special Session. 
End of Document '• 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government \Vorks. 
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§ 26-21-24. Prohibition against bed banking by nursing care ... , UT ST§ 26-21-24 
West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 26. Utah Health Code 
Chapter 21. Health Care Facility Licensing and Inspection Act (Refs & Annos) 
Part 1. General Provisions 
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-24 
§ 26-21-24. Prohibition against bed banking by nursing care facilities for Medicaid reimbursement 
Currentness 
(I) For purposes of this section: 
(a) "bed banking" means the designation of a nursing care facility bed as not part of the facility's operational bed 
capacity; and 
(b) "nursing care facility" is as defined in Subsection 26-21-23(1). 
(2) Beginning July 1, 2008, the department shall, for purposes of Medicaid reimbursement under Chapter 18, Part 1, 
Medical Assistance Programs, prohibit the banking of nursing care facility beds. 
Credits 
Laws 2008, c. 347, § 3, eff. Mar. 18, 2008. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-24, UT ST§ 26-21-24 
Current through the 2017 First Special Session. 
End of Document f) 2017 Thomson Reut~rs. No claim to original U.S. Gl)Vt:mment Works. 
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West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 26. Utah Health Code 
Chapter 21. Health Care Facility Licensing and Inspection Act (Refs & Annos) 
Part 1. General Provisions 
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-25 
§ 26-21-25. Patient identity protection 
Currentness 
( 1) As used in this section: 
(a) "EMTALA" means the federal Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act. 
(b) "Health professional office" means: 
(i) a physician's office; or 
(ii) a dental office. 
(c) "Medical facility" means: 
(i) a general acute hospital; 
(ii) a specialty hospital; 
(iii) a home health agency; 
(iv) a hospice; 
(v) a nursing care facility~ 
(vi) a residential-assisted living facility; 
(vii) a birthing center; 
(viii) an ambulatory surgical facility; 
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(ix) a smal1 health care facility; 
(x) an abortion clinic; 
(xi) a facility owned or operated by a health maintenance organization; 
(xii) an end stage renal disease facility; 
(xiii) a health care clinic; or 
(xiv) any other health care facility that the committee designates by rule. 
(2)(a) In order to discourage identity theft and health insurance fraud, and to reduce the risk of medical errors caused by 
incorrect medical records, a medical facility or a health professional office shall request identification from an individual 
prior to providing in-patient or out-patient services to the individual. 
(b) If the individual who will receive services from the medical facility or a health professional office lacks the legal 
capacity to consent to treatment, the medical facility or a health professional office shall request identification: 
(i) for the individual who lacks the legal capacity to consent to treatment; and 
(ii) from the individual who consents to treatment on behalf of the individual described in Subsection (2)(b)(i). 
(3) A medical facility or a health professional office: 
(a) that is subject to EMTALA: 
(i) may not refuse services to an individual on the basis that the individual did not provide identification when 
requested; and 
(ii) shall post notice in its emergency department that informs a patient of the patient's right to treatment for an 
emergency medical condition under EMT ALA; 
(b) may not be penalized for failing to ask for identification; 
(c) is not subject to a private right of action for failing to ask for identification; and 
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(d) may document or confirm patient identity by: 
(i) photograph; 
(ii) fingerprinting; 
(iii) palm scan; or 
(iv) other reasonable means. 
(4) The identification described in this section: 
(a) is intended to be used for medical records purposes only; and 
(b) shall be kept in accordance with the requirements of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 
1996. 
Credits 
Laws 2009, c. %, § 1, eff. May 12, 2009; Laws 2010, c. 218, § 15, eff. May 11, 2010. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-25, UT ST§ 26-21-25 
Current through the 2017 First Special Session. 
End of Document {; 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Wt)rks. 
WESTLA\V © 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim io original U.S. Government Works. 3 
§ 26-21-26. General acute hospital to report prescribed controlled ... , UT ST§ 26-21-26 
West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 26. Utah Health Code 
Chapter 21. Health Care Facility Licensing and Inspection Act (Refs & Annos) 
Part 1. General Provisions 
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-26 
§ 26-21-26. General acute hospital to report prescribed controlled substance poisoning or overdose 
Currentness 
(1) If a person who is 12 years ofage or older is admitted to a general acute hospital for poisoning or overdose involving 
a prescribed controlled substance, the general acute hospital shall, within three business days after the day on which the 
person is admitted, send a written report to the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing, created in Section 
58-1-103, that includes: 
(a) the patient's name and date of birth; 
(b) each drug or other substance found in the person's system that may have contributed to the poisoning or overdose, 
if known; 
(c) the name of each person who the general acute hospital has reason to believe may have prescribed a controlled 
substance described in Subsection ( I )(b) to the person, if known; and 
(d) the name of the hospital and the date of admission. 
(2) Nothing in this section may be construed as creating a new cause of action. 
Credits 
Laws 2010, c. 290, § 1, eff. May 11, 2010; Laws 2016, c. 99, § I, eff. May 10, 2016. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-26, UT ST§ 26-21-26 
Current through the 2017 First Special Session. 
End of Document ~: 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 
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West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 26. Utah Health Code 
Chapter 21. Health Care Facility Licensing and Inspection Act (Refs & Annos) 
Part 1. General Provisions 
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-27 
§ 26-21-27. Consumer access to health care facility charges 
Currentness 
Beginning January 1, 2011, a health care facility licensed under this chapter shall, when requested by a consumer: 
(1) make a list of prices charged by the facility available for the consumer that includes the facility's: 
(a) in-patient procedures; 
(b) out-patient procedures; 
(c) the 50 most commonly prescribed drugs in the facility; 
( d) imaging services; and 
(e) implants; and 
(2) provide the consumer with information regarding any discounts the facility provides for: 
(a) charges for services not covered by insurance; or 
(b) prompt payment of billed charges. 
Credits 
Laws 2010, c. 68, § 2, eff. March 22, 2010. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-27, UT ST§ 26-21-27 
Current through the 2017 First Special Session. 
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West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 26. Utah Health Code 
Chapter 21. Health Care Facility Licensing and Inspection Act (Refs & Annos) 
Part 1. General Provisions 
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-28 
§ 26-21-28. Pilot program for managed care model with a 
small health care facility operating as a skilled nursing facility 
Currentness 
(1) Notwithstanding the requirement for Medicaid certification under Chapter 18, Part 5, Long Term Care Facility--
Medicaid Certification, and Section 26-21-23, a small health care facility with four to 16 beds, functioning as a skilled 
nursing facility, may be approved for licensing by the department as a pilot program in accordance with this section, and 
without obtaining Medicaid certification for the beds in the facility. 
(2)(a) The department shall establish one pilot program with a facility that meets the qualifications under Subsection (3). 
The purpose of the pilot program is to study the impact of an integrated managed care model on cost and quality of care 
involving pre- and post-surgical services offered by a small health care facility operating as a skilled nursing facility. 
(b) The small health care facility that is operating as a skilled nursing facility and is participating in the pilot program, 
shall, on or before November 30, 2020, issue a report to the Legislative Health and Human Services Interim Committee 
on patient outcomes and cost of care associated with the pilot program. 
(3) A small health care facility with four to 16 beds that functions as a skilled nursing facility may apply for a license 
under the pilot program if the facility will: 
(a) be located in: 
(i) a county of the second class that has at least 1,800 square miles within the county; and 
(ii) a city of the fifth class; and 
(b) limit a patient's stay in the facility to no more than IO days. 
Credits 
Laws 2016, c. 357, § 2, eff. May 10, 2016. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-28, UT ST§ 26-21-28 
Current through the 2017 First Special Session. 
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West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 26. Utah Health Code 
Chapter 21. Health Care Facility Licensing and Inspection Act (Refs & Annos) 
Part 1. General Provisions 
( 1) For purposes of this section: 
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-29 
§ 26-21-29. Birthing centers--Regulatory restrictions 
Currentness 
(a) "Certified nurse midwife" means an individual who is licensed under Title 58, Chapter 44a, Nurse Midwife Practice 
Act. 
(b) "Direct-entry midwife" means an individual who is licensed under Title 58, Chapter 77, Direct-Entry Midwife Act. 
(c) ••Licensed maternity care practitioner" includes: 
(i) a physician; 
(ii) a certified nurse midwife; 
(iii) a direct entry midwife; 
(iv) a naturopathic physician; and 
(v) other individuals who are licensed under Title 58, Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing Act and 
whose scope of practice includes midwifery or obstetric care. 
(d) "Naturopathic physician" means an individual who is licensed under Title 58, Chapter 71, Naturopathic Physician 
Practice Act. 
(e) "Physician" means an individual who is licensed under Title 58, Chapter 67, Utah Medical Practice Act, or Title 
58, Chapter 68, Utah Osteopathic Medical Practice Act. 
(2) The Health Facility Committee and the department may not require a birthing center or a licensed maternity care 
practitioner who practices at a birthing center to: 
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(a) maintain admitting privileges at a general acute hospital; 
(b) maintain a written transfer agreement with one or more general acute hospitals; 
(c) maintain a collaborative practice agreement with a physician; or 
(d) have a physician or certified nurse midwife present at each birth when another licensed maternity care practitioner 
is present at the birth and remains until the maternal patient and newborn are stable postpartum. 
(3) The Health Facility Committee and the department shall: 
(a) pennit all types of licensed maternity care practitioners to practice in a birthing center; and 
(b) except as provided in Subsection (2)(b), require a birthing center to have a written plan for the transfer ofa patient 
to a hospital in accordance with Subsection ( 4 ). 
(4) A transfer plan under Subsection (3)(b) shall: 
(a) be signed by the patient; and 
(b) indicate that the plan is not an agreement with a hospital. 
(5) If a birthing center transfers a patient to a licensed maternity care practitioner or facility, the responsibility of the 
licensed maternity care practitioner or facility, for the patient: 
(a) does not begin until the patient is physically within the care of the licensed maternity care practitioner or facility; 
(b) is limited to the examination and care provided after the patient is transferred to the licensed maternity care 
practitioner or facility; and 
(c) does not include responsibility or accountability for the patient's decision to pursue an out-of-hospital birth and 
the services of a birthing center. 
(6)(a) Except as provided in Subsection (6)(c), a licensed maternity care practitioner who is not practicing at a birthing 
center may, upon receiving a briefing from a member of a birthing center's clinical staff, issue a medical order for the 
birthing center's patient without assuming liability for the care of the patient for whom the order was issued. 
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(b) Regardless of the advice given or order issued under Subsection (6)(a), the responsibility and liability for caring 
for the patient is that of the birthing center and the birthing center's clinical staff. 
(c) The licensed maternity care practitioner giving the order under Subsection (6)(a) is responsible and liable only for 
the appropriateness of the order, based on the briefing received under Subsection (6)(a). 
(7) The department shall hold a public hearing under Subsection 63G-3-302(2)(a) for a proposed administrative rule, 
and amendment to a rule, or repeal of a rule, that relates to birthing centers. 
Credits 
Laws 2016, c. 73, § 1, eff. May 10, 2016. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-29, UT ST§ 26-21-29 
Current through the 2017 First Special Session. 
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§ 26-21-100. Reserved, UT ST§ 26-21-100 
West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 26. Utah Health Code 
Chapter 21. Health Care Facility Licensing and Inspection Act (Refs & Annos) 
Part 1. General Provisions 
Reserved 
Credits 
Laws 2012, c. 328, § 2, eff. May 8, 2012. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-100 
§ 26-21-100. Reserved 
Currentness 
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-100, UT ST§ 26-21-100 
Current through the 2017 First Special Session. 
End of Document 'v 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Gov~rnment Works. 
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West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 26. Utah Health Code 
Chapter 21. Health Care Facility Licensing and Inspection Act (Refs & Annos) 
Part 2. Clearance for Direct Patient Access 
As used in this part: 
U.CA. 1953 § 26-21-201 
§ 26-21-201. Definitions 
Currentness 
(1) "Clearance" means approval by the department under Section 26-21-203 for an individual to have direct patient 
access. 
(2) "Covered body" means a covered provider, covered contractor, or covered employer. 
(3) "Covered contractor" means a person that supplies covered individuals, by contract, to a covered employer or covered 
provider. 
(4) "Covered employer" means an individual who: 
(a) engages a covered individual to provide services in a private residence to: 
(i) an aged individual, as defined by department rule; or 
(ii) a disabled individual, as defined by department rule; 
(b) is not a covered provider; and 
(c) is not a licensed health care facility within the state. 
(5) "Covered individual": 
(a) means an individual: 
(i) whom a covered body engages; and 
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(ii) who may have direct patient access; 
(b) includes: 
(i) a nursing assistant, as defined by department rule; 
(ii) a personal care aide, as defined by department rule; 
(iii) an individual licensed to engage in the practice of nursing under Title 58, Chapter 31 b, Nurse Practice Act; 
(iv) a provider of medical, therapeutic, or social services, including a provider of laboratory and radiology services; 
(v) an executive; 
(vi) administrative staff, including a manager or other administrator; 
(vii) dietary and food service staff; 
(viii) housekeeping and maintenance staff; and 
(ix) any other individual, as defined by department rule, who has direct patient access; and 
(c) does not include a student, as defined by department rule, directly supervised by a member of the staff of the 
covered body or the student's instructor. 
( 6) .. Covered provider" means: 
(a) an end stage renal disease facility; 
(b) a long-term care hospital; 
(c) a nursing care facility; 
(d) a small health care facility; 
(e) an assisted living facility; 
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(f) a hospice; 
(g) a home health agency; or 
(h) a personal care agency. 
(7) "Direct patient access" means for an individual to be in a position where the individual could, in relation to a patient 
or resident of the covered body who engages the individual: 
(a) cause physical or mental harm; 
(b) commit theft; or 
(c) view medical or financial records. 
(8) "Engage" means to obtain one's services: 
(a) by employment; 
(b) by contract; 
(c) as a volunteer; or 
(d) by other arrangement. 
(9) "Long-term care hospital": 
(a) means a hospital that is certified to provide long-term care services under the provisions of 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1395tt; 
and 
(b) does not include a critical access hospital, designated under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1395i-4(c)(2). 
(10) "Patient" means an individual who receives health care services from one of the following covered providers: 
(a) an end stage renal disease facility; 
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(b) a long-term care hospital; 
(c) a hospice; 
(d) a home health agency; or 
(e) a personal care agency. 
(11) .. Personal care agency" means a health care facility defined by department rule. 
(12) "Resident" means an individual who receives health care services from one of the following covered providers: 
(a) a nursing care facility; 
(b) a small health care facility; 
(c) an assisted living facility; or 
( d) a hospice that provides living quarters as part of its services. 
(13) "Residential setting" means a place provided by a covered provider: 
(a) for residents to live as part of the services provided by the covered provider; and 
(b) where an individual who is not a resident also lives. 
(14) "Volunteer" means an individual, as defined by department rule, who provides services without pay or other 
compensation. 
Credits 
Laws 2012, c. 328, § 3. eff. May 8, 2012. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-201, UT ST§ 26-21-201 
Current through the 2017 First Special Session. 
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West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 26. Utah Health Code 
Chapter 21. Health Care Facility Licensing and Inspection Act (Refs & Annos) 
Part 2. Clearance for Direct Patient Access 
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-202 
§ 26-21-202. Clearance required 
Currentness 
( 1) A covered provider may engage a covered individual only if the individual has clearance. 
(2) A covered contractor may supply a covered individual to a covered employer or covered provider only if the individual 
has clearance. 
(3) A covered employer may engage a covered individual who does not have clearance. 
(4)(a) Notwithstanding Subsections (1) and (2), if a covered individual does not have clearance, a covered provider may 
engage the individual or a covered contractor may supply the individual to a covered provider or covered employer: 
(i) under circumstances specified by department rule; and 
(ii) only while an application for clearance for the individual is pending. 
(b) For purposes of Subsection (4)(a), an application is pending if the following have been submitted to the department 
for the individual: 
(i) an application for clearance; 
(ii) the personal identification information specified by the department under Subsection 26-21-204(4)(b); and 
(iii) any fees established by the department under Subsection 26-21-204(9). 
Credits 
Laws 2012, c. 328, § 4, eff. May 8, 2012. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-202, UT ST§ 26-21-202 
Current through the 2017 First Special Session. 
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West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 26. Utah Health Code 
Chapter 21. Health Care Facility Licensing and Inspection Act (Refs & Annos) 
Part 2. Clearance for Direct Patient Access 
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-203 
§ 26-21-203. Department authorized to grant, deny, or 
revoke clearance--Department may limit direct patient access 
Currentness 
(1) As provided in Section 26-21-204, the department may grant, deny, or revoke clearance for an individual, including 
a covered individual. 
(2) The department may limit the circumstances under which a covered individual granted clearan~e may have direct 
patient access, based on the relationship the factors under Subsection 26-21-204(4)(a) and other mitigating factors may 
have to patient and resident protection. 
Credits 
Laws 2012, c. 328, § 5, eff. May 8, 2012. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-203, UT ST§ 26-21-203 
Current through the 2017 First Special Session. 
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West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 26. Utah Health Code 
Chapter 21. Health Care Facility Licensing and Inspection Act (Refs & Annos) 
Part 2. Clearance for Direct Patient Access 
U.CA. 1953 § 26-21-204 
§ 26-21-204. Clearance 
Currentness 
(1) The department shall determine whether to grant clearance for each applicant for whom it receives: 
(a) the personal identification information specified by the department under Subsection 26-21-204(4)(b); and 
(b) any fees established by the department under Subsection 26-21-204(9). 
(2) The department shall establish a procedure for obtaining and evaluating relevant information concerning covered 
individuals, including fingerprinting the applicant and submitting the prints to the Criminal Investigations and Technical 
Services Division of the Department of Public Safety for checking against applicable state, regional, and national criminal 
records files. 
(3) The department may review the following sources to determine whether an individual should be granted or retain 
clearance, which may include: 
(a) Department of Public Safety arrest, conviction, and disposition records described in Title 53, Chapter IO, Criminal 
Investigations and Technical Services Act, including information in state, regional, and national records files; 
(b) juvenile court arrest, adjudication, and disposition records, as allowed under Section 78A-6-209; 
(c) federal criminal background databases available to the state; 
( d) the Department of Human Services' Division of Child and Family Services Licensing Information System described 
in Section 62A-4a-1006; 
(e) child abuse or neglect findings described in Section 78A-6-323; 
(f) the Department of Human Services' Division of Aging and Adult Services vulnerable adult abuse, neglect, or 
exploitation database described in Section 62A-3-311.1; 
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(g) registries of nurse aids described in 42 C.F.R. Sec. 483.156; 
(h) licensing and certification records of individuals licensed or certified by the Division of Occupational and 
Professional Licensing under Title 58, Occupations and Professions; and 
(i) the List of Excluded Individuals and Entities database maintained by the United States Department of Health and 
Human Services' Office of Inspector General. 
(4) The department shall adopt rules that: 
(a) specify the criteria the department will use to determine whether an individual is granted or retains clearance: 
(i) based on an initial evaluation and ongoing review of infom1ation under Subsection (3); and 
(ii) including consideration of the relationship the following may have to patient and resident protection: 
(A) warrants for arrest; 
(B) arrests; 
(C) convictions, including pleas in abeyance; 
(D) pending diversion agreements; 
(E) adjudications by a juvenile court of committing an act that if committed by an adult would be a felony or 
misdemeanor, if the individual is over 28 years of age and has been convicted, has pleaded no contest, or is subject 
to a plea in abeyance or diversion agreement for a felony or misdemeanor, or the individual is under 28 years 
of age; and 
(F) any other findings under Subsection (3); and 
(b) specify the personal identification infom1ation that must be submitted by an individual or covered body with an 
application for clearance, including: 
(i) the applicant's Social Security number; and 
(ii) except for applicants under 18 years of age, fingerprints. 
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(5) For purposes of Subsection (4)(a), the department shall classify a crime committed in another state according to 
the closest matching crime under Utah law, regardless of how the crime is classified in the state where the crime was 
committed. 
(6) The Department of Public Safety, the Administrative Office of the Courts, the Department of Human Services, the 
Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing, and any other state agency or political subdivision of the state: 
(a) shall allow the department to review the infom1ation the department may review under Subsection (3); and 
(b) except for the Department of Public Safety, may not charge the department for access to the infonnation. 
(7) The department shall adopt measures to protect the security of the information it reviews under Subsection (3) and 
strictly limit access to the information to department employees responsible for processing an application for clearance. 
(8) The department may disclose personal identification information specified under Subsection (4)(b) to the Department 
of Human Services to verify that the subject of the information is not identified as a perpetrator or offender in the 
information sources described in Subsections (3)(d) through (0. 
(9) The department may establish fees, in accordance with Section 631-1-504, for an application for clearance, which 
may i~clude: 
(a) the cost of obtaining and reviewing information under Subsection (3); 
(b) a portion of the cost of creating and maintaining the Direct Access Clearance System database under Section 
26-21-209; and 
( c) other department costs related to the processing of the application and the ongoing review of information pursuant 
to Subsection (4)(a) to determine whether clearance should be retained. 
Credits 
Laws 2012, c. 328, § 6, eff. May 8, 2012. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-204, UT ST§ 26-21-204 
Current through the 2017 First Special Session. 
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West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 26. Utah Health Code 
Chapter 21. Health Care Facility Licensing and Inspection Act (Refs & Annos) 
Part 2. Clearance for Direct Patient Access 
U.C.A.1953 § 26-21-205 
§ 26-21-205. Department of Public Safety--Retention ofinformation--Notification of Department of Health 
Currentness 
The Criminal Investigations and Technical Services Division within the Department of Public Safety shall: 
(1) retain, separate from other division records, personal information, including any fingerprints, sent to it by the 
Department of Health pursuant to Subsection 26-21-204(3)(a); and 
(2) notify the Department of Health upon receiving notice that an individual for whom personal information has been 
retained is the subject of: 
(a) a warrant for arrest; 
(b) an arrest; 
(c) a conviction, including a plea in abeyance; or 
(d) a pending diversion agreement. 
Credits 
Laws 2012, c. 328, § 7, eff. May 8, 2012. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-205, UT ST§ 26-21-205 
Current through the 2017 First Special Session. 
End of Docum~nt ,() 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 
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West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 26. Utah Health Code 
Chapter 21. Health Care Facility Licensing and Inspection Act (Refs & Annos) 
Part 2. Clearance for Direct Patient Access 
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-206 
§ 26-21-206. Covered providers and covered contractors required to apply for clearance of certain individuals 
Currentness 
(1) As provided in Subsection (2), each covered provider and covered contractor operating in this state shall: 
(a) collect from each covered individual it engages, and each individual it intends to engage as a covered individual, 
the personal identification information specified by the department under Subsection 26-21-204(4)(b); and 
(b) submit to the department an application for clearance for the individual, including: 
(i) the personal identification information; and 
(ii) any fees established by the department under Subsection 26-21-204(9). 
(2) Clearance granted for an individual pursuant to an application submitted by a covered provider or a covered 
contractor is valid until the later of: 
(a) two years after the individual is no longer engaged as a covered individual; or 
(b) the covered provider's or covered contractor's next license renewal date. 
Credits 
Laws 2012, c. 328, § 8, eff. May 8, 2012. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-206, UT ST§ 26-21-206 
Current through the 2017 First Special Session. 
End of Document f:; 2017 Thom:;on Reuters. No daim to original U.S. Government Works. 
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West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 26. Utah Health Code 
Chapter 21. Health Care Facility Licensing and Inspection Act (Refs & Annos) 
Part 2. Clearance for Direct Patient Access 
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-207 
§ 26-21-207. Covered providers required to apply for clearance for certain individuals 
other than residents residing in residential settings--Certain individuals other 
than residents prohibited from residing in residential settings without clearance 
Currentness 
( 1) A covered provider that provides services in a residential setting shall: 
(a) collect the personal identification information specified by the department under Subsection 26-21-204(4)(b) for 
each individual 12 years of age or older, other than a resident, who resides in the residential setting; and 
(b) submit to the department an application for clearance for the individual, including: 
(i) the personal identification information; and 
(ii) any fees established by the department under Subsection 26-21-204(9). 
(2) A covered provider that provides services in a residential setting may allow an individual 12 years of age or older, 
other than a resident, to reside in the residential setting only if the individual has clearance. 
Credits 
Laws 2012, c. 328, § 9, eff. May 8, 2012. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-207, UT ST§ 26-21-207 
Current through the 2017 First Special Session. 
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West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 26. Utah Health Code 
Chapter 21. Health Care Facility Licensing and Inspection Act (Refs & Annos) 
Part 2. Clearance for Direct Patient Access 
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-208 
§ 26-21-208. Application for clearance by individuals 
Currentness 
(1) An individual may apply for clearance by submitting to the department an application, including: 
(a) the personal identification information specified by the department under Subsection 26-21-204(4)(b); and 
(b) any fees established by the department under Subsection 26-21-204(9). 
(2) Clearance granted to an individual who makes application under Subsection (1) is valid for two years unless the 
department determines otherwise based on its ongoing review under Subsection 26-21-204(4)(a). 
Credits 
Laws 2012, c. 328, § 10, eff. May 8, 2012. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-208, UT ST§ 26-21-208 
Current through the 2017 First Special Session. 
End of Document ~;:, 2017 Thoms\m Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 
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West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 26. Utah Health Code 
Chapter 21. Health Care Facility Licensing and Inspection Act (Refs & Annas) 
Part 2. Clearance for Direct Patient Access 
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-209 
§ 26-21-209. Direct Access Clearance System database--Contents--Use 
Currentness 
(1) The department shall create and maintain a Direct Access Clearance System database, which: 
(a) includes the names of individuals for whom the department has received: 
(i) an application for clearance under this part; or 
(ii) an application for background clearance under Section 26-8a-310; and 
(b) indicates whether an application is pending and whether clearance has been granted and retained for: 
(i) an applicant under this part; and 
(ii) an applicant for background clearance under Section 26-Sa-3 l 0. 
(2)(a) The department shall allow covered providers and covered contractors to access the database electronically. 
(b) Data accessible to a covered provider or covered contractor is limited to the information under Subsections (1) 
(a)(i) and (l)(b)(i) for: 
(i) covered individuals engaged by the covered provider or covered contractor; and 
(ii) individuals: 
(A) whom the covered provider or covered contractor could engage as covered individuals; and 
(B) who have provided the covered provider or covered contractor with sufficient personal identification 
information to uniquely identify the individual in the database. 
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(c)(i) The department may establish fees, in accordance with Section 631-1-504, for use of the database by a covered 
contractor. 
(ii) The fees may include, in addition to any fees established by the department under Subsection 26-21-204(9), an 
initial set-up fee, an ongoing access fee, and a per-use fee. 
Credits 
Laws 2012, c. 328, § 11, eff. May 8, 2012; Laws 2015, c. 307, § 4, eff. July 1, 2015. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-209, UT ST§ 26-21-209 
Current through the 2017 First Special Session. 
End of Document rt 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Gov1..'rnment Works. 
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West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 26. Utah Health Code 
Chapter 21. Health Care Facility Licensing and Inspection Act (Refs & Annos) 
Part 2. Clearance for Direct Patient Access 
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-210 
§ 26-21-210. No civil liability 
Currentness 
A covered body is not civilly liable for submitting to the department infom1ation required under this part or refusing to 
employ an individual who does not have clearance to have direct patient access under Section 26-21-203. 
Credits 
Laws 2012, c. 328, § 12, eff. May 8, 2012. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-210, UT ST§ 26-21-210 
Current through the 2017 First Special Session. 
End of Document f> 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 
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§ 26-21-211. Repealed pursuant to§ 631-1-226, eff. July 1, 2013, UT ST§ 26-21-211 
West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 26. Utah Health Code 
Chapter 21. Health Care Facility Licensing and Inspection Act (Refs & Annos) 
Part 2. Clearance for Direct Patient Access 
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-211 
§ 26-21-211. Repealed pursuant to§ 63!-1-226, eff. July 1, 2013 
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-211, UT ST§ 26-21-211 
Current through the 2017 First Special Session. 
End of Document 
Currentness 
:(:, :?.O 17 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government \Vorks. 
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West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 26. Utah Health Code 
Chapter 21. Health Care Facility Licensing and Inspection Act (Refs & Annos) 
Part 3. Assisted Living Facility Surveillance Act 
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-301 
§ 26-21-301. Title 
Currentness 
This part is known as the .. Assisted Living Facility Surveillance Act." 
Credits 
Laws 2016, c. 141, § I, eff. May 10, 2016. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-301, UT ST§ 26-21-301 
Current through the 2017 First Special Session. 
End of Document ,r;, 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 
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West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 26. Utah Health Code 
Chapter 21. Health Care Facility Licensing and Inspection Act (Refs & Annos) 
Part 3. Assisted Living Facility Surveillance Act 
As used in this pa rt: 
(1) "Facility" means an assisted living facility. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-302 
§ 26-21-302. Definitions 
Currentness 
(2) "Legal representative" means an individual who is legally authorized to make health care decisions on behalf of 
another individual. 
(3)(a) "Monitoring device" means: 
(i) a video surveillance camera; or 
(ii) a microphone or other device that captures audio. 
(b) "Monitoring device" does not include: 
(i) a device that is specifically intended to intercept wire, electronic, or oral communication without notice to or the 
consent of a party to the communication; or 
(ii) a device that is connected to the Internet or that is set up to transmit data via an electronic communication. 
(4) "Resident" means an individual who receives health care from a facility. 
(5) "Room" means a resident's private or shared primary living space. 
(6) "Roommate" means an individual sharing a room with a resident. 
Credits 
Laws 2016, c. 141, § 2, eff. May 10, 2016. 
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U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-302, UT ST§ 26-21-302 
Current through the 2017 First Special Session. 
End of Document © 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 
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West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 26. Utah Health Code 
Chapter 21. Health Care Facility Licensing and Inspection Act (Refs & Annos) 
Part 3. Assisted Living Facility Surveillance Act 
U.C.A.1953 § 26-21-303 
§ 26-21-303. Monitoring device--Installation, notice, and consent--Liability 
Currentness 
( 1) A resident or the resident's legal representative may operate or install a monitoring device in the resident's room if 
the resident and the resident's legal representative, if any, unless the resident is incapable of informed consent: 
(a) notifies the resident's facility in writing that the resident or the resident's legal representative, if any: 
(i) intends to operate or install a monitoring device in the resident's room; and 
(ii) consents to a waiver agreement, if required by a facility; 
(b) obtains written consent from each of the resident's roommates, and their legal rep:esenta tive, if any, that specifically 
states the hours when each roommate consents to the resident or the resident's legal representative operating the 
monitoring device; and 
(c) assumes all responsibility for any cost related to installing or operating the monitoring device. 
(2) A facility shall not be civilly or criminally liable to: 
(a) a resident or resident's roommate for the operation of a monitoring device consistent with this part; and 
(b) any person other than the resident or resident's roommate for any claims related to the use or operation of a 
monitoring device consistent with this part, unless the claim is caused by the acts or omissions of an employee or agent 
of the facility. 
(3) Notwithstanding any other provision of this part, an individual may not, under this part, operate a monitoring device 
in a facility without a court order: 
(a) in secret; or 
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(b) with an intent to intercept a wire, electronic, or oral communication without notice to or the consent of a party 
to the communication. 
Credits 
Laws 2016, c. 141, § 3, eff. May 10, 2016. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-303, UT ST§ 26-21-303 
Current through the 2017 First Special Session. 
End of Domment @ 2017 Thomson Reuters. No daim to original U.S. Government Works. 
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§ 26-21-304. Monitoring device-Facility admission, patient ... , UT ST§ 26-21-304 
West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 26. Utah Health Code 
Chapter 21. Health Care Facility Licensing and Inspection Act (Refs & Annos) 
Part 3. Assisted Living Facility Surveillance Act 
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-304 
§ 26-21-304. Monitoring device--Facility admission, patient discharge, and posted notice 
Currentness 
( 1) A facility may not deny an individual admission to the facility for the sole reason that the individual or the individual's 
legal representative requests to install or operate a monitoring device in the individual's room. 
(2) A facility may not discharge a resident for the sole reason that the resident or the resident's legal representative 
requests to install or operate a monitoring device in the individual's room. 
(3) A facility may require the resident or the resident's legal representative to place a sign near the entrance of the resident's 
room that states that the room contains a monitoring device. 
Credits 
Laws 2016, c. 141, § 4, eff. May 10, 2016. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-304, UT ST§ 26-21-304 
Current through the 2017 First Special Session. 
End of Document ~- 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim t0 original U.S. Government Works. 
WESTLAW © 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 1 
ADDENDUM6 
UTAH R. CIV. P.26 
(ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTES) 
RULE 26. GENERAL PROVISIONS GOVERNING DISCLOSURE ... , UT R RCP Rule 26 
West's Utah Code Annotated 
State Court Rules 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (Refs & Annos) 
Part V. Depositions and Discovery 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 26 
RULE 26. GENERAL PROVISIONS GOVERNING DISCLOSURE AND DISCOVERY 
Currentness 
(a) Disclosure. This rule applies unless changed or supplemented by a rule governing disclosure and discovery in a practice 
area. 
(a)(l) Initial disclosures. Except in cases exempt under paragraph (a)(3), a party shall, without waiting for a discovery 
request, serve on the other parties: 
(a)(l)(A) the name and, if known, the address and telephone number of: 
(a)(l )(A)(i) each individual likely to have discoverable information supporting its claims or defenses, unless solely for 
impeachment, identifying the subjects of the information; and 
(a)(l)(A)(ii) each fact witness the party may call in its case-in-chief and, except for an adverse party, a summary of the 
expected testimony; 
(a)(l)(B) a copy of all documents, data compilations, electronically stored infom1ation, and tangible things in the 
possession or control of the party that the party may offer in its case-in-chief, except charts, summaries and demonstrative 
exhibits that have not yet been prepared and must be disclosed in accordance with paragraph (a)(5); 
(a)(l)(C) a computation of any damages claimed and a copy of all discoverable documents or evidentiary material on 
which such computation is based, including materials about the nature and extent of injuries suffered; 
(a)(l)(D) a copy of any agreement under which any person may be liable to satisfy part or all of a judgment or to 
indemnify or reimburse for payments made to satisfy the judgment; and 
(a)(l)(E) a copy of all documents to which a party refers in its pleadings. 
(a)(2) Timing of initial disclosures. The disclosures required by paragraph (a)(l) shall be served on the other parties: 
(a)(2)(A) by the plaintiff within 14 days after filing of the first answer to the complaint; and 
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(a)(2)(B) by the defendant within 42 days after filing of the first answer to the complaint or within 28 days after that 
defendant's appearance, whichever is later. 
(a)(3) Exemptions. 
(a)(3)(A) Unless otherwise ordered by the court or agreed to by the parties, the requirements of paragraph (a)(l) do not 
apply to actions: 
(a)(3)(A)(i) for judicial review of adjudicative proceedings or rule making proceedings of an administrative agency; 
(a)(3)(A)(ii) governed by Rule 65B or Rule 65C; 
(a)(3)(A)(iii) to enforce an arbitration award; 
(a)(3)(A)(iv) for water rights general adjudication under Title 73, Chapter 4, Determination of Water Rights. 
(a)(3)(B) In an exempt action, the matters subject to disclosure under paragraph (a)(l) are subject to discovery under 
paragraph (b). 
(a)(4) Expert testimony. 
(a)( 4)(A) Disclosure of expert testimony. A party shall, without waiting for a discovery request, serve on the other parties 
the following information regarding any person who may be used at trial to present evidence under Rule 702 of the Utah 
Rules of Evidence and who is retained or specially employed to provide expert testimony in the case or whose duties as an 
employee of the party regularly involve giving expert testimony: (i) the expert's name and qualifications, including a list 
of all publications authored within the preceding IO years, and a list of any other cases in which the expert has testified 
as an expert at trial or by deposition within the preceding four years, (ii) a brief summary of the opinions to which the 
witness is expected to testify, (iii) all data and other infom1ation that will be relied upon by the witness in fonning those 
opinions, and (iv) the compensation to be paid for the witness's study and testimony. 
(a)(4)(B) Limits on expert discovery. Further discovery may be obtained from an expert witness either by deposition or 
by written report. A deposition shall not exceed four hours and the party taking the deposition shall pay the expert's 
reasonable hourly fees for attendance at the deposition. A report shall be signed by the expert and shall contain a complete 
statement of all opinions the expert will offer at trial and the basis and reasons for them. Such an expert may not testify 
in a party's case-in-chief concerning any matter not fairly disclosed in the report. The party offering the expert shall pay 
the costs for the report. 
(a)(4)(C) Timing for expert discovery. 
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(a)(4)(C)(i) The party who bears the burden of proof on the issue for which expert testimony is offered shall serve on 
the other parties the information required by paragraph (a)(4)(A) within seven days after the close of fact discovery. 
Within seven days thereafter, the party opposing the expert may serve notice electing either a deposition of the expert 
pursuant to paragraph (a)(4)(B) and Rule 30, or a written report pursuant to paragraph (a)(4)(B). The deposition shall 
occur, or the report shall be served on the other parties, within 28 days after the election is served on the other parties. 
If no election is served on the other parties, then no further discovery of the expert shall be permitted. 
(a)(4)(C)(ii) The party who does not bear the burden of proof on the issue for which expert testimony is offered shall 
serve on the other parties the information required by paragraph (a)(4)(A) within seven days after the later of (A) the 
date on which the election under paragraph (a)(4)(C)(i) is due, or (B) receipt of the written report or the taking of the 
expert's deposition pursuant to paragraph (a)(4)(C)(i). Within seven days thereafter, the party opposing the expert may 
serve notice electing either a deposition of the expert pursuant to paragraph (a)(4)(B) and Rule 30, or a written report 
pursuant to paragraph (a)(4)(B). The deposition shall occur, or the report shall be served on the other parties, within 28 
days after the election is served on the other parties. If no election is served on the other parties, then no further discovery 
of the expert shall be permitted. 
(a)( 4)(C)(iii) If the party who bears the burden of proof on an issue wants to designate rebuttal expert witnesses it shall 
serve on the other parties the infom1ation required by paragraph (a)(4)(A) within seven days after the later of (A) the 
date on which the election under paragraph (a)(4)(C)(ii) is due, or (B) receipt of the written report or the taking of the 
expert's deposition pursuant to paragraph (a)(4)(C)(ii). Within seven days thereafter, the party opposing the expert may 
serve notice electing either a deposition of the expert pursuant to paragraph (a)(4)(B) and Rule 30, or a written report 
pursuant to paragraph (a)(4)(B). The deposition shall occur, or the report shall be served on the other parties, within 28 
days after the election is served c n the other parties. If no election is served on the other parties, then no further discovery 
of the expert shall be permitted. 
(a)(4)(D) Multiparty actions. In multiparty actions, all parties opposing the expert must agree on either a report or a 
deposition. If all parties opposing the expert do not agree, then further discovery of the expert may be obtained only by 
deposition pursuant to paragraph (a)(4)(B) and Rule 30. 
(a)(4)(E) Summary of non-retained expert testimony. If a party intends to present evidence at trial under Rule 702 of the 
Utah Rules of Evidence from any person other than an expert witness who is retained or specially employed to provide 
testimony in the case or a person whose duties as an employee of the party regularly involve giving expert testimony, 
that party must serve on the other parties a written summary of the facts and opinions to which the witness is expected to 
testify in accordance with the deadlines set forth in paragraph (a)(4)(C). A deposition of such a witness may not exceed 
four hours. 
(a)(5) Pretrial disclosures. 
(a)(5)(A) A party shall, without waiting for a discovery request, serve on the other parties: 
(a)(5)(A)(i) the name and, if not previously provided, the address and telephone number of each witness, unless solely 
for impeachment, separately identifying witnesses the party will call and witnesses the party may call; 
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(a)(5)(A)(ii) the name of witnesses whose testimony is expected to be presented by transcript of a deposition and a copy 
of the transcript with the proposed testimony designated; and 
(a)(5)(A)(iii) a copy of each exhibit, including charts, summaries and demonstrative exhibits, unless solely for 
impeachment, separately identifying those which the party will offer and those which the party may offer. 
(a)(5)(B) Disclosure required by paragraph (a)(5) shall be served on the other parties at least 28 days before trial. At least 
14 days before trial, a party shall serve and file counter designations of deposition testimony, objections and grounds for 
the objections to the use of a deposition and to the admissibility of exhibits. Other than objections under Rules 402 and 
403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, objections not listed are waived unless excused by the court for good cause. 
(b) Discovery scope. 
(b)(l) In general. Parties may discover any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the claim or defense of any party 
if the discovery satisfies the standards of proportionality set forth below. Privileged matters that are not discoverable 
or admissible in any proceeding of any kind or character include all information in any form provided during and 
created specifically as part of a request for an investigation, the investigation, findings, or conclusions of peer review, 
care review, or quality assurance processes of any organization of health care providers as defined in the Utah Health 
Care Malpractice Act for the purpose of evaluating care provided to reduce morbidity and mortality or to improve the 
quality of medical care, or for the purpose of peer review of the ethics, competence, or professional conduct of any health 
care provider. 
(b )(2) Proportionality. Discovery and discovery requests are proportional if: 
(b)(2)(A) the discovery is reasonable, considering the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the complexity of the 
case, the parties' resources, the importance of the issues, and the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues; 
(b)(2)(B) the likely benefits of the proposed discovery outweigh the burden or expense; 
(b)(2)(C) the discovery is consistent with the overall case management and will further the just, speedy and inexpensive 
determination of the case; 
(b)(2)(D) the discovery is not unreasonably cumulative or duplicative; 
(b)(2)(E) the information cannot be obtained from another source that is more convenient, less burdensome or less 
expensive; and 
(b)(2)(F) the party seeking discovery has not had sufficient opportunity to obtain the information by discovery or 
otherwise, taking into account the parties' relative access to the information. 
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(b)(3) Burden. The party seeking discovery always has the burden of showing proportionality and relevance. To ensure 
proportionality, the court may enter orders under Rule 37. 
(b)(4) Electronically stored information. A party claiming that electronically stored information is not reasonably 
accessible because of undue burden or cost shall describe the source of the electronically stored information, the nature 
and extent of the burden, the nature of the information not provided, and any other information that will enable other 
parties to evaluate the claim. 
(b)(5) Trial preparation materials. A party may obtain otherwise discoverable documents and tangible things prepared 
in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party or by or for that other party's representative (including 
the party's attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent) only upon a showing that the party seeking 
discovery has substantial need of the materials and that the party is unable without undue hardship to obtain substantially 
equivalent materials by other means. In ordering discovery of such materials, the court shall protect against disclosure 
of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other representative of a party. 
(b)(6) Statement previously made about the action. A party may obtain without the showing required in paragraph (b) 
(5) a statement concerning the action or its subject matter previously made by that party. Upon request, a person not a 
party may obtain without the required showing a statement about the action or its subject matter previously made by 
that person. If the request is refused, the person may move for a court order under Rule 37. A statement previously made 
is (A) a written statement signed or approved by the person making it, or (B) a stenographic, mechanical, electronic, or 
other recording, or a transcription thereof, which is a substantially verbatim recital of an oral statement by the person 
making it and contemporaneously recorded. 
(b )(7) Trial preparation; experts. 
(b)(7)(A) Trial-preparation protection for draft reports or disclosures. Paragraph (b)(5) protects drafts of any report or 
disclosure required under paragraph (a)(4), regardless of the form in which the draft is recorded. 
(b)(7)(B) Trial-preparation protection for communications between a party's attorney and expert witnesses. Paragraph 
(b)(5) protects communications between the party's attorney and any witness required to provide disclosures under 
paragraph (a)(4), regardless of the form of the communications, except to the extent that the communications: 
(b)(7)(B)(i) relate to compensation for the expert's study or testimony; 
(b )(7)(B)(ii) identify facts or data that the party's attorney provided and that the expert considered in forming the opinions 
to be expressed; or 
(b)(7)(B)(iii) identify assumptions that the party's attorney provided and that the expert relied on in forn1ing the opinions 
to be expressed. 
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(b)(7)(C) Expert employed only for trial preparation. Ordinarily, a party may not, by interrogatories or otherwise, 
discover facts known or opinions held by an expert who has been retained or specially employed by another party in 
anticipation of litigation or to prepare for trial and who is not expected to be called as a witness at trial. A party may 
do so only: 
(b)(7)(C)(i) as provided in Rule 35(b); or 
(b )(7)(C)(ii) on showing exceptional circumstances under which it is impracticable for the party to obtain facts or opinions 
on the same subject by other means. 
(b)(8) Claims of privilege or protection of trial preparation materials. 
(b )(8)(A) Information withheld. If a party withholds discoverable information by claiming that it is privileged or prepared 
in anticipation of litigation or for trial, the party shall make the claim expressly and shall describe the nature of the 
documents, communications, or things not produced in a manner that, without revealing the information itself, will 
enable other parties to evaluate the claim. 
(b)(8)(B) Information produced. If a party produces infom1ation that the party claims is privileged or prepared in 
anticipation of litigation or for trial, the producing party may notify any receiving party of the claim and the basis for 
it. After being notified, a receiving party must promptly return, sequester, or destroy the specified information and any 
copies it has and may not use or disclose the information until the claim is resolved. A receiving party may promptly 
present the information to the court under seal for a determination of the claim. If the receiving party disclosed the 
information before being notified, it must take reasonable steps to retrieve it. The producing party must preserve the 
information until the claim is resolved. 
(c) Methods, sequence and timing of discovery; tiers; limits on standard discovery; extraordinary discovery. 
(c)(l) Methods of discovery. Parties may obtain discovery by one or more of the following methods: depositions upon oral 
examination or written questions; written interrogatories; production of documents or things or permission to enter upon 
land or other property, for inspection and other purposes; physical and mental examinations; requests for admission; 
and subpoenas other than for a court hearing or trial. 
(c)(2) Sequence and timing of disco11ery. Methods of discovery may be used in any sequence, and the fact that a party 
is conducting discovery shall not delay any other party's discovery. Except for cases exempt under paragraph (a)(3), a 
party may not seek discovery from any source before that party's initial disclosure obligations are satisfied. 
(c)(3) Definition of tiers for standard discovery. Actions claiming $50,000 or less in damages are pem1itted standard 
discovery as described for Tier I. Actions claiming more than $50,000 and less than $300,000 in damages are permitted 
standard discovery as described for Tier 2. Actions claiming $300,000 or more in damages are permitted standard 
discovery as described for Tier 3. Absent an accompanying damage claim for more than $300,000, actions claiming non-
monetary relief are permitted standard discovery as described for Tier 2. 
WESTLAV/ © 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 6 
~ 
RULE 26. GENERAL PROVISIONS GOVERNING DISCLOSURE ... , UT R RCP Rule 26 
(c)(4) Definition of damages. For purposes of determining standard discovery, the amount of damages includes the total 
of all monetary damages sought (without duplication for alternative theories) by all parties in all claims for relief in the 
original pleadings. 
(c)(5) Limits on standard fact discovery. Standard fact discovery per side (plaintiffs collectively, defendants collectively, 
and third-party defendants collectively) in each tier is as follows. The days to complete standard fact discovery are 
calculated from the date the first defendant's first disclosure is due and do not include expert discovery under paragraphs 
(a)(4)(C) and (D). 
-. ......... __,,_.,_,_,..~,...--,-,- ,., ,,. ,,. - .. ~ ~---~ .. ,.~..,,.,,. .... ,.,. _._,_,,,,,, 
Tier Days 
to 
Total Rule 33 Rule 34 Rule 36 Complete 
Fact Interrogatories Requests Requests Standard 
Amount of Deposition including all for for Fact 
Damages Hours discrete subparts Production Admission Discovery 
S50,000 or 
less 3 0 5 5 120 
2 More than 
SS0,000 and 
less than 
S300,000 
or non-
monetary 
relief 15 to 10 10 180 
3 S300,000 or 
more 30 20 20 20 210 
(c)(6) Extraordinary discovery. To obtain discovery beyond the limits established in paragraph (c)(5), a party shall file: 
(c)(6)(A) before the close of standard discovery and after reaching the limits of standard discovery imposed by these 
rules, a stipulated statement that extraordinary discovery is necessary and proportional under paragraph (b)(2) and that 
each party has reviewed and approved a discovery budget; or 
(c)(6)(B) before the close of standard discovery and after reaching the limits of standard discovery imposed by these 
rules, a request for extraordinary discovery under Rule 37(a). 
( d) Requirements for disclosure or response; disclosure or response by an organization; failure to disclose; initial and 
supplemental disclosures and responses. 
(d)(l) A party shall make disclosures and responses to discovery based on the information then known or reasonably 
available to the party. 
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(d)(2) If the party providing disclosure or responding to discovery is a corporation, partnership, association, or 
governmental agency, the party shall act through one or more officers, directors, managing agents, or other persons, 
who shall make disclosures and responses to discovery based on the information then known or reasonably available 
to the party. 
(d)(3) A party is not excused from making disclosures or responses because the party has not completed investigating 
the case or because the party challenges the sufficiency of another party's disclosures or responses or because another 
party has not made disclosures or responses. 
(d)(4) If a party fails to disclose or to supplement timely a disclosure or response to discovery, that party may not use 
the undisclosed witness, document or material at any hearing or trial unless the failure is harmless or the party shows 
good cause for the failure. 
(d)(S) If a party learns that a disclosure or response is incomplete or incorrect in some important way, the party must 
timely serve on the other parties the additional or correct information if it has not been made known to the other 
parties. The supplemental disclosure or response must state why the additional or correct information was not previously 
provided. 
(e) Signing discovery requests, responses, and objections. Every disclosure, request for discovery, response to a request for 
discovery and objection to a request for discovery shall be in writing and signed by at least one attorney of record or 
by the party if the party is not represented. The signature of the attorney or party is a certification under Rule 11. If a 
request or response is not signed, the receiving party does not need to take any action with respect to it. If a certification 
is made in violation of the rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, may take any action authorized by 
Rule 11 or Rule 37(b). 
(f) Filing. Except as required by these rules or ordered by the court, a party shall not file with the court a disclosure, a 
request for discovery or a response to a request for discovery, but shall file only the certificate of service stating that the 
disclosure, request for discovery or response has been served on the other parties and the date of service. 
Credits 
[Effective May 2, 2005; amended effective November I, 2007; November 1, 2008; November 1, 2011; March 6, 2012; 
April 1, 2013; May 1, 2015.] 
Editors' Notes 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTES 
Disclosure requirements and timing. Rule 26(a)(l). The 2011 amendments seek to reduce discovery costs by requiring 
each party to produce, at an early stage in the case, and without a discovery request, all of the documents and physical 
evidence the party may offer in its case-in-chief and the names of witnesses the party may call in its case-in-chief, with 
a description of their expected testimony. In this respect, the amendments build on the initial disclosure requirements 
of the prior rules. In addition to the disclosures required by the prior version of Rule 26(a)( I), a party must disclose 
each fact witness the party may call in its case-in-chief and a summary of the witness's expected testimony, a copy of all 
documents the party may offer in its case-in-chief, and all documents to which a party refers in its pleadings. 
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Not all information will be known at the outset of a case. If discovery is serving its proper purpose, additional witnesses, 
documents, and other information will be identified. The scope and the level of detail required in the initial Rule 26(a)( I) 
disclosures should be viewed in light of this reality. A party is not required to interview every witness it ultimately may 
call at trial in order to provide a summary of the witness's expected testimony. As the information becomes known, it 
should be disclosed. No summaries are required for adverse parties, including management level employees of business 
entities, because opposing lawyers are unable to interview them and their testimony is available to their own counsel. 
For uncooperative or hostile witnesses any summary of expected testimony would necessarily be limited to the subject 
areas the witness is reasonably expected to testify about. For example, defense counsel may be unable to interview a 
treating physician, so the initial summary may only disclose that the witness will be questioned concerning the plaintifrs 
diagnosis, treatment and prognosis. After medical records have been obtained, the summary may be expanded or refined. 
Subject to the foregoing qualifications, the summary of the witness's expected testimony should be just that--a summary. 
The rule does not require prefiled testimony or detailed descriptions of everything a witness might say at trial. On the 
other hand, it requires more than the broad, conclusory statements that often were made under the prior version of Rule 
26(a)(l )(e.g., "The witness will testify about the events in question" or "The witness will testify on causation."). The 
intent of this requirement is to give the other side basic information concerning the subjects about which the witness is 
expected to testify at trial, so that the other side may determine the witness's relative importance in the case, whether 
the witness should be interviewed or deposed, and whether additional documents or information concerning the witness 
should be sought. This information is important because of the other discovery limits contained in the 2011 amendments, 
particularly the limits on depositions. 
Likewise, the documents that should be provided as part of the Rule 26(a)(l) disclosures are those that a party reasonably 
believes it may use at trial, understanding that not all documents will be available at the outset of a case. In this regard, it is 
important to remember that the duty to provide documents and witness inforn1ation is a continuing one, and disclosures 
must be promptly supplementl!d as new evidence and witnesses become known as the case progresses. 
The amendments also require parties to provide more information about damages early in the case. Too often, the subject 
of damages is deferred until late in the case. Early disclosure of damages information is important. Among other things, 
it is a critical factor in determining proportionality. The committee recognizes that damages often require additional 
discovery, and typically are the subject of expert testimony. The Rule is not intended to require expert disclosures at the 
outset of a case. At the same time, the subject of damages should not simply be deferred until expert discovery. Parties 
should make a good faith attempt to compute damages to the extent it is possible to do so and must in any event provide 
all discoverable information on the subject, including materials related to the nature and extent of the damages. 
The penalty for failing to make timely disclosures is that the evidence may not be used in the party's case-in-chief. To make 
the disclosure requirement meaningful, and to discourage sandbagging, parties must know that if they fail to disclose 
important information that is helpful to their case, they will not be able to use that information at trial. The courts will 
be expected to enforce them unless the failure is harmless or the party shows good cause for the failure. 
The 2011 amendments also change the time for making these required disclosures. Because the plaintiff controls when 
it brings the action, plaintiffs must make their disclosures within 14 days after service of the first answer. A defendant is 
required to make its disclosures within 28 days after the plaintiffs first disclosure or after that defendant's appearance, 
whichever is later. The purpose of early disclosure is to have all parties present the evidence they expect to use to prove 
their claims or defenses, thereby giving the opposing party the ability to better evaluate the case and determine what 
additional discovery is necessary and proportional. 
The time periods for making Rule 26(a)(l) disclosures, and the presumptive deadlines for completing fact discovery, are 
keyed to the filing of an answer. If a defendant files a motion to dismiss or other Rule 12(b) motion in lieu ofan answer, 
these time periods normally would be not begin to run until that motion is resolved. 
WESTLAW @ 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 9 
RULE 26. GENERAL PROVISIONS GOVERNING DISCLOSURE ... , UT R RCP Rule 26 
Finally, the 2011 amendments eliminate two categories of actions that previously were exempt from the mandatory 
disclosure requirements. Specifically, the amendments eliminate the prior exemption for contract actions in which the 
amount claimed is $20,000 or less, and actions in which any party is proceeding pro se. In the committee's view, these 
types of actions will benefit from the early disclosure requirements and the overall reduced cost of discovery. 
Expert disclosures and timing. Rule 26(a)(3). Expert discovery has become an ever-increasing component of discovery 
cost. The prior rules sought to eliminate some of these costs by requiring the written disclosure of the expert's opinions 
and other background information. However, because the expert was not required to sign these disclosures, and because 
experts often were allowed to deviate from the opinions disclosed, attorneys typically would take the expert's deposition 
to ensure the expert would not offer "surprise" testimony at trial, thereby increasing rather than decreasing the overall 
cost. The amendments seek to remedy this and other costs associated with expert discovery by, among other things, 
allowing the opponent to choose either a deposition of the expert or a written report, but not both; in the case of 
written reports, requiring more comprehensive disclosures, signed by the expert, and making clear that experts will not 
be allowed to testify beyond what is fairly disclosed in a report, all with the goal of making reports a reliable substitute 
for depositions; and incorporating a rule that protects from discovery most communications between an attorney and 
retained expert. Discovery of expert opinions and testimony is automatic under Rule 26(a)(3) and parties are not required 
to serve interrogatories or use other discovery devices to obtain this information. 
Disclosures of expert testimony are made in sequence, with the party who bears the burden of proof on the issue for 
which expert testimony will be offered going first. Within seven days after the close of fact discovery, that party must 
disclose: (i) the expert's curriculum vitae identifying the expert's qualifications, publications, and prior testimony; (ii) 
compensation information; (iii) a brief summary of the opinions the expert will offer; and (iv) a complete copy of the 
expert's file for the case. The file should include all of the facts and data that the expert has relied upon in forming the 
expert's opinions. If the expert has prepared summaries of data, spreadsheets, charts, tables, or similar materials, they 
should be included. If the expert has used software programs to make calculations or otherwise summarize or organize 
data, that information and underlying formulas should be provided in native form so it can be analyzed and understood. 
To the extent the expert is relying on depositions or materials produced in discovery, then a list of the specific materials 
relied upon is sufficient. The committee recognizes that experts frequently will prepare demonstrative exhibits or other 
aids to illustrate the expert's testimony at trial, and the costs for preparing these materials can be substantial. For that 
reason, these types of demonstrative aids may be prepared and disclosed later, as part of the Rule 26(a)(4) pretrial 
disclosures when trial is imminent. 
Within seven days after this disclosure, the party opposing the retained expert may elect either a deposition or a written 
report from the expert. A deposition is limited to four hours, which is not included in the deposition hours under Rule 
26(c)(5), and the party taking it must pay the expert's hourly fee for attending the deposition. If a party elects a written 
report, the expert must provide a signed report containing a complete statement of all opinions the expert will express 
and the basis and reasons for them. The intent is not to require a verbatim transcript of exactly what the expert will say 
at trial; instead the expert must fairly disclose the substance of and basis for each opinion the expert will offer. The expert 
may not testify in a party's case in chief concerning any matter that is not fairly disclosed in the report. To achieve the goal 
of making reports a reliable substitute for depositions, courts are expected to enforce this requirement. If a party elects 
a deposition, rather than a report, it is up to the party to ask the necessary questions to "lock in" the expert's testimony. 
But the expert is expected to be fully prepared on all aspects of his/her trial testimony at the time of the deposition and 
may not leave the door open for additional testimony by qualifying answers to deposition questions. 
The report or deposition must be completed within 28 days after the election is made. After this, the party who does 
not bear the burden of proof on the issue for which expert testimony is offered must make its corresponding disclosures 
and the opposing party may then elect either a deposition or a written report. Under the deadlines contained in the 
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rules, expert discovery should take less than three months to complete. However, as with the other discovery rules, these 
deadlines can be altered by stipulation of the parties or order of the court. 
The amendments also address the issue of testimony from non-retained experts, such as treating physicians, police 
officers, or employees with special expertise, who are not retained or specially employed to provide expert testimony, or 
whose duties as an employee do not regularly involve giving expert testimony. This issue was addressed by the Supreme 
Court in Drew v. Lee, 2011 UT 15, wherein the court held that reports under the prior version of Rule 26(a)(3) are not 
required for treating physicians. 
There are a number of difficulties inherent in disclosing expert testimony that may be offered from fact witnesses. First, 
there is often not a clear line between fact and expert testimony. Many fact witnesses have scientific, technical or other 
specialized knowledge, and their testimony about the events in question often will cross into the area of expert testimony. 
The rules are not intended to erect artificial barriers to the admissibility of such testimony. Second, many of these 
fact witnesses will not be within the control of the party who plans to call them at trial. These witnesses may not be 
cooperative, and may not be willing to discuss opinions they have with counsel. Where this is the case, disclosures will 
necessarily be more limited. On the other hand, consistent with the overall purpose of the 2011 amendments, a party 
should receive advance notice if their opponent will solicit expert opinions from a particular witness so they can plan their 
case accordingly. In an effort to strike an appropriate balance, the rules require that such witnesses be identified and the 
information about their anticipated testimony should include that which is required under Rule 26(a)(l)(A)(ii), which 
should include any opinion testimony that a party expects to elicit from them at trial. If a party has disclosed possible 
opinion testimony in its Rule 26(a)(l)(A)(ii) disclosures, that party is not required to prepare a separate Rule 26(a)(4)(E) 
disclosure for the witness. And if that disclosure is made in advance of the witness's deposition, those opinions should be 
explored in the deposition and not in a separate expert deposition. Otherwise, the timing for disclosure e of non-retained 
expert opinions is the same as that for retained experts under Rule 26(a)(4)(C) and depends on whether the party has the 
burden of proof or is responding to another expert. Rules 26(a)(4)(E) and 26(a)(l)(A)(ii) are not intended to elevate form 
over substance--all they require is that a party fairly inform its opponent that opinion testimony may be offered from a 
particular witness. And because a party who expects to offer this testimony normally cannot compel such a witness to 
prepare a written report, further discovery must be done by interview or by deposition. 
Finally, the amendments include a new Rule 26(b)(7) that protects from discovery draft expert reports and, with limited 
exception, communications between an attorney and an expert. These changes are modeled after the recent changes to 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and are intended to address the unnecessary and costly procedures that often were 
employed in order to protect such information from discovery, and to reduce "satellite litigation" over such issues. 
Scope of discovery-Proportionality. Rule 26(b). Proportionality is the principle governing the scope of discovery. Simply 
stated, it means that the cost of discovery should be proportional to what is at stake in the litigation. 
In the past, the scope of discovery was governed by "relevance" or the "likelihood to lead to discovery of admissible 
evidence." These broad standards may have secured just results by allowing a party to discover all facts relevant to the 
litigation. However, they did little to advance two equally important objectives of the rules of civil procedure--the speedy 
and inexpensive resolution of every action. Accordingly, the former standards governing the scope of discovery have 
been replaced with the proportionality standards in subpart (b)(l). 
The concept of proportionality is not new. The prior rule permitted the Court to limit discovery methods if it determined 
that "the discovery was unduly burdensome or expensive, taking into account the needs of the case, the amount in 
controversy, limitations on the parties' resources, and the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation." The Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure contains a similar provision. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C). This method oflimiting discovery, 
however, was rarely invoked either under the Utah rules or federal rules. 
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Under the prior rule, the party objecting to the discovery request had the burden of proving that a discovery request 
was not proportional. The new rule changes the burden of proof. Today, the party seeking discovery beyond the scope 
of '"standard" discovery has the burden of showing that the request is •·relevant to the claim or defense of any party" 
and that the request satisfies the standards of proportionality. As before, ultimate admissibility is not an appropriate 
objection to a discovery request so long as the proportionality standard and other requirements are met. 
The 2011 amendments establish three tiers of standard discovery in Rule 26(c). Ideally, rules of procedure should be 
crafted to promote predictability for litigants. Rules should limit the need to resort to judicial oversight. Tiered standard 
discovery seeks to achieve these ends. The "one-size-fits-all" system is rejected. Tiered discovery signals to judges, 
attorneys, and parties the amount of discovery which by rule is deemed proportional for cases with different amounts 
in controversy. 
Any system of rules which permits the facts and circumstances of each case to inform procedure cannot eliminate 
uncertainty. Ultimately, the trial court has broad discretion in deciding whether a discovery request is proportional. The 
proportionality standards in subpart (b)(2) and the discovery tiers in subpart (c) mitigate uncertainty by guiding that 
discretion. The proper application of the proportionality standards will be defined over time by trial and appellate courts. 
Standard and extraordinary discovery. Rule 26(c). As a counterpart to requiring more detailed disclosures under Rule 
26(a), the 2011 amendments place new limitations on additional discovery the parties may conduct. Because the 
committee expects the enhanced disclosure requirements will automatically permit each party to learn the witnesses and 
evidence the opposing side will off er in its case-in-chief, additional discovery should serve the more limited function of 
permitting parties to find witnesses, documents, and other evidentiary materials that are ham1ful, rather than helpful, 
to the opponent's case. 
Rule 26(c) provides for three separate "tiers" of limited, "standard" discovery that are presumed to be proportional to 
the amount and issues in controversy in the action, and that the parties may conduct as a matter ofright. An aggregation 
of all damages sought by all parties in an action dictates the applicable tier of standard discovery, whether such damages 
are sought by way of a complaint, counterclaim, or otherwise. The tiers of standard discovery are set forth in a chart that 
is embedded in the body of the rule itself. "Tier 1" describes a minimal amount of standard discovery that is presumed 
proportional for cases involving damages of $50,000 or less. "Tier 2" sets forth larger limits on standard discovery that 
are applicable in cases involving damages above $50,000 but less than $300,000. Finally, "Tier 3" prescribes still greater 
standard discovery for actions involving damages in excess of $300,000. Deposition hours are charged to a side for the 
time spent asking questions of the witness. In a particular deposition, one side may use two hours while the other side 
uses only 30 minutes. The tiers also provide presumptive limitations on the time within which standard discovery should 
be completed, which limitations similarly increase with the amount of damages at issue. A statement of discovery issues 
will not toll the period. Parties are expected to be reasonable and accomplish as much as they can during standard 
discovery. A statement of discovery issues may result in additional discovery and sanctions at the expense of a party who 
unreasonably fails to respond or otherwise frustrates discovery. After the expiration of the applicable time limitation, 
a case is presumed to be ready for trial. Actions for non-monetary relief, such as injunctive relief, are subject to the 
standard discovery limitations of Tier 2, absent an accompanying monetary claim of $300,000 or more, in which case 
Tier 3 applies. The committee determined these standard discovery limitations based on the expectation that for the 
majority of cases filed in the Utah State Courts, the magnitude of available discovery and applicable time parameters 
available under the three-tiered system should be sufficient for cases involving the respective amounts of damages. 
Despite the expectation that standard discovery according to the applicable tier should be adequate in the typical case, the 
201 I amendments contemplate there will be some cases for which standard discovery is not sufficient or appropriate. In 
such cases, parties may conduct additional discovery that is shown to be consistent with the principle of proportionality. 
There are two ways to obtain such additional discovery. The first is by stipulation. If the parties can agree additional 
discovery is necessary, they may stipulate to as much additional discovery as they desire, provided they stipulate the 
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additional discovery is proportional to what is at stake in the litigation and counsel for each party certifies that the party 
has reviewed and approved a budget for additional discovery. Such a stipulation should be filed before the close of the 
standard discovery time limit, but only after reaching the limits for that type of standard discovery available under the 
rule. If these conditions are met, the Court will not second-guess the parties and their counsel and must approve the 
stipulation. 
The second method to obtain additional discovery is by a statement of discovery issues. The committee recognizes 
there will be some cases in which additional discovery is appropriate, but the parties cannot agree to the scope of such 
additional discovery. These may include, among other categories, large and factually complex cases and cases in which 
there is a significant disparity in the parties' access to information, such that one party legitimately has a greater need 
than the other party for additional discovery in order to prepare properly for trial. To prevent a party from taking 
advantage of this situation, the 2011 amendments allow any party to request additional discovery. As with stipulations 
for extraordinary discovery, a party requesting extraordinary discovery should do so before the close of the standard 
discovery time limit, but only after the party has reached the limits for that type of standard discovery available to 
it under the rule. By taking advantage of this discovery, counsel should be better equipped to articulate for the court 
what additional discovery is needed and why. The requesting party must demonstrate that the additional discovery is 
proportional and certify that the party has reviewed and approved a discovery budget. The burden to show the need 
for additional discovery, and to demonstrate relevance and proportionality, always falls on the party seeking additional 
discovery. However, cases in which such additional discovery is appropriate do exist, and it is important for courts to 
recognize they can and should permit additional discovery in appropriate cases, commensurate with the complexity and 
magnitude of the dispute. 
Protective order language moved to Rule 37. The 2011 amendments delete in its entirety the prior language of Rule 
26(c) governing motions for protective orders. The substance of that language is now found in Rule 37. The committee 
determined it was preferable to cover requests for an order to compel, for a protective order, and sanctions in a single 
rule, rather than two separate rules. 
Consequences of failure to disclose. Rule 26(d). If a party fails to disclose or to supplement timely its discovery responses, 
that party cannot use the undisclosed witness, document, or material at any hearing or trial, absent proof that non-
disclosure was harmless or justified by good cause. More complete disclosures increase the likelihood that the case will 
be resolved justly, speedily, and inexpensively. Not being able to use evidence that a party fails properly to disclose 
provides a powerful incentive to make complete disclosures. This is true only if trial courts hold parties to this standard. 
Accordingly, although a trial court retains discretion to determine how properly to address this issue in a given case, the 
usual and expected result should be exclusion of the evidence. 
LEGISLATIVE NOTE 
(1) The amended language in paragraph (b)(l) is intended to incorporate long-standing protections against discovery 
and admission into evidence of privileged matters connected to medical care review and peer review into the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. These privileges, found in both Utah common law and statute, include Sections 26-25-3, 58-13-4, 
and 58-13-5, UCA, 1953. The language is intended to ensure the confidentiality of peer review, care review, and quality 
assurance processes and to ensure that the privilege is limited only to documents and infom1ation created specifically 
as part of the processes. It does not extend to knowledge gained or documents created outside or independent of the 
processes. The language is not intended to limit the court's existing ability, if it chooses, to review contested documents 
in camera in order to determine whether the documents fall within the privilege. The language is not intended to alter 
any existing law, rule, or regulation relating to the confidentiality, admissibility, or disclosure of proceedings before the 
Utah Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing. The Legislature intends that these privileges apply to all 
pending and future proceedings governed by court rules, including administrative proceedings regarding licensing and 
reimbursement. 
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(2) The Legislature does not intend that the amendments to this rule be construed to change or alter a final order 
concerning discovery matters entered on or before the effective date of this amendment. 
(3) The Legislature intends to give the greatest effect to its amendment, as legally permissible, in matters that are pending 
on or may arise after the effective date of this amendment, without regard to when the case was filed. 
Notes of Decisions (225) 
Rules Civ. Proc., Rule 26, UT R RCP Rule 26 
Current with amendments received through September 1, 2017 
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